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Summary 
Mozambique is undergoing intensive socio-economic reforms to reconstruct war 
damages and develop the nation. The reforms consist of economic liberalisation through 
structural adjustment and monetarist economic stabilisation, e.g. government withdrawal 
from economic activities, privatisation, deregulation, reduction of tariff levels on imports 
and tax on investments, cuts of expenditure on social services, restrictive credit system, 
focus on monetarism, increased taxation on individual income, etc. The nature of these 
reforms, on the surface, leads to morally questionable conditions. There is social chaos 
and disintegration, high indices of corruption, subtle recolonisation, decline of civil 
services, etc. At the bottom lie the market ethics and fundamentalist theological 
discourse by dint of which the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund deny 
historical consciousness, lack institutional memory, vest themselves with unquestionable 
international authority, dictate and impose policies without accountability for the social 
consequences. If there is any hope for Mozambicans, it lies in development ethics which 
relies heavily on the liberation motif, historical consciousness, and African Heritage. 
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Chapter One 
Prolegomena 
1.1 Mogambique: Geographical Situation 
Mozambique is situated in the Southeast of Africa, covering 799 390 Km2 of land. It 
stretches from the North down to the South with the widest width of 962% Km (from 
Mossuril peninsula to the marks of the first border in the confluence of Aruangua and 
Zambeze rivers), and the narrowest width of 45% Km (from Sivayana, Southern 
Namaacha to Catembe, Alto-farol). It has firm land of 786 380 Km2 and internal waters 
of 13 000 Mk2 . The coastal length stretches for 2 515 Km from Rovuma to Ponta Douro. 
Mozambique is bordered by South Africa and Swaziland in the South, Tanzania and 
Malawi in the North, Zimbabwe and Zambia in the West, and watered by the Indian 
Ocean from up North down South. It has a population of about 17 423 200 inhabitants 
of whom 48Y2 per cent are men and 51 Yi are women (Anuario Estatistico, INE 1995:7). 
1.2 Defining the Problem and Thesis 
After ten years of a revolutionary armed struggle for liberation, Mozambique was 
unconditionally declared independent on 25 June 1975. The independence event was 
followed by a golden but short period of socialism. Following this period, Mozambique 
became a battleground of both civil and cold wars for sixteen years. Financed by 
Western powers and the Apartheid regime of South Africa, the civil war was aimed at 
sabotaging and destabilising the country and thereby undermining the then existing 
FRELIMO political government. The civil war, or rather the war of destabilisation, was 
successfully orchestrated. It literally brought Mozambique down to its knees. Economic 
activity, especially in rural areas, was completely halted. National infrastructures and 
patrimony were completely destroyed. The social and moral fibre of Mozambican society 
was dramatically destroyed. By the end of the war more than a million people had died, 
either brutally massacred by Rename or killed in the cross fire. The socio-economic 
crisis was frightening. Poverty was severe, with people living in squalid shantytowns 
around urban areas. The inflation rate was skyrocketing. The country was rich in lack of 
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capital. Foreign debt was climbing up daily as more and more loans were granted and 
never re-paid, and interest was piling up monthly on unpaid capital and interest. Besides 
the spiralling debt, there were strenuous international economic pressures. 
A General Peace Agreement was signed on October 4, 1992, in Santo Egidio, Rome, 
Italy. Following this, the Government embarked on intensive economic reforms in the 
quest for reconstruction and development. Some of these economic reforms had been 
introduced in 1987 and subsequent years under the name of Programa de Reabilita9ao 
Econ6mica (Economic Rehabilitation Programme) -PRE. These reforms were, however, 
intensified and made more aggressive, more savage, and wilder after the peace 
agreement. Since the country was held under the grip of a foreign debt trap, it was easy 
for the international economic institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank) 
and donor community (through Non-Governmental Organisations) to impose trade and 
economic policies and conditions (structural adjustment programmes and economic 
stabilisation) favourable to their interests and coerce the Government to believe and 
abide by them. These included economic deregulation and liberalisation, withdrawal of 
the Government from economic activity, reduction of tariff levels on imports, deflation of 
tax rates on investments, etc. All these were done under the name of economic 
liberalisation. Left with no other alternative, the Government succumbed to this "free 
market" capitalism. The result is that Mozambique is now opened up to foreign abuse 
and made vulnerable to the exploitative power of Western capital. Therefore there is a 
paradoxical condition on the surface. There is (1) economic growth, but (2) there is no 
reconstruction of war damages and development at all1. 
In view of the situation described above, this dissertation intends to do three things. 
First, we shall diagnose the Mozambican socio-economic crisis. Second, we shall 
discuss the policies prescribed to remedy this crisis. Third, we shall summon ethics to 
critically place such policy prescriptions under an evaluative framework to see if they do 
measure up to ethically acceptable social criteria. 
0 
1 The floods of February and cyclones of February 2000 accentuated the Mozambican crisis. 
Where there was any sign of hope and life, the floods and cyclones passed through, sowing 
despair, death, misery and hunger. The flood/cyclone damages have not yet been calculated. 
However, it is clear that, economically, Mozambique will have to start from scratch and build 
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By way of historical retrieval, we shall diagnose the socio-economic conditions of 
Mozambique under the Portuguese colonial regime, and the dynamics of the war of 
destabilisation. By so doing we shall bring to the surface the "development of 
underdevelopment" wrought by the colonial economic system and the war of 
destabilisation. Our main argument here will be twofold: (1) Portugal enriched itself at 
the expense of Mozambique, that is, as an economy, Mozambique fed instead of 
competed with Portuguese economy; (2) Mozambique became the cold war 
battleground in a bi-polar world system, where the conservative right wing was at pains 
to contain Frelimo's communist tendencies in order to promote private interests. This 
historical retrieval is necessary to explain the reasons for commending or refuting the 
socio-economic policies currently at work. 
We shall discuss the government's passive and oppressive role, its National 
Reconstruction Plan (NRP), and the socio-economic policies themselves as imposed by 
the international economic powers: the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF}, and the donor community working hand in glove with international Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Drawing from the resulting socio-economic 
conditions, we shall draw our conclusions. 
When all is said and done, we shall endeavour to show that the problem we are dealing 
with here is socio-ethical. For if we are sane people, then, we should agree that after the 
colonial plunder and destabilising war reconstruction and development should inter a/ia: 
(a) re-establish security of livelihood among the poorest, 
(b) make health care and basic education accessible to the poor, 
(c) reduce vulnerability to future disasters, 
(d) restart the local economy in a sustainable fashion, 
(e) avoid dependence and make life most wholesome and worth living, 
(f) and do so within ethically acceptable social criteria, 
Considering all these aspects, the dissertation asserts that there is no serious concern 
or desire, let alone commitment, for truly human reconstruction and development on the 
part of the belligerent groups and institutions acting in the economy. 
new infrastructures to replace those that were washed away or damaged. As though that were 
not enough, the Mozambican government does not have the capacity to manage the situation. 
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The real and final objectives of all efforts toward socio-economic transformation seem to 
be: (1) to further disintegrate Mozambican society, (2) turn Mozambicans into prisoners 
of the earth for exploitation, (3) re-institutionalise socio-economic enslavement to re-
colonise the country so as to feed Western economies, (4) create a climate favourable 
to importing dirty Western industry, and (5) forge a brand new market for Western 
luxurious consumer goods, seeing that these goods find no market any more in the 
already saturated Western markets. These conditions are immoral. Part of the reason 
for all this is the dearth of ethics or the use of highly suspect ethics: market ethics. 
The dissertation will show that these immoral circumstances emanate from the socio-
ethically-flawed ethic underpinning the socio-economic transformation currently at work 
in Mozambique. Put in other words, the present reconstruction and development 
programmes are built upon socio-ethically-perverted foundations. 
In the light of this socio-ethical perspective we shall see that despite the registered 
economic growth, there has been no reconstruction and development. The living 
conditions have not been improving for the majority of the population. In fact, contrary 
to the claims of free marketers, livelihoods of more than 70 per cent of the population 
have been deteriorating since 1992. I shall now and then use statistical data. However, 
the major and final concern of the study is real people on the face of the earth, living 
real earthly lives. It is about people walking and wandering like lost sheep on town 
streets, on narrow ways in bush-lands, battling daily with hunger, pain, diseases, crime 
and death, wondering which way to turn this time, and wondering where their next daily 
bread will come from. The ultimate focus of the study is historical and material. In other 
words, I am interested in people on their different subsistence occupations, who live and 
work within historically and socially defined realms. 
This socio-ethical perspective will help us analyse the ethic of the adopted development 
alternative. The participant actors in the economy follow a development ethic that 
fosters heavy reliance on foreign capital. It is the kind of development ethic that is 
intensively pro-capital and anti-labour, pro-big and anti-small in nature. It is also 
inordinately export-oriented, relying on primary products. The dissertation is concerned 
with the ethical aspect of these development processes currently at work. It addresses 
itself to the moral aspects of the social circumstances created by the current economic 
OPAGE 040 
policies in the national economy. The current socio-economic processes in Mozambique 
are shot through with controversial ethical commitments. 
In the end, we shall recommend a national development and reconstruction programme 
which is in line with Africa's aspirations, and which does no violence to African 
understanding of the concept of life. We shall argue that unless our development ethics 
emanates from our traditional African heritage, e.g. the wholeness of life, sense of 
community or ubuntu, to say the least, we shall be sinking ourselves into something less 
than life. This socio-ethical perspective will help us analyse the ethic of the adopted 
development alternative. The participant actors in the economy follow a development 
ethic that fosters heavy reliance on foreign capital. It is the kind of development 
The study is also socio-ethical in that it diagnoses value conflicts, assesses the actually 
imposed policies, justifies or refutes valuations placed on reconstruction and 
development performance in the contemporary Mozambique. The ultimate question of 
ethics in this study is whether current socio-economic transformations in Mozambique 
do or do not provide all Mozambicans with a better human life, life most wholesome, life 
worth living, and social arrangements that provide them with a widening range of 
choices for them to seek the common and individual good. The study draws from ethics 
to legitimise or debunk development actions and measures, implicating belligerent 
economic actors-individuals, groups, and institutions-for their (anti-)social activities in 
our society. 
1.3 Method of Approach 
The methodological approach is in line with the nature and content of the discipline of 
the dissertation, namely development ethics. Development ethics is eclectic in nature 
and interdisciplinary in content. This is because development ethics chooses freely and 
easily from other sciences: sociology, economics, political economy, philosophy, history, 
anthropology, ethics, theology, etc., and it does so eclectically. Ethics places each 
discipline's concept of development under an evaluative framework wherein 
development means ultimately the quality of life and society's progress towards values 
expressed in that society. One compelling assumption here is that there is no society 
devoid of social, economic, political, and historical awareness. 
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The dissertation is analytical in two aspects. First, it analyses the social and economic 
conditions of the people of Mozambique in the context of development and 
reconstruction. Mozambicans are social and economic beings and any study of their 
conditions should regard them accordingly. They progressively interact with each other 
and with other nationals, form social groups and institutions, define and redefine roles in 
society daily, in search of a better life. 
Ethics is summoned to critically question this aspect of development to see if it does 
measure up to ethically acceptable social criteria. In whatever eclectic choice of its 
subject, development must be geared toward creating a better human life and social 
circumstances that provide a widening range of choices for people to live dignified lives. 
Second, the study analyses political economy, the ways by dint of which 
Mozambicans-be they individuals, groups or institutions-manoeuvre and or 
institutionalise their individual or compounded interests, how they distribute the country's 
resources amongst themselves, and how they interact with foreign economic 
institutions. 
The study is critical. In view of the history of Mozambique, it criticises the socio-
economic policies at work, the modus operandi of the belligerent actors in the economy, 
and their underlying ethics. It questions the kind of society they seek to build and 
whether the socio-economic history of the people of Mozambique is being taken into 
account. Can Mozambicans be assured of meaningful development and reconstruction 
under present circumstances? Whose development and reconstruction? Is there socio-
economic justice? 
The study has an historical bearing in the sense that it deals with human phenomena in 
specific time (post-war) and space (Mozambique), aiming at making sense of such 
phenomena in view of future prospects of life. Further, the dissertation is historical in the 
sense that it views people as historical agents; they orchestrate their history. It 
categorically refuses to dehistoricise humanity. We refuse to take the status quo as 
divinely designed and blessed. We see it as a result of unjust historical processes 
orchestrated by human beings. As a people, Mozambicans have a history which, in the 
past, determined what we are today and, today, determines what tomorrow we shall be. 
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Besides I firmly believe, as Frank (1975:96) puts it, that "All serious study of the 
problems of development of underdeveloped areas and all serious intent to formulate 
policy for the elimination of underdevelopment and for the promotion of development 
must take into account, nay, must begin with, the fundamental historical and structural 
causes of underdevelopment in capitalism." If development will emanate from ethically 
acceptable social criteria, then, development ethicists ought to understand people, the 
agents who undergo development processes, as historical subjects and must regard 
them as such. 
The study is also evaluative. It evaluates, in moral terms, the causes of the current 
social circumstances and their respective socio-economic implications. Ethics is 
summoned to place all these aspects under an evaluative framework to determine if the 
present national development and reconstruction programme does measure up to 
ethically acceptable social criteria. Development must be geared toward creating a 
better human life and social circumstances that provide a widening range of choices for 
people to live dignified lives. 
Owing to different kinds of data examined in the study, the method of research will also 
be fluid and flexible. The method will swing between two poles: quantitative 
methodological analysis and qualitative methodological analysis. Macro-economic and 
social indicators, population censuses, socio-historical information, theological and 
ethical literatures-all these-will be part of the data incorporated in the study. I shall 
draw information from a diverse range of sources. 
1.4 Limitations 
There are limitations to this study. The available data can be misleading. Usually 
quantitative data, e.g. statistics, are not accurate. Inaccurate population census, for 
instance, has far reaching implications, such as inaccurate GDP or income per capita, 
inaccurate economic growth rate, inaccurate unemployment rate, etc. Qualitative data, 
e.g. socio-historical literature, may be inaccurate as well, giving an unrealistic picture of 
actuality. Both quantitative and qualitative data may be twisted to suit ideological 
intentions and opportunistic interests. This can be done consciously or unconsciously, 
intentionally or unintentionally, since what is written usually tells more about the writer-
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his/her culture, socio-economic status, and political affiliation-than it tells about what is 
written about. So it is with interviews. They are potentially capable of distorting reality. 
An interviewee, for instance, may fear to tell the truth 1; may express her/his frustrations 
and/or anger and therefore fail to be objective, fail to see or portray reality for what it 
truly is. 
Another limitation concerns social sciences in Mozambique. The social sciences-
including some humanities-are still in their embryonic stage within the Mozambican 
academic ranks. Another limitation concerns thick and unchecked bureaucracy which 
has proven to be very hard to penetrate along the years. All these are due to the 
colonial legacy characteristic of socio-economic and political distortions that we inherited 
from the Portuguese. This means that valuable information, at least for the present 
study, is scarce or not available in many cases. Hence under this condition it will be 
difficult to find information, especially one collected by Mozambicans themselves. 
Besides, a flexible method applied with the hope that it will render accurate results is 
also potentially fallacious. Greater profit is most likely to be realised where much has 
been invested or risked, but it is also there that a greater loss is most likely to be 
realised. 
Another far-reaching limitation is that NGO officials, donor consultants, and foreign 
researchers dominate the field of research, especially social research, in Mozambique2 . 
NGO officials research and write only to live up to their donor-masters' expectations and 
demands and thus make them happy. This way NGO officials increase their prestige 
back at home, secure funds for fun and pleasure, and thus have their jobs secured. So it 
is all about securing their jobs and pension funds, etc., and not about research per se. 
Donor consultants "research" and write only to build the empires of those who 
0 
1 
2 
One cannot be too outspoken in contemporary Mozambique. An assassin can be hired to 
assassinate an outspoken person for as cheap as 40 US dollars. This is how wicked our 
beloved country has become. 
These expatriates dominate the field of research because they are the ones who have the 
resources, time and means to do so. Mozambican intellectuals and academicians do not 
have these things. They face the problems of having been pushed to or below the poverty 
line by SAPs and EST, so they spend most of their time trying to make ends meet, looking 
for jobs other than their regular ones to compensate their regular incomes. Thus they are left 
with no time for research. That is why Dr Mazula (the rector of the Eduardo Mondlane 
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commission them, usually to recommend political concessions in favour of donors. To 
put it plainly, they write for money, and never for the sake of the truth and actuality for 
what it really is, let alone academic credibility and independence. Given the fact that 
today there is a market for everything, poverty has become a highly marketable 
commodity. So researchers look with great fascination at the plight of poverty in which 
Mozambicans are damned to live. They contemplate it with a sense of awe. For them it 
is a source of amusement and pleasure, and a subject for research and journal articles, 
which will generate them grants and contracts. It is quite. disgusting that the poverty 
of Mozambicans should be the source for gerierating and sustaining 
livelihoods of many Western people. Whatever has become/of their sense of shame and 
·, 
humanity? Furthermore, these researchers have a habit of removing knowledge from 
Mozambique. After researching, they take data and documentation back to their home 
countries, alienating Mozambicans from knowledge about themselves. Joe Hanlon has 
documented these practices so trenchantly in his Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots? 
(1992). 
Development ethics as a field of study is an embryonic discipline. Besides, it "straddles 
and overlaps, as it were, intellectual spaces occupied by multiple diagnostic, policy, and 
normative sciences" (Goulet 1995:xii). Certainly this enriches, but it also limits in many 
ways at the same time. Dealing with an issue of a multidisciplinary nature can be 
perplexing. A person can lose focus and thus depart from the proposed objective. A 
person can tend to dwell more on one or two aspects while doing injustice to the others. 
In addition, never before, it seems, has a study on ethics of any kind (development, 
social, economic, political, or theological) ever been done on Mozambican affairs by 
anyone, let alone by Mozambicans. This in itself is a powerful limitation, for I am left 
alone to stride where no one has ever stridden before. Ethics is a field of study 
unspoken of in Mozambican intellectual ranks. 
University) complained about the decline of research in Mozambique. With SAPs and EST 
"Mozambican intellectuals are faced with 'economic prostitution"', he said. 
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1.5 Theoretical Frame of Reference 
There are preliminary socio-ethical propositions and presuppositions that are formative 
and informative to this ethical treatise. These are the ethos upon which this study is 
grounded. They are our socio-ethical points of departure. They are the socio-ethical 
values that will be summoned to place the current socio-economic transformation under 
an evaluative framework. 
The study is grounded on Christian faith. However, to say this is not enough, for there 
are as many brands of Christianity as there are peoples and cultures in the world. So 
which one am I referring to? It is the Christian faith as gleaned through the lenses of the 
African Heritage. It is the Christian faith as understood and interpreted in an African 
worldview, tradition and culture. For Christianity in itself, if there is such a thing at all 
anyway, "is always a beggar seeking food and drink, cover and shelter from the 
cultures it encounters in its never-ending journeys and wanderings" (Mbiti in Maluleke 
1996:8). Our pioneers in African Theology have always observed and emphasised this 
point time and again: "Conversion to Christ (and therefore joining the church) does not 
mean that the individual or the community comes empty-handed into the church." 
Individuals and communities come into the faith with their languages, cultures, 
worldviews, social institutions and socio-ethical values. Ethicists, theologians, 
philosophers, etc. "are part and parcel of this traditional African World-it influences 
them directly or indirectly, and their [treatises] cannot ignore this fact" (Mbiti 1998:141-
142). For Jesus did not come for to abolish but to fulfil, to fill full, our sense of life. 
The African Heritage also forms and informs the study. I believe in African 
Heritage. I believe in the African mode of life. I believe in my Africanness. Naturally 
one needs not to explain it in as much as one needs not to explain one's blackness. I 
should point out that I do not venture into (re)building up an African value system. I 
believe it is there on its own right. I rather intend to underscore some vital aspects of 
the African Heritage upon and within which I dare to do ethics in this study. 
Some moral philosophers or ethicists and theologians deceive themselves. They profess 
to be holding pure Christian views. Consequently they also believe themselves to be 
writing and speaking universally. Rather, unlike those, we hereby solemnly acknowledge 
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and announce the formativity and informativity of our African Heritage in this ethical 
treatise. We know our problems. We know the causes. We know our audience. Not 
surprisingly we can speak appealingly and meaningfully to them. Our theoretical frame 
of reference will consist of the elements described in the following paragraphs. 
1. 5. 1 Wholeness of Life 
The wholeness of life is part and parcel of those African socio-ethical values which are 
characteristic of the African Heritage. In the African Heritage, life is all encompassing. 
In traditional African culture morality is understood in terms of the wholeness of life. 
Manas Buthelezi makes this very point when he says: "It has often rightly been said that 
the African has a sense of the wholeness of life" (1987:95). To illustrate this point let us 
consider the religiosity of an African. For an African all of life is religion and all of 
religion is life. As Buthelezi writes, "The traditional African religion was characterised by 
the motif of the wholeness of life. In fact, it is more correct to say that religion and life 
belong together" (1987:95). It is this sense of wholeness of life that makes traditional 
religion to have no boundaries in the life of an African. This is the point Mbiti is making 
when he explains: 
Because traditional religions permeate all the departments of life, there is no formal 
distinction between the sacred and the secular, between the religious and the non-
religious, between the spiritual and the material areas of life. Wherever the African is, 
there is his religion: he carries it to the field where he is sowing seed or harvesting a new 
crop, he takes it with him to the beer party or to attend a funeral ceremony; and if he is 
educated, he takes religion with him to the examination room at school or in the 
University; if he is a politician he takes it to the house of parliament (1975:2). 
The wholeness of life is not in effect at the time when the African is born, and ending 
when s/he dies. No, not at all. It is in effect even before s/he is born, and continues well 
after her/his death. Taking this theme further, Mbiti argues, "although many African 
languages do not have a word for religion as such, it nevertheless accompanies the 
individual from long before his birth to long after his physical death" (1975:2). 
By the same token Buthelezi writes, " ... everyone who participated in the life of the 
community automatically participated also in its religion. There was no separate day of 
worship because the whole rhythm of daily life was a continuous liturgy that permeated 
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such commonplace things as eating, drinking, love-making, etc." Buthelezi also 
contends that life for an African is "such a whole that not even death could disintegrate 
it .... death was not regarded as a point which marked the termination of fellowship 
among those who had [lived] in communion on this side of the grave" (1987:95-96). 
Mbiti (1998:154) rightly asserts that even Western "atheism can hardly find a home in 
Africa[1] and poses no immediate danger to Christianity." 
Within this theoretical framework of thought we fashion the ethic of this dissertation and 
argue that development must honour the sacramental character of life. Development 
must mean advancement towards the realisation of the wholeness of life. Any socio-
economic process that falls short of this sacramental quality is dross and therefore 
useless. Socio-ethically, this kind of development is unworthy of an African, for it 
diminishes her/him into something inferior and undesirable. As Dr Julius Nyerere points 
out, development should be "the creation of conditions, both material and spiritual, 
which enable man the individual, and man the species, to become his best" (1987:118). 
The ethical implication which emanates from the wholeness of life is that good life is not 
much about having more as it is about being more or whole. This constitutes a powerful 
challenge to the narrow Western ethics of materialism and greed. For human beings 
shall not live by bread alone. The point is, if social circumstances created by 
development inhibit or make it difficult for people to live wholesome lives, that is, to be 
more in life, then that development does not measure up to ethically acceptable social 
criteria. 
0 
1 This is particularly true in Mozambique. When Frelimo used the Marxist-Leninist ethos to 
sanction its rampant destruction of traditional life alleging modernisation, the people 
counteracted with strong resistance. This way Frelimo prepared a fertile ground and sowed 
seeds of hatred and rebellion. That is why in some areas Renamo could exploit this condition 
to its favour; legitimise its brutality with great easy, and the people's support. In order to do 
this, it was enough for Renamo to say to the people that it was waging the war of the gods 
against Frelimo. This is how deeply fond Mozambicans are of their traditional religion. Our 
religiosity has always been exploited for opportunistic self-interests. And in terms of the 
subject of our study pressing questions surface, some of which J. N. K. Mugambi asks: I 
have often raised the question as to how we can explain the apparent contradiction, that 
contemporary Africa continues to be, perhaps, the most 'religious' continent in the world, and 
yet its peoples remain the most abused of all history. How could it be that the peoples who 
continue to call on God most reverently are the ones that God seems to neglect most 
vehemently? Could it be that irreligion is the key to success, and that religion is the key to 
backwardness?" From Liberation to Reconstruction: African Christian Theology After the 
Cold War(1995:33). 
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1. 5. 2 Human Dignity 
There is something about human beings which qualifies them as inherently worthwhile. 
Human beings have an intrinsic value. They are valuable in their own right. In other 
words, they need no other extrinsic value to confer them value. Put differently, they are 
not valuable because there is some element outside human beings which gives them 
self-worth. In this framework of thought, we can therefore say that human beings have 
dignity. Dignity is that spark of the image of God that never disappears even though we 
have a fallen nature. Dignity is an inherent value of human beings and it is thus precisely 
because human beings are created in the image of God (Genesis 1 :27). As professor 
Hulley writes: 
I believe that dignity should be regarded as inherent, something which belongs to 
human beings solely because they are human beings. This dignity belongs to us 
because we are made in the divine image. [Therefore,] to ignore that dignity and 
create social conditions which make it difficult or impossible to be dignified, or to allow 
such conditions to come about as a result of neglect, then becomes an indictment of 
society. The kind of circumstances we seek to create for human society should be a 
reflection of what is proper for people who have inherent dignity to live in (Hulley 
1997:63). 
Buthelezi calls this dignity "the truth of man's creaturely relatedness to God." He also 
asserts that since we are people, we have the power to be. Thus he says: "To be man 
[sic] is to have power to be truly man [sic]" (1987:97). Development must open ways for 
people to live with dignity. That is why Dr Nyerere is convinced that the "purpose of 
development is man [sic]." For him, poverty, for instance, frustrates human dignity. He 
goes on to say: " ... to talk of the development of man [sic], and to work for the 
development of man [sic], must mean the development also of the kind of society which 
serves man, which enhances the well-being, and preserves his dignity" (Nyerere 
1987: 119). As he refuses vehemently that people should live Jn poverty and perpetuate 
the status quo, Nyerere points out that, 
We say man [sic] was created in the image of God. I refuse to imagine of a God who 
is poor, ignorant, superstitious, fearful, oppressed, wretched-which is the lot of the 
majority of those He created in His own image. Men [sic] are creators of themselves 
and their conditions, but under present conditions we are creatures, not of God, but of 
our fellow men [sic]" (1987: 119). 
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Nyerere asserts that under no circumstances should people create social conditions in 
which other people are impaired to live with dignity, as those being made in the image of 
God. Human dignity is taken seriously in this ethic. Development, if it is properly to be 
development, must create social circumstances in which people can live and express 
themselves with dignity. If development subjects human beings to humiliation, if it turns 
them into some other entities less and unworthy of themselves, then, such development 
can hardly measure up to ethically acceptable social criteria. This is the argument we 
will apply to the case of Mozambique. 
1. 5. 3 Sense of Community 
Contrary to Western peoples, who are best known for their rampant individualism, 
bellicose character and attitudes, Africans are traditionally known for their strong sense 
of community, togetherness, solidarity, and respect for life 1. This is truly socio-ethically 
acceptable for full human life. "To be human is to belong to the whole community" (Mbiti 
1975:2). Alan Boesak recalls that Motho ke motho ka batho babang. He rightly goes on 
to say "This age-old African proverb has its equivalent in almost all African languages, 
and its meaning is still as profound as ever; even more so: One is only human because 
of others, with others, for others" (1981: 152). John Mbiti has recently put it this way: 
"There are values associated with life in community, human harmony with nature and 
the departed members of family. The basic philosophy here is: 'I am because we are, 
and since I am therefore we are"' (1998:145). The ethical implication, of course, is that 
"[a] good deed increases the health of the community, and helps to build up the 
[community]; an evil deed tends toward the destruction of the community" (Bujo 
1992:23). This is so whether the deed is performed by an individual or by a corporate 
body of people. This is the African heritage that forms and informs the ethic cherished in 
this dissertation. This is the ethic summoned to diagnose and place the socio-economic 
processes currently at work in Mozambique under a critical evaluative framework to see 
if they do measure up to ethically acceptable social criteria. 
0 
1 Concerning the respect for life Benezet Buja, in his African Theology in Its Social Context 
(1992:22), observes rightly that, in traditional African religions, "[t]he morality of an act is 
determined by its life-giving potential: good acts are those which contribute to the 
community's vital force, whereas bad acts, however apparently significant, are those which 
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1. 5. 4 Liberation 
As a work born out of a situation of oppression and injustice, development ethics views 
development as liberation. A credible development ethic must identify with the forces of 
the liberation of the oppressed. In order to fulfil the task of liberation development ethics 
must do several things: be social in the fashion of historical materialism, be contextual, 
and take the situation of the poor and oppressed as its point of departure. In order to do 
these things, it must draw from Liberation Theology in its numerous brands: Latin-
American Liberation Theology, Black Theology (African and North American}, and 
Feminist Theology. 
1.5.4.1 Historical consciousness 
Development ethics is highly indebted to the Theology of Liberation on the aspect of 
historical consciousness. Theology of Liberation has always insisted that theological 
reflection and praxis emanate from the social context of the theologian. Liberation 
Theologians themselves are indebted to Feuerbach, Marx and Engels, from whom they 
borrowed this insight. Feuerbach, Marx and Engels pioneered the method of historical 
materialism, which argues that political and economic changes are the result of the 
economic, material conditions in which people find themselves, and that political 
changes are, as a matter of course, simply by-products of the material conditions of life. 
Social consciousness emanates from the material conditions in which people live. Marx 
wrote, 
The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual 
life process in general. It is not the consciousness of human beings that determines 
their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive 
forces of society came into conflict with the existing relations of production .... Then 
begins an epoch of social revolution (in Tucker, ed. 1978:4-5). 
Liberation theologians have taken this method of historical materialism and made a 
creative application of it in theology, bringing it to its logical conclusion: theology does 
not have an independent existence but it is from beginning to end a social product. 
tend to diminish life. [Community] is a real 'mystical body', encompassing both dead and the 
living members, in which every member has an obligation to every other [through good acts]." 
OPAGE 0150 
Theology begins with sense data. Perception, not conception, is the clue to reality or to 
God. In the light of historical materialism, James Cone writes: 
What people think about God cannot be divorced from their place and time in a 
definite history and culture. While God may exist in some heavenly city beyond time 
and space, human beings cannot transcend history. They are limited to the specificity 
of their finite nature. And even when theologians claim to point beyond history 
because of the possibility given by the Creator of history, the divine image disclosed 
in their language is shared by their place in time. Theology is subjective speech about 
God, a speech that tells us far more about the hopes and dreams of certain God-
talkers than about the Maker and Creator of heaven and earth (1975:41 ). 
This view of liberation theology, this method of historical materialism, inspires the ethic 
of this dissertation. The development ethic of this dissertation is not an ethic of 
independent-universal-impartial-eternal truth or knowledge. This ethic is inspired by the 
relativity of thought processes. Put differently, the ethic of this dissertation does not 
absolutise the relative but, conversely, it rather relativises the absolute. That is why I 
argue that this ethical treatise springs from an African perception of reality, sense of life, 
aspirations, social circumstances, and worldview. This ethic draws from our African 
Heritage, as we have explained. When the IMF and the World Bank absolutise their 
parochial Eurocentric market ethic, design and impose SAPs and EST, they are sinking 
us into something unworthy of our Africanness. When they hold us under the grip of the 
debt-trap and coerce us to do that which is diametrically opposed to our African 
Heritage, they are asking us to choose the "free market" system over our dignity; they 
are robing us of what is properly ours by virtue of being human; they are forcing us to 
sell our birth right cheaply. 
1. 5. 4. 2 The social context 
Having said that this ethics is inspired by historical materialism, we must bring this 
proposition to its logical conclusion. Development ethics must be situational. Again, in 
this aspect, we must summon insights from liberation theology to fashion the ethic. 
Having recognised the relativity of our thought processes, then, a European or American 
ethic can neither claim supremacy nor relevance here without turning us into objects or 
Its, that is, without denying us our personhood and identity. 
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This ethic is born out of a unique experience and context of oppression just as Black 
Theology originated from the unique experience of Black people-where their 
"blackness was enough justification to subject them to a life of pain, humiliation, 
degradation, exploitation and oppression"-just as Latin-American Theology of 
Liberation originated out of wrestling "with class domination and oppression"-just as 
Feminist Theology is born out of the church's "perennial problem of male domination 
and exploitation of women in all societies" (Maimela 1998: 111 ). In explaining the 
difference between White and Black theologies, Cone writes: "What then is the form and 
content of black religious thought when viewed in the light of their social situation? 
Briefly, the form of black religious thought is expressed in the style of story and its 
content is liberation" (1975:54). In fact, the same is true about white theology. For many 
"white theologians" speak "to and for the culture of the ruling class" and build "logical 
systems." Whites discuss the meaning of meaning and not the real issues with which 
Blacks wrestle daily. Concretely "Whites debated the validity of infant baptism or the 
issue of predestination and free will; blacks recited biblical stories about God leading the 
Israelites from Egyptian bondage, Joshua and the battle of Jericho, and the Hebrew 
children in the fiery furnace" (Cone 1975:53-54). The point is that in difference and 
similarity they are both sociological. That is, the differences between these two 
theologies are sociological in that they mirror social contexts of two different social 
classes. One is concerned with white interests of domination and oppression; the other 
is concerned with black interests and aspirations of liberation. Their similarity emerges 
from their having both sociological origins and label. 
In this sense, the ethic informing this work is contextual since it is born out of a unique 
Mozambican social context and situation of oppression and poverty. It is born out of a 
situation of a long history (500 years) of colonialism. It is born out of a situation in which 
we are told that since our coloniser plundered our land for 500 years we owe him/her 
hundreds of millions of dollars. It is born out of a situation in which the powers of the 
world financed and waged a war of terror against the innocent, destroying completely 
their livelihoods. It is born out of a situation in which the innocent, the poor, women and 
children who neither initiated, nor fought the war, to begin with, are prohibited to repair 
war damages and thereby subjected to chronic illiteracy, dependence, malnutrition, lack 
of medical care, maternity related deaths, etc. It is born out of a situation in which the 
poor earn less than 100 dollars per capita per year and yet they are squeezed to pay 
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billions of dollars to the rich who earn over 10 000 dollars per capita per year. It is born 
out of a situation in which the poor are told that they and their children, even their 
children's children, those who are born and those yet to be born, owe the rich billions of 
dollars. This is the social context, the Sitz im leben, in which this ethical treatise is 
articulated. 
1. 5. 4. 3 Preferential option for the poor and oppressed 
One other important aspect of this ethic inspired by liberation theology is that of a 
preferential option for the poor and oppressed. The value system of the privileged is the 
reason why the poor and oppressed find themselves in the situation of impoverishment 
and oppression. Hence there can be reconstruction and development only if the terms 
of life and economic policies are dictated and formulated according to the needs of the 
poor and oppressed. There can be genuine reconstruction and development in 
Mozambique only if, and only if, the socio-economic process currently at work measures 
up to ethically acceptable social criteria. And ethically acceptable social criteria mean, in 
this situation, taking sides with the poor and oppressed. This is the point that has been 
consistently echoed by liberation theologians. Actually they insist that the situation of the 
poor and oppressed must be the point of departure of any Christian theology. This is 
precisely the point Assmann kept hammering at in his Theology for a Nomad Church: 
If the state of domination and dependency, in which two-thirds of humanity live with 
an annual toll of thirty million dead from starvation and malnutrition, does not become 
the starting point of any Christian theology today, even in affluent and powerful 
countries, then theology cannot begin to relate meaningfully to the real situation. Its 
questions will lack reality and not relate to real men and women (1976:54). 
The problem of the poor and oppressed cannot be solved if it is framed within the 
oppressors' frame of reference. That is why market ethics that dictates the policies of 
the WB and IMF will never result in reconstruction or development for the poor. This is 
precisely the reason why oppressors' ethics and theologies have failed to address the 
problem of poverty and oppression. In their Biblical hermeneutics, liberation theologians 
have always paid attention to the God who is forever on the side of the poor and 
oppressed. God is a liberating God, revealed in situations of oppression. God defends 
the poor and defenceless. The God revealed in Jesus Christ is a liberating God who 
persistently sides with those who are despised and rejected by society (Kiagora 
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1998:345-6). That is why Jesus is rejected right through from his birth to his death. Thus 
Thomas K. Hanks writes: 
Anyone who has read much in theological classics (Augustine, Luther, Calvin, 
Barth, Berkouwer et al.) will recognise that the theme of oppression has received little 
or no attention there. One might think that the Bible says little about oppression. 
Furthermore, one searches in vain for the theme in Bible dictionaries, 
encyclopaedias, and the like. 
However, when we strike the rock of a complete Bible concordance, to our great 
surprise we hit a guster of texts and terms that deal with oppression! In short, we find 
a basic structural category of biblical theology. 
If we reflect on the Bible writers' historical contexts, we shall understand why they 
speak often about oppression (1983:4). 
Development ethicists must follow suit. Their ethical treatises must take sides with the 
poor and oppressed. The situation of the poor and oppressed must be the point of 
departure of not just studying but of doing ethics. We just cannot afford to be (re)made 
in the image of the oppressors. For Africans, Mozambicans in particular, development 
ethics, then, must be an ethic of revolution. According to Boesak (1981:151), such an 
ethic "must mean a search for a totally new social order." It is an ethic inspired by the 
African heritage, in which the wholeness of life is an overriding motif of human 
existence. That is why Boesak goes on to say: "in this search it will have to drink deep 
from the well of African tradition, to use what is good and wholesome for contemporary 
society." Although it evokes nostalgic emotions-some would call it utopian-he 
nevertheless says later on that this ethic "sincerely believes that it is possible to 
recapture what was sacred in the African community long before white people came-
solidarity, respect for life, humanity, and community. It must be possible not only to 
recapture it, but to enhance it and bring it to full fruition in contemporary society" 
(1981 :152). This is an ethic of African heritage in which the wholeness of life is the motif 
of existence. 
1.5.5. Additional Socio-Ethical Values 
There are additional socio-ethical values to be included in this theoretical frame of 
reference. In his Situation Ethics: The New Morality, Joseph Fletcher (1976) speaks of 
principles which inspire his book. From these I draw what he calls Persona/ism. Ethics of 
persolnalism holds that "Obligation is to persons, not to things; to subjects, not to 
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objects." It is an ethic which "puts people at the center of concern, not things" (1976:50). 
Pursuing this subject further, Fletcher draws from Martin Buber's dialogic thesis about /-
Thou. He writes: "There is nothing individualistic about personalism. . . . Value is 
relative to persons and persons are relative to society, to neighbours. An I is an I in 
relationship with a You; a You is a You, capable of being an /, in relation to a Me" 
(1976:50). So there is the concept of community embedded in personalism. 
Fletcher also draws from Kant's maxim of the necessity of treating people as ends and 
never as means. "Personality is therefore the first-order concern for ethical 
choices .... Treat persons as ends, never as means", he says. "Even if in some 
situations a material thing is chosen rather than a person, it will be [if it is done in a 
Christian spirit] for the sake of the person, not for the sake of the thing itself .... Love is 
of people, by people, and for people. Things are to be used; people are to be loved." 
The inversion of this principle, argues Fletcher, is "immoral" (1976-51). Indeed, Denis 
Goulet (1995:172) has rightly pointed out in this regard that, "If any aspiration can be 
said to be universal, cutting across all lines of cultural space and individual personality, it 
is that every human person and group wishes to be treated by others as a being of 
worth, for its own sake and on its own terms and regardless of its utility to others." So 
the value of personalism fashions our ethic. It is a value under which the current socio-
economic transformations are ethically appraised. 
Amongst other socio-ethical values underlying our ethic which deserve special mention 
here are: sympathy, benevolence, fairness, duty and commitment. In as much as they 
relate to people's sentimental feelings for the well-being of others, sympathy and 
benevolence overlap with each other and tend to be similar. According to Robert 
Rowthorn (1996:16), "Sympathy normally refers to our feelings for specific beings with 
whom we have some personal familiarity, if only through media images, whereas 
benevolence involves a more general sense of goodwill." "Fairness and duty are not 
based on sentiments or feelings of some sort." They are based on moral rules. Fairness 
is charged with some notions of justice. Duty overlaps with commitment and they are 
sometimes used interchangeably. However, commitment, as Rowthorn observes, 
"embodies the notion of personal decision or promise." Duty on the other hand, "is 
typically intrinsic to, and inseparable from, some specific social role such as doctor, 
pilot, mother or father. Taking on a social role may be a voluntary act, but the duties 
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associated with this role are defined by convention or law" ( 1996: 16). Our ethical 
appraisal of the Mozambican socio-economic transformations will also be formed and 
informed by these socio-ethical values. 
1.5.6 Justifying the Theoretical Frame of Reference 
The reason this theoretical framework and not any other is chosen is because, in my 
opinion, it does justice to the Mozambican socio-historical predicaments. Drawing ethical 
values from the African Heritage makes more sense than drawing from other 
worldviews. This is because all else that was tried ran bankrupt and failed to address 
our problems. Portuguese Colonialism caused untold catastrophe and human sacrifice. 
After independence, the Frelimo Administration adopted ideological perspectives that 
reflected the paternalism of all ruling classes in relation to the dominated classes. Os 
Frelimistas (the Frelimists) remained prisoners of a modernisation ethos and attitudes 
which downplayed and downsized our Africanness. In their pursuit of modernisation, Os 
Frelimistas drafted the poor and the oppressed into the ideological structures of their 
oppressors. They did so by dint of using Marxist concepts such as "feudal" and 
"capitalist" to downgrade rural and traditional life as u/trapassado (outdated or 
backward), our mother languages as linguas de caes (dogs' languages), etc. We were 
made to believe that Portuguese life style and behaviour meant modernisation or 
development or dignity. We were mentally conquered. As oppressed people, we were 
made to believe that we are worthless and therefore have nothing to offer to the world. 
We were made to believe that we would only be regarded as people if we expressed 
ourselves with borrowed identities. Further, the current socio-economic transformations 
seem to resemble re-colonisation more than anything else. 
Arguing within the nobility of the African Heritage is an antidote to these ideological 
distortions. It gives us a sense of belonging, space, and dignity. In doing so we are at 
home with ourselves and with the world. Speaking for ourselves in our terms and in our 
language restores back our identity and works toward our liberation. It is to do ethics of 
liberation. Our socio-historical consciousness and reality give us no other option but that 
of a liberation motif in articulating our ethical treatises. Further, all truth or knowledge is 
relative. When an ethicist articulates her-/himself on a given subject-poverty, sexuality, 
morality, God, etc.-what we get is more about her/himself, his/her perception of reality 
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imprisoned in her/his socio-historical environment. She or He often tells more about 
his/her parochial needs and hopes and less about the subject itself. In fact, the idea of 
the subject "in itself' or "disinterested" knowledge turns out to be pure ideological 
fantasy which is foreign to the realm of reality. This is fair and honest. This is why this 
ethical theoretical frame of reference and not any other is selected. 
1.6 The Importance of the Study 
There are reports and proposals about Mozambique written by expatriates: NGO 
officials, donor consultants, and foreign researchers. However, the fact that they are 
motivated by ulterior motives and opportunistic interests means that they have 
compromised their academic credibility (if it ever existed), that they have sworn to 
sacrifice the truth and justice on the altar of unjust social security, and that their works 
are grounded on a different theoretical frame of thought, not on the African Heritage and 
Liberation. Their works have not been written within a theological ethical evaluative 
framework, let alone the African Heritage. 
Mozambican academicians have written articles on the economic situation and the 
social impact of SAPs and EST in this post-war dispensation. However, these 
academicians have been groomed under the school of value-free and rational choice 
economics. Hence their works are not based on ethical standards, let alone the nobility 
of the African Heritage. This is partly because social sciences are still in their embryonic 
stages. Theological ethics in particular is unheard of in Mozambican academic ranks. 
Joseph Hanlon is a prominent researcher on Mozambican economic affairs, who is well 
abreast of the current socio-economic transformations there. His books, Mozambique: 
Who Calls the Shots and Peace Without Profit: How the l.M.F. Blocks Rebuilding in 
Mozambique, are brilliantly and trenchantly well written expositions of Mozambique in 
war and post-war. His works are usually excellently documented polemics aimed at 
political lobbying in Europe and the USA. But Hanlon is a journalist who is not 
interested in writing within an ethical or moral-philosophical evaluative framework that 
draws from the African Heritage. Besides, Hanlon is an expatriate. However, I feel 
morally obliged to solemnly confess that Hanlon is a "sane expatriate," one of the most 
beloved sons of the soil indeed. Yet the very fact of his being an expatriate means that 
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his writings do not emanate from the context of pain, oppression, SAPs and EST 
squeezes, and poverty that are the damning social circumstances to which we 
Mozambicans are subjected. 
There is no work on Mozambique, to my knowledge, and which is written within the 
theological-ethical evaluative framework and from an insider's point of view. Besides, 
this dissertation is inspired by my social context of poverty, pain, depression, 
oppression, regression and repression. I have witnessed the war of terror waged by 
Rename. I have witnessed massacres with my own eyes. I have personal experiences 
and fresh memories of South African (during apartheid days) raids of destabilisation as 
a schoolboy in Ressano Garcia. I have eaten rotten American low quality yellow maize 
meal, yellow beans, coal-like beans, and fish with repugnant odour, all supplied by 
NGOs. I recall so freshly our repugnance and disgust in eating these things at Esco/a 
Industrial e Comercial de Xai-Xai. I recall us saying, "today lunch is concrete and 
bullets!" For us, to eat American yellow porridge was as hard as trying to eat concrete. 
And it was equally so hard to eat the coal-like beans that we called them bullets. These 
beans were boiled from morning to evening but never, never, cooked at all. I have 
personal experience of what it is to be a war-displaced person. I know what it is to be 
abducted either by Rename or Frelimo to fight a war we could not make sense of. I 
know what it is to be screwed too tightly by IMF and WB relentless squeezes. I know 
what apertar o cinto 1 means. 
This study is unique in the way described above. I trust it will serve towards filling the 
gaps in Mozambican academic ranks, especially since theological ethics is an unknown 
field of study among Mozambican academicians. In arguing within the nobility of the 
African heritage, I see this discussion as contributing towards challenging the supposed 
supremacy and superiority of right wing conservative market ethics of the WB and IMF 
as currently imposed on the Mozambican people. I hope it will stimulate open popular 
discussion and conscientisation of the masses about the prevalent social circumstances. 
I embark on this ethical study in fear and trembling of the Lord Jesus Christ who inspires 
me and keeps my zealous solidarity with the poor and oppressed. 
0 
1 This is a Mozambican popular saying which means "tightening the belt." It is used to describe 
the SAPs and EST imposed by the WB and IMF 
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1. 7 Structural Organisation 
The first chapter, as just witnessed, introduces the reader to the problem and thesis of 
study. It also explains the methodological approach of the study, highlights its 
significance, and also lays the preliminary socio-ethical propositions and 
presuppositions of the study. The second chapter is a retrospective, historical overview 
of Mozambique since colonial times to the end of the war of destabilisation. It introduces 
the reader to the development of underdevelopment as part of the diagnosis of the 
socio-economic problems. This is done because before making any moral claims or 
judgements, and before making any prescriptions, one must diagnose the problems and 
the causes properly. Besides, the problems of the colonial legacy were not solved and 
de-colonisation never took place completely. These problems were inherited and 
brought forward into the new dispensation. So, bearing in mind the socio-economic 
aspects underscored in chapter two, chapter three outlines the current socio-economic 
reforms, e.g. structural adjustment, economic stabilisation, implemented to remedy the 
socio-economic illnesses already diagnosed and outlined in chapter two. However, 
chapter three is still part of the diagnoses of the Mozambican crisis. Since these socio-
economic reforms were implemented as corrective measures, I argue that such 
measures are predominantly ethically defective and shallow. Hence the main title of the 
dissertation: Pitfalls of National Development and Reconstruction... Chapter four 
considers the market ethic which underpins the socio-economic reforms currently at 
work and which the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWls) (WB and IMF) imposed. It also 
explores their fundamentalist market ethics and techniques in the imposition and 
defence of their positions. This chapter passes moral judgement on these ethics and 
techniques. These ethics and techniques are the nucleus of the pitfalls of national 
development and reconstruction. Finally, based on the African Heritage which informs 
the dissertation, and on the social context of Mozambique, the chapter also ventures 
towards a socio-economic transformation which measures up to ethically acceptable 
social criteria-towards a reconstruction and development programme which enhances 
human life-which makes life most wholesome-life worthy of living-creating social 
circumstances in which Mozambicans can live with dignity. 
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Chapter Two 
A Brief Historical Retrospect of the Mozambican Socio-
Economic and Political Milieu 
All serious study of the problems of development of underdeveloped areas and all 
serious intent to formulate policy for the elimination of underdevelopment and for the 
promotion of development must take into account, nay must begin with, the 
fundamental historical and structural cause of underdevelopment in capitalism (Frank 
1975:96). 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter overviews the socio-economic and political conditions of Mozambique since 
the colonial times up to the peace agreement1 time (October 4th 1992). The chapter does 
not reassess the history of Mozambique as such. Rather, it only underscores those 
structural socio-economic and political aspects of Mozambique's history that are 
relevant to the concerns of the dissertation, namely the socio-economic transformations 
after the war of destabilisation2. It diagnoses the structural causes of Mozambique's 
underdevelopment. Its salient themes range from colonial plunder to destabilisation and 
the aid industry. It also highlights the respective social impact. 
The aim is to lay the background against which the current economic reforms were 
intensified or implemented. The chapter indicates the conditions under which the 
socio-economic transformation was supposedly begun. The chapter is, as it were, the 
groundwork of the dissertation-that is, it is the base on which the subsequent 
developments of the dissertation are grounded. 
0 
1 
2 
President Chissano of Frelimo (the party in power) and the leader of Renamo (the rebel 
movement) Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama signed the fire cease and peace 
agreement. 
For the orchestrators and the dynamics of destabilisation see section 2.4 on destabilisation 
in this chapter. 
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2.2 Socio-Economic Conditions in the Context of Colonial Exploitation 
2. 2. 1 The Draining Nature of Portuguese Colonial System 
The colonial nature and character of the Mozambican economy, which existed for five 
hundred years, cannot be underestimated. It is bound to generate near-perpetual 
negative consequences. The Mozambican situation worsened because of its 
colonisation by a poor, underdeveloped, peripheral economy of the West: the 
Portuguese economy. Portuguese colonial activities in the colonies were aimed at 
reviving Portugal's own economic backwardness. The surplus of production was 
systematically transferred to Portugal. Nothing or little, if anything, was left for local 
investment. The colonial administration relied heavily on the exploitation of labour, i. e. 
chibalo, a system of forced labour that relied solely on overt physical aggression. The 
Portuguese colonial administration extracted inordinate mineral resources, raw 
materials, and scarce natural resources from Mozambique to Portugal, thus boosting the 
Portuguese economy at home while at the same time postponing local industrial 
production. 
There is another dimension in which Portugal drained Mozambique in order to enrich 
itself. Portugal determined the terms of trade and exercised the import and export 
transactions in ways which could only jeopardise Mozambique's industrial and economic 
progress. The fact that the Lisbon administration was drowning Mozambique in a 
chronic socio-economic mess did not matter at all, so long as it benefited Portugal. 
Mittleman witnesses to this phenomenon: 
.... Mozambique [had a] recurring negative balance of trade within the escudo zone. 
For all/selected/ years ... covering 1961-1973, Mozambique imported more for both 
Portugal and the other Portuguese colonies than it exported to them. Except for a few 
products, Portuguese goods and those from its colonies entered Mozambique duty 
free; all other countries faced a tariff. Prevalent practices of undervaluing exports and 
overvaluing imports caused Mozambique to suffer severe foreign-exchange losses. In 
197 4, for example, Mozambican sugar sold at an average price that was less than half 
of the international price .... Similarly, firms operating in Mozambique bought imported 
used machinery at discount, then registered it at the value of new equipment (quoted 
in Egero 1987:50). 
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The Lisbon administration had highly centralised socio-economic and political power in 
Lisbon, thus costing Mozambique the right and prestige of socio-economic self-
determination. Even the existing economic activities were monitored from Lisbon. As 
another source witnesses: 
... [T]he country had no financial institutions of its own, no stock exchange, and its 
entrepreneurs depended on the arbitrary decisions of the Banco Nacional 
Ultramanrino for loans of more than 90 days. Tied down as they were by the system of 
interterritorial payments with its lengthy backlogs, reaching 15 months in 1971, they 
watched the repatriation of Portuguese companies of 2,000 million escudos a year, a 
sum almost equal to the total costs to Portugal of the Mozambican administration. 
When the Mozambique Chamber of Commerce put up 60 million escudos in 1963 to 
found a local bank, they were refused permission ... (Middlemas 1978:39). 
This economic system contributed to create and to nurture the stubborn culture and 
mentality of dependence, one of the aspects of the colonial legacy that proved 
increasingly hard to combat after independence. 
The demands of the Portuguese economy at home blocked a self-sustained growth in 
the colonies. This resulted in deep dependence on South Africa and Rhodesia. It is 
important now to highlight the problem of labour migration. 
2. 2. 2 Labour Migration and Forced Labour: Chiba lo 
In the beginning of the 20th century Mozambicans saw further significant deterioration of 
their conditions of life due to underpaid or unpaid forced labour and a heavy taxation 
system. Their wages and terms of trade collapsed together with their purchasing power. 
Amid these conditions they were prompted to migrate to the neighbouring countries 
(South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Tanganyika), where, although the salaries were 
still inhumane indeed, the acquisition of consumer goods with affordable prices was still 
possible. Abroad, at least, there was freedom of choice in the job market, whereas in 
Mozambique there was, especially in rural areas, subjection to forced labour (chibalo) 
and forced production of specific agricultural products for colonial exports: cotton, 
cashew nuts, tea, sugar, copra, sisal, and tobacco. Mozambicans were violently coerced 
to cultivate these products, leaving them no time to cultivate nutritious products they 
needed to live---maize mill, rice, sweet potatoes, peanuts, etc. They were systematically 
OPAGE 0270 
left to starve with hunger. Martha Chissano, then a mother of 24, thus describes her 
encounter with forced labour (chibalo) in the '50s in Mandhlakazi district, Gaza: 
In Mandhlakazi, each person was obliged to cultivate cotton and rice; no one was 
obliged to cultivate the two at the same time. However, there was discrimination 
against women because besides that, women had to offer free labour to the regu/os 
[traditional leaders appointed by the colonial administration] whenever they 
demanded. Women without husbands [absent as migrant workers], or single were, 
specifically, appointed for this end. Since everyone had an identification card, the 
regu/o, through his sub-chiefs and sipaios [bloodthirsty and brutish watchmen], was 
always in a position to know which family had not paid tax. 
I cultivated rice for Makupulani, our regulo. Immediately before the rice harvest, the 
capatazes [foremen, that is, heads of groups of workers] were sent to each field to 
estimate the number of sacks that each cultivator would harvest and, on the basis of 
this estimate, the capatazes distributed the sacks. If, in the end, they were unable to 
fill the sacks, ( ... ) they could accuse them of hiding a portion of rice for their own 
consumption. We were not allowed to consume any rice produced by us; we were 
obliged to give over every grain to the authorities, and then we would go to the shops 
and buy the rice for our consumption. 
The production of rice caused enormous suffering in the lands of Makupulani. On one 
occasion, some women, myself included, were arrested and taken to one of the 
regulo's sub-chiefs for investigation, because we cultivated our own fields, within the 
term. The reason was that many of us were unable to do it, everybody knew: none of 
us had a plough, and we had to work the hard and heavy lands of the riverbank only 
with our hoes. Some of the women could not manage because they were ill, but all 
these valid reasons were rejected, immediately, by the chiefs, who ordered us to lie on 
our stomachs to whip us on our backs (quoted in Rocha & Hedges 1993:149). 
In the following extract, Albino Macheche gives an account of frequent scenes in 
Nampula city where, in those days, he worked as a nurse: 
At the time, it was common to see in the Nampula hospital, men and women with 
excavated buttocks, with wounds, or ulcers, because that administrator used a whip, 
made of old tyre remains and a handle, which was used to torture the people who 
tried to flee during the production of rice and cotton. He beat them repeatedly on their 
buttocks which were hurt with wounds, or ulcers, when at an advanced stage [of 
deterioration]. 
In the Nampula city it was usual to see escorted people, dressed only with interior 
shirts, loincloths or rugged clothes. In the open city, the prisoners walked almost 
naked. We could see them as they returned to the dungeons coming from forced 
labour [chibalo]. 
That was a spectacle on the streets of Nampula, at the time, for people who had not 
been used to see a similar thing. People were petrified because they passed in rows 
of 20/30 people, to and from the fields and the dungeons. Some of these individuals 
were part of those who were caught fleeing from production of cotton and rice (quoted 
in Rocha & Hedges 1993:150). 
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Joaquim Maquival also describes violent forced labour as he experienced it in the 
Milange Oriental Tea Society. 
I began at 12 years old to work for the company; they paid me 15 escudos a month. 
We worked from 6 in the morning until 12 noon, when we stopped for 2 hours and 
continued from 2 until 6. The whole family worked for the company: my brothers, my 
father .... my father earned 150 escudos a month. He had to pay 195 escudos in 
annual tax. We did not want to work for the company, but when we refused, the 
government sent the police to the villages and arrested those who refused, and if they 
fled the government circulated photographs and signalled the start of the hunting of 
men. When they found them they beat them, and put them in prison and when they 
got out they had to work with no holidays at all; the argument was that they fled 
because they did not need the money.... Thus, in our camps only our mothers 
remained, who could do little. We had only to eat the little they could produce (quoyed 
in Rocha & Hedges 1993:150). 
Faced with shortage of cheap labour in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in the 
1940s, companies in these countries sought contracts of cheap labour in the 
neighbouring countries, especially in Mozambique. The way was, therefore, also opened 
for clandestine migration of Mozambicans to those lands, fleeing forced labour. My 
grandfather and my father spent days and nights in the bushes of Mandhlakaze hiding 
from forced labour. They eventually fled to South Africa on foot where they worked as 
clandestine immigrants in the mines of Johannesburg, and later in the plantations of 
Natal with South African identities (dom pass). They remained there for more than ten 
years. Back in Mozambique they had left families vulnerable to misery. 
With the aim of controlling these migrations and securing itself huge incomes at the 
expense of Mozambicans' toil in the mines, the Lisbon colonial administration had 
signed an agreement-still back at the turn of the nineteenth century-with the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA), the South African mine worker 
recruitment organisation. This agreement regulated revenue and forex reserves on 
supply of labour, and payment of half-and later sixty per cent-of the workers' wages 
in pure gold at a fixed nominal value. This gold became gigantic and indispensable 
income for the Lisbon administration. Therefore, despite protests from farmers, planters 
and officials in Mozambique, the Salazar administration renewed the agreement 
consistently throughout the colonial period. The exportation of men kept the colonial 
economy in a state of chronic labour shortage. 
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In 1947 the Lisbon colonial administration and Southern Rhodesia agreed that the 
Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC) could establish a recruitment 
network in Mozambique. The commission was also charged to register illegal 
Mozambican immigrants working in Southern Rhodesia, and to impose and extract 
taxes from them. It is estimated that in the close of 1960 the number of Mozambican 
immigrants working in Southern Rhodesia was over 117,000, over 200,000 working in 
South Africa (Rocha & Hedges1993), and over 100,000 working in farms and other 
sectors in Tanganyika by the eve of the latter's independence (Hall & Young 1997). 
One would think that with the demise of the fascist regimes in Europe in World War 11 
the Lisbon colonial administration would have eased its colonial screws in the colonies. 
Reality, however, points to the very contrary. Portugal-being a "third world" country 
itself-tightened the screws even harder on its colonies, in the attempt to catch up with 
the fast industrialising counterparts in Europe. The above quoted extracts reveal the 
ruthlessness of Portuguese colonial fascism-not to mention the forced migration to the 
plantations of Sao Tome. 
Economically speaking, this was a huge drainage of human capital from the country. It 
is impossible to calculate the economic loss, social impact, and human sacrifice that 
these colonial manoeuvres caused in Mozambique. This was the development of 
underdevelopment and dependence triggered by the Lisbon colonial administration, 
which later would stubbornly persist even in the decades following independence. 
2.2.3 Development Programmes, the Settlers' Influx, and Job, Education and 
Racial Discrimination 
Only under the pressure of the liberation struggle movements in the 1960s did the 
Lisbon administration begin a series of reforms in the system in favour of the colonies. 
Forced labour was abolished, but administrators and private cotton companies 
continued its illegal practice until 1973. The period between 1960 and 1970 is 
characteristic for its expansion in industrial investment. This phenomenon resulted in 
some significant economic growth, thereby ranking Mozambique the eighth among the 
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most industrialised economies in Africa in the same period (Egero 1987:53; Hall & 
Young 1997:10). 
These phenomenal reforms within the Lisbon colonial administration system had been 
also motivated by other reasons favourable to the colonial master. The years between 
the 1950s and 1970s witnessed massive migrations of Portuguese peasantry, os 
colonatos, to Mozambique. Resembling their country, these were the rural poor, 
propertyless, illiterate, usually ignorant, unemployed and unemployable settlers in their 
home country in search of better conditions of life. This was a sheer dumping of living 
"human waste" in Mozambique by the Portuguese colonial administration. As K. 
Middlemas describes them, they were 
.... immigrants from Portugal, not officials on duty; they brought their families and 
possessions and settled either as artisans in the towns and growing suburbs, or in 
small farms and peasant co/onatos .... Their style of life and expectations, while 
Portuguese, contrasted sharply with the seingneurial outlook of the ranchers, or tea 
and sugar planters of Zambezia, or the large farmers, many of German and South 
African origin, clustered around Manica and Vila Pery near the Rhodesian border 
(Middlemas 1978:35). 
In order to protect itself from exposure and public embarrassment, the colonial 
administration could only transport these immigrants in the darkest hours before dawn. 
As another source explains: 
When the ships arrived from Portugal, no one was allowed to leave before dark. Only 
late in the evenings did they board the trains for Gaza and Limpopo, rugged and 
barefoot and still representatives of the colonial master. In Limpopo, it was not 
unusual that the Black servant had to help his master read the paper or write his 
letters (Mendonca, quoted in Egero 1987:48). 
These immigrants-not Blacks-were the real beneficiaries of the reforms in the 
system. Besides, this immigration phenomenon led to a socio-economic system based 
entirely on tight racism. All the professional hierarchies were under the grip of the fascist 
colonial system. Hence colonisers competed unjustly with Blacks for salaried 
employment in all socio-economic levels: transportation industry, small businesses, 
artisan sector, farming, etc. The result was explicit job reservation in favour of non-
African people, even at the lowest level of management. 
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Trade unions were formed. But these always remained under strong control of the 
colonial administration. In effect, they operated in harmony with racial discrimination. 
The trade unions demanded that only people with professional dossiers (issued by the 
same trade unions) should be employed for salaried jobs under the pretext of protecting 
qualified workers from cheap labour, thus denying Blacks access to salaried jobs. 
The same discriminating practice existed in the education system, a condition that would 
have fatal consequences in the post-independence era. Blacks were kept out of 
education, or education was used to make them prisoners of the earth so that they could 
be colonised even more brutally. 
There were two types of schools: state controlled schools for Whites and mission 
schools for Blacks. In the state controlled schools-where Blacks constituted only 13 
per cent of the total number of registered students nation-wide-the passing rate was 
60 per cent in 1960. In the mission schools-where the Catholic Church had the 
monopoly-where government control was absent-and where Blacks represented 76 
per cent of the total number of registered pupils, in the same year-the passing rate 
was less than 29 per cent. 
Discrimination was even more accentuated in secondary schools. Of 704 students 
nation-wide in 1945 only 1 was black, representing only 0.14 per cent. Of 2550 students 
in 1960 only 69 were black, representing only a mere 2. 7 per cent (Rocha & Hedges 
1993:182). In the year of independence (1975) the University had only a dozen Blacks 
out of a total of 3,000 students, representing only 0.4 per cent (Hall & Young 1997:10). 
Drawing from these statistics analysts reached the following logical and inevitable 
conclusions: 
Around 1960, only 0.2 per cent of the black population [6 000 000] reached, annually, 
a primary level of literacy. The global percentage of illiteracy was about 95 per cent. 
A reduced number of Black children was authorised to receive a primary education of 
the same level as the Whites', and a proportion of Black children, in relation to that of 
White children, in "common" primary and secondary schools, was very small in 1960 
than in 1930. 
The barriers to education of Blacks were more effective, as they advanced through 
the various levels of education. It was for this reason that a considerable number of 
Blacks fled to various neighbouring countries, to have access to secondary education, 
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as, for example, Eduardo Mondlane, who managed to register in a school of the Swiss 
Mission, in Transvaal (Rocha & Hedges 1993:182). 
In sum, the Mozambican economy fed rather than competed with the Portuguese 
economy. It had been deeply dependent on plantations, forced labour (chibalo), service 
industry, human export, and management of foreign (British and South African) 
enterprise. Mozambique is dissimilar to many other African countries because fascist 
Portugal continued its oppression and forced labour longer than many other countries 
which had colonies. The result was, as Joe Hanlon observed, "Mozambique is one of 
the poorest countries in Africa not because it lacks natural resources, nor because 
Portugal left it underdeveloped, but rather because Portugal [the second most 
underdeveloped country in Europe] actively underdeveloped it" (Hanlon 1987:22). 
2.2.4 Economic Sabotage and the Flight of Human Capital 
After independence the new government of Frelimo was thrown deep into administration 
nightmares as it tried to curb the economic decline it had inherited from the colonial 
master. The colonial administration had drained the monetary reserves in military 
expenditures-amounting to 5.5 billion escudos in 1971-to fund the war which it 
decisively lost. Ten years of war were also ten years of Portuguese propaganda against 
Frelimo. Repression and insecurity grew, and from 1971 onwards international migration 
showed a growing negative tide. The Portuguese began to leave the country. In fact, of 
course, by independence half of the White population had left. Most of these did not 
leave empty-handed. Economic sabotage had long begun. There were many cases of 
"orders" of imported supplies which never arrived, and which were really transfers of 
money abroad. As Joe Hanlon writes: "One of the most dramatic was Borer [a 
commercial Portuguese agroindustrial company], which ran one of the world's largest 
palm plantations. They loaded the entire 1975 copra crop, worth 2 million pounds, on to 
four ships and sailed away, never to return" (1987:48). Thus Egero also explains: 
.... The Mozambique government, in a retrospective review of the colonial economy, 
reports that during the last two years before Independence, foreign reserves slumped 
to two billion escudos a year .... 
By this time, an estimated half of the Portuguese community had left the country, 
carrying with them all that could be taken away and destroying the rest. They were to 
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be followed by most of the remainder already in the year after Independence, leaving 
the new government with an economy extremely dependent on an increasingly hostile 
neighbour, South Africa, and with only the rudiments of a functioning bureaucracy 
(1987:55). 
The nationalisation of social services-health, education and the land, in particular-
affording Frelimo great popularity-ended privileged access to social services. The 
standard dropped for the minority White. This accelerated the flight of the Portuguese. 
In rural areas also there was a flight of Whites. There they killed cattle, destroyed their 
machinery, and burned their farms and crop reserves before they left. Fleeing 
technicians and owners paralysed or destroyed machinery, or removed essential parts, 
destroying the records and repair manuals. Mixing formulas in industrial companies 
were destroyed together with the records of where the machinery had been bought. 
What made this all too serious was the very strict division of labour by which anything 
technical or semi-technical had been done by the settlers. Thus the remaining workers 
were left with no skills or idea to keep the factories running. 
Still very dramatic was the abandonment of businesses, some of which were built over 
many years. As Hanlon writes, "Suddenly, one day, owners would be gone, leaving 
behind a workforce without a clue as to how to manage the business. For example, 
waiters who had never been allowed to handle money found themselves running 
restaurants" (Hanlon 1987:47). 
2.3 Mozambique Under Frelimo 
The flight of the Portuguese created very dramatic economic problems. More than 300 
businesses were abandoned, most of which were small. The building boom stopped, 
paralysing the construction industry, and throwing thousands of people out of work. 
Thousands of domestic workers suddenly were unemployed. Thousands from the hotel 
and tourism industry were suddenly out of work. As one writer truly observes, 
Frelimo inherited a bankrupt economy with chronic balance of payments surpluses, 
cushioning the economic crisis caused by the flight of the Portuguese. Partly this was 
self-generating: industry was dependent on imported raw materials, so the collapse of 
industry meant a sharp fall in imports. Also, it was the departing Portuguese who had 
imported consumer goods (Hanlon 1987:50-51 ). 
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2.3.1 Intervention 
To control the situation the Frelimo government introduced the concept of 
"intervention", a type of bankruptcy procedure, in which the state took over the running 
of an abandoned or sabotaged business, allowing, however, the owner to reclaim it later 
under certain procedures. All these businesses had been "intervened" by the end of 
1976. 
To do this, Frelimo created Dynamising Groups (Os Grupos Dinamizadores-GDs). 
These were ad hoc committees of eight to ten people, set up in villages, urban 
neighbourhoods, and work places, starting in 1974. The GDs officially took over the 
collapsing colonial apparatus. They took control over the abandoned businesses, and 
guarded against those who sabotaged the economy. Since the people were unfamiliar 
with Frelimo and its policies, especially in the South, the GDs also became the 
educating bodies that introduced Frelimo to the people. 
2.3.2 Unexpected earnings 
In 1975 Malawi cut off the supply of labour to South Africa. Mozambique took over the 
vacant posts, increasing the number of its workers. There was a wave of strikes in the 
South African gold mines in the 1970's, from which Mozambicans also benefited through 
significant wage increases. Hence they were paid in gold at the official price which 
Mozambique could sell at the free market rates. Further, by 1974 the gold price had 
risen three times above the official price, from which Mozambique unexpectedly 
benefited by more than $US 100 million a year. 
, 2. 3. 3 A Success story? 
The mobilisation and motivation of the populace through the GDs was a success. The 
GDs also combined the roles of courts, councils, debating groups and mobilisation for 
latrine buildings, and adult literacy classes. Mass meetings became very frequent. The 
education system and health services, which had served only Whites in urban and 
settler areas, were dramatically restructured and expanded to cover even the forgotten 
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villages in the rural areas. Adult literacy had been less than 15 per cent. By 1980 the 
number of qualified school leavers increased four-fold in both primary and secondary 
education (Direc9ao Nacional de Estatistica-DNE 1985). In health services "primary 
health care" was promoted even before the World Health Organization (WHO) began to 
promote it. Between 1976 and 1978 a vaccination campaign reached 95 per cent of the 
population and provided a highly accurate forecast for the 1980 census. In 1982 there 
were more than twice as many rural health posts and centres as there had been at 
independence (ONE 1985). A WHO survey in 1982 revealed that 81 per cent of rural 
children had been seen at least once by a health worker, and two-thirds of rural health 
posts surveyed had a sufficient stock of essential drugs. It was one of the success 
stories cited by WHO and other international health experts (Hanlon 1987:55-71). 
In short, despite a shortage of skills Mozambique struggled through on a wave of 
massive enthusiasm. By 1977 the bankrupt economy began to rise and it grew steadily 
until 1981. With the exports rising, the GDP was double the 1977 level and well above 
pre-independence levels. 
2.4 Destabilisation 
2.4. 1 Internal Destabilisation 
Even during the liberation struggle Frelimo had its internal factions, tensions and 
defections to Rhodesia, where Rename was formed by the Rhodesian security services 
together with dissatisfied Portuguese bourgeoisie. These tensions and defections were 
caused by Frelimo's own growing inclinations and tendencies towards Marxist-Leninism, 
responsible for its gradual decline from its initial nationalism. Besides, there were some 
ethnic tensions, with the northerners complaining that Frelimo leadership was dominated 
by southerners from Gaza. These factors were cracks through which the enemy would 
later penetrate. They were to be exploited and taken advantage of by South Africa and 
Rhodesia to destabilise the country. 
At its Third Party Congress in 1977, Frelimo removed its veil and revealed its real 
authoritarian face, which would later haunt the entire country. Frelimo declared openly 
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that it was a Marxist-Leninist party, which, in itself, was not bad. But it was the paving of 
the way towards the fascism of the 1980s. In the Congress the party declared: 
The hard class battles demand that the working class, closely allied with the 
peasantry, its fundamental ally, and with the progressive elements of the labouring 
class, organise itself into a vanguard Party, guided by the scientific ideology of the 
Marxist-Leninism (quoted in Haile 1989:21 ). 
Frelimo's fond commitment to the Marxist-Leninist ideology was further stressed in 
President Machel's address, entitled Every Revolution is a Contribution to Marxism, 
delivered in Berlin on 11 April, 1983, at an international celebration marking the 
centenary of Marx's death: 
Dear comrades, with deep feelings we greet this August assembly where 
representatives of the forces of progress and socialism, from all the continents and 
peoples, from all races and nations, are together celebrating the centenary of the 
death of one of mankind's most beloved sons, Karl Marx . 
.... In four continents, workers, taking control of their destiny, are building a happy 
future, are building socialism, Communism . 
... . Marxism is a shining path, a sun of hope and certainly that never sets, a sun that is 
always at its zenith. 
Marxism, the science of revolution, is the fruit of practice, of mankind's struggle for a 
better future and so is renewed and developed through human practice. The 
experience of revolutionary struggle of the Mozambican people provides an illustration 
of this principle. 
The dictatorship of the proletariat is as alive today as at the time of the Commune 
(quoted in Haile 1989:23). 
Frelimo drew further and further away from the people it boasted of serving. Marx's 
dictatorship of the proletariat-which meant popular democracy-was quietly folded and 
thrown under the carpet of heavy-handed rule. With the Maputo heavily centralised 
government, the DGs were ignored and pushed to the periphery. In rural areas people 
were expropriated of their land and forced to live in aldeias comunais (communal 
villages) where they could be easily massacred by Rename. 
In urban areas, especially in Maputo, there were networks of Opera<;ao Produ<;ao 
(Operation Production) through which the unemployed were arrested and taken to 
forced labour in rural areas, hundreds of miles away. Many were arrested on the road 
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and deported without notifying their families. Since homes were searched, too, many 
were arrested in their homes in case they did not produce cartao de resident (resident 
card). Everyone had to produce four cards on the spot whenever asked by the police: 
cartao de residente (resident card), cartao de trabalho (work card), bilhete de identidade 
(identity card}, cartao de recenceamento (military service card) in case one was young 
enough to run and to carry an AK47. 
Surely Frelimo was ferociously repressive and Hanlon is right in stating that "Frelimo 
created resistance where there was none" (1987: 183). It had completed the U-turn to 
the old time colonial chibalo. Surely Frelimo repelled people with its atrocious activities. 
Frelimo betrayed the people and thus destroyed its support base. It did not live up to the 
people's aspirations. Some of these people did, indeed, join or support Rename. The 
consequential social impact cannot be well conceived by an outsider, but we, the 
Mozambicans, until now, do feel the pain deeply. We still have the scars. 
2.4.2 Rhodesian and South African Destabilisation 
Destabilisation really began way back at independence. In just two years South Africa 
cut the number of Mozambican mine workers from 118 000 in 197 4 to 41 000 in 1976, 
causing unemployment problems. The official payments in gold were terminated in 
1978. South Africa imposed economic sanctions against Mozambique (simply for being 
free}, cutting its use of the port of Maputo from 6 million tonnes before independence to 
3 million in 1981, and down to less than 1 million tonnes later. These measures, 
together, caused Mozambique at least $US 800 million in lost earnings by 1983 (Hanlon 
1992:11). 
In 1976 Mozambique closed its border with Southern Rhodesia and imposed UN-
sponsored sanctions 1 against it. It shut its borders with Rhodesia, loosing the vital 
earnings by port and railway traffic from Rhodesia and Zambia. As a result the 
0 
1 Mozambique had just become independent and it was keen to see its neighbours (Southern 
Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia) independent too. Hence the Frelimo government gave 
full support to Zanu's revolutionary struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe. This 
"communist" and "anti-Christian" behaviour certainly annoyed Smith's Regime, who retaliated 
with air-strikes. The socio-economic and political relations between these two countries 
deteriorated. The shutting of the border and sanctions against Southern Rhodesia took place 
within this socio-political atmosphere. 
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Rhodesian and Zambian economies became integrated to the South African economy, 
as their cargo was diverted to South African ports. The sanctions cost Mozambique 
about $US 600 million according to UN estimates (Hanlon 1987:51). 
Meanwhile, Rhodesia retaliated with fierce military raids into Mozambique and disrupted 
the central provinces' roads, rail, ports, hydroelectric power, and damaged oil reserves. 
Together with dissatisfied Portuguese anti-Frelimo bourgeoisie, the Rhodesian security 
services created a guerrilla force, Rename, placed defectors from Frelimo as its puppet 
leaders, and opened an anti-Frelimo radio station. Rename was effective in destabilising 
Manica and Sofala provinces. 
In 1980 Zimbabwe became independent. The Zanu Administration introduced massive 
socio-economic reforms. Mozambican borders with Zimbabwe reopened. Zimbabwe 
resumed the use of the Beira corridor for its cargo. The Zimbabwean economy partly 
disengaged from the South African economy. With the declaration entitled Toward 
Economic Liberation, the nine majority-ruled states of Southern Africa founded, in the 
same year, the SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference), 
declaring their intent to "liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic 
of South Africa." The declaration states: 
Southern Africa is dependent on the Republic of South Africa as a focus of transport 
and communications, an exporter of goods and services, and as an importer of goods 
and cheap labour. This dependence is not a natural phenomenon nor is it simply the 
result of a free market economy. The nine states and one occupied territory of 
Southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) were, in varying degrees, deliberately 
incorporated -- by metropolitan powers, colonial rulers, and large corporations -- into 
the colonial and sub-colonial structures centering in general on the Republic of South 
Africa. The development of national economies as balanced units, let alone the 
welfare of the people of Southern Africa, played no part in the economic integration 
strategy. Not surprisingly, therefore, Southern Africa is fragmented, grossly exploited, 
and subject to economic manipulations by outsiders ... 
It is not the quest for liberation, but the entrenched racism, exploitation, and 
oppression which is the cause of conflict in Southern Africa. The power behind this is 
in large measure economic. Economic liberation is, therefore, as vital as political 
freedom (quoted in Hanlon 1987:213). 
With the independence of Zimbabwe Rename had no support base. Its radio station was 
shut down. In the master-puppet relation, South Africa took over from Rhodesia as 
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Renamo's master. South Africa nurtured Renamo and became actively involved in the 
destabilisation of Mozambique, having re-established the Renamo radio station. South 
Africa worked consistently through Renamo to keep the railway from Zimbabwe to Beira 
and Maputo closed. At times the SADF operated directly. In 1981 it expertly sabotaged 
the bridges carrying roads, the railway, the oil pipeline from Beira to Zimbabwe, and 
destroyed the marker buoys in Beira port. Since then Renamo kept the railway from 
Beira to Malawi shut, and even cut the road linking Malawi to Zimbabwe. In 1983 the 
South African Defense Force (SADF) sabotaged the British Petroleum oil storage depot 
in Beira, causing $US 20 million worth of damages. In the same year Zimbabwe was hit 
by fuel scarcity. South African involvement is described in Hanlon's book as he writes: 
.... One report quotes Dhlakama [Renamo leader] as saying, 'you South Africans are 
like my parents' and that 'everything depends on you'. He also thanks them 'for 
evacuating my wife from Zimbabwe to South Africa'. In one meeting, an unidentified 
'Colonel Charlie' says he will send specialists and instructors to teach the MNR how to 
use heavy weapons and do sabotage operations. And Charlie adds: 'The instructors 
who go to Mozambique will not only teach, but also participate in attacks.' 
One of these 'instructors' was Alan Gingles, killed trying to mine the Beira-Zimbabwe 
railway in October 1981. Mozambican soldiers came across him and shot the mine; 
he was blown up and only his ear was found, which at least proved he was White. But 
in his pack was a partly finished novel about Northern Ireland, written in a school 
notebook. It contains, ironically, his own obituary: 'Death, as he now knew, was 
anything but pleasant or glorious.' The London Observer eventually showed that the 
handwriting was that of Gingles. Born in Lame in Northern Ireland, he joined the Ulster 
Defence Regiment and went on to Sandhurst and the Royal Irish Rangers. 
Transferred to Germany, he became bored and resigned his British commission, 
moving to Rhodesia to join the Selous Scouts. With independence there, he joined the 
South African Defence Force. An SADF statement in 1981 said Gingles was killed 'in 
action against terrorists' in the 'operation area' (Hanlon 1987:222-223). 
Renamo's destabilising operations ranged from attacks on economic bases to sheer 
acts of brutality. It burned down factories, crop fields, schools, hospitals, shops; 
destroyed bridges, roads and railways; ambushed and attacked cars, buses, lorries, and 
trains, killing thousands of people. It was extremely dangerous to travel and people were 
afraid to do so. To those who risked and travelled it was a very traumatic experience, 
since it was like walking on a tightrope as cars and buses passed through recently and 
long burned cars and buses and degenerating dead bodies. Renamo committed 
brutality: cut men's genitals while they were alive, smashed babies against tree trunks, 
opened women's pregnant bellies with bayonets and killed the embryos, committed 
rape. Renamo massacred people in very dramatic ways: cut people's heads and threw 
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them into water wells, lined dead bodies on the roads or divided them with knives and 
cooked them. Behind these atrocities was South Africa. 
In its destabilising operations South Africa, in 1983, began building a railway across 
Swaziland to make it easier to ship cargoes to the ports of Durban and Richard's Bay 
from the Eastern Transvaal, and thus divert more traffic away from Maputo. These 
measures were also intended to seduce Swaziland away from SADCC with money. 
After Mozambique's independence, the South African government pushed hard for rapid 
containerisation of most traffic through the Safmarine (South African sea cargo shiping 
company). By then Safmarine dominated the container shipping cartel which served 
Southern Africa. In this way Zimbabwe's cargo was further diverted from Maputo to the 
Durban modernised container port. It is important to recall that the South African 
government and companies dominated all the shipping agents in the region. As a result, 
three years after independence the Rhodesian cargo went through South Africa. Only 
low value and non-containerised cargo was allowed to go through Mozambique. 
Communication and transportation routes through Mozambique were cut, and rural 
economy totally destroyed. 
2.5 The Turn to the West 
By the mid '80s, the Mozambican economy was successfully brought to a complete halt. 
In 1983 the forex reserves were dry. Destabilisation, then, forced Mozambique to turn to 
the West for help. It was now open and desperate for aid which it had initially refused. 
New aid missionaries were ready to invade the country, but not quite yet. For 
Mozambique was left alone for some time so it could feel the sting of its rebelliousness a 
little longer. 
2.5.1 A Cold War Battleground and the West's Hostility 
The early 1980s saw the culmination of the Cold War. In the same period Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher ascended to power in two Western powers, and 
changed the political outlook and attitudes in the Western society. They tightened their 
foreign policies in order to contain Marxism-Leninism in the world. As some 
commentators observed, "Reagan has directed and presided over America's reassertion 
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of its active world role. Previously, the US had been drawing inward and seemed 
unwilling or unable to exert influence." Although "the administration has assisted viable 
Western-oriented movements seeking to topple Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist 
regimes," now it was prepared to establish "a willingness to use force" (Heatherly & 
Burton 1989:464-7). The White House Mandate /II, in Reagan's time, spoke of the 
"Frelimo regime ... composed of long-time, hardline Marxist-Leninists; weaning them 
away form Moscow is surely impossible." Its objective was to "roll back the Soviet 
empire" as it claimed that Mozambique was a "Soviet colony" where "Moscow ... has 
access to airfields and naval facilities" (Heatherly & Burton 1989:598, 608, 612). The US 
had turned Mozambique into a battleground to fight the Cold War against the Eastern 
block. 
The US Congress was under the grip of hard-line right wing demagogues who operated 
as anti-Frelimo and pro-Rename lobbyists. Not surprisingly the Reagan Doctrine 
supported Rename, calling it "the freedom fighters" and "people's liberation movement," 
and claiming that "Rename is establishing a provisional government in the large area of 
Mozambique in which the resistance movement operates freely." It also claimed that "of 
all insurgencies against pro-Soviet regimes anywhere in the world, Rename is closest to 
victory" (in Hanlon 1992:46; Gifford 1988:73-76). This was sheer propaganda and, from 
a common Mozambican's point of view, it was utter insult and ridicule. 
What is interesting is that the Reagan administration had as its top priority for Africa for 
1985, "to urge Mozambique to abandon Marxism." It further declared that "If, by early 
1985, Machel is not decisively moving away from Marxism, then, a clear alternative 
exists through support for MNR [Rename] by the United States." We should always bear 
in mind that, for Americans, as the Reagan's Mandate II itself states clearly, "Africa is an 
important part of the Western commonwealth, providing critical raw materials and 
markets." Therefore the continent should be made "congenial once again for private 
investment" and certain specific interventions "must be ironed out on a classified basis." 
The Reagan administration also argued that Southern Africa represented "the most 
productive and economically important part of Africa from the point of view of the West." 
The only fear they had was for the "White tribe of South Africa": "fear of having South 
Africa disintegrated into chaos and anarchy-where much of central Africa headed after 
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the advent of one man, one vote." Thus "South Africa needs both time and a sense of 
security" (in Hanlon 1992:45). 
The hostile and cold predisposition of the United States toward Mozambique at a time 
when Mozambique had already turned its back on Marxism-Leninism was indeed 
unjustifiable. As a mater of fact, Mozambique already had withdrawn from Marxist-
Leninist ideology, had written a non-communist constitution, and had, on its own, turned 
to the West for help. Indeed, as Crocker grumbled in testimony to the Senate Africa 
Subcommittee on 24 June 1987: 
... it is especially ironic that Mozambique got little attention in Washington when it 
appeared to be firmly committed to socialism, close relations with Moscow, and 
antagonism toward the United States. Only when Mozambique manifestly changed its 
course and began to reach out to us and our Western allies did Mozambique and US 
foreign policy toward that country become an issue in our own foreign policy debate 
(quoted in Hanlon 1992:46). 
2.5.2 Religious Groups: Partakers in Scandal 
It is a hard, naked, truth that Christian organisations have blessed and baptised the war 
of destabilisation in Mozambique. They blatantly scandalised the Gospel of justice. 
Religious groups of the New Right, with unqualified support from Reagan who was 
himself their faithful and aggressive adherent, had a political and destabilising role to 
play in Mozambique. These groups, all of which were either American or South African, 
saw themselves as defenders of the Christian faith, waging a "holy" war for Jesus Christ 
and against the anti-Christian communists. They launched operations based on 
ignorance and misinformation. The fact that hard-line right-wingers painted a caricature 
of Mozambique in the U.S.A., and the geographical distance itself between U.S.A. and 
Mozambique, counted greatly for ideological distortions which led religious groups to 
partake in scandal, to partake in the table of the prince of evil. Most Americans and, 
indeed, Westerners at large were incapable of looking beyond these pre-tailored 
caricatures and gross distortions about Mozambique. 
Ian Grey, a young man from Australia, went to Tel Aviv, Israel, in 1986. There he was to 
encounter an extraordinary religious experience, after which he felt equipped to work for 
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Jesus in Africa. Recruited later in the same year "to do the Lord's work" in Mozambique, 
he repeatedly entered the country illegally from Malawi, worked in Rename held areas,· 
supplying Rename with Bibles and other goods, and also relaying messages between 
Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo's President) and Thomas Schaff, a Rename spokesman in 
Washington and a former missionary to Mozambique 1• His work had helped raise funds 
for Rename in the U.S.A. in the name of Jesus. After his arrest on 2nd November 1987, 
he was sentenced to ten and a half years in prison. He then admitted that he had been 
misinformed and fooled. He also apologised for causing harm to the people of 
Mozambique (Gifford 1988:75; van Koevering 1992:115). When interviewed, this is what 
he said to an Australian newspaper: 
I was na'ive, foolish, and was a tool of those who committed horrendous acts against 
the Mozambican people ... I was duped by political Christians into believing that the 
MNR [Renamo] were freedom fighters and churches were being destroyed ... When I 
heard from my father [who had come from Australia to attend the trial] that there was 
religious freedom and more churches now than when Frelimo took over at 
independence from Portugal in 1975, I realised how I had been duped ... 
I saw a lot of suffering in the areas I preached. Some had only bark for clothing. But 
today I realise the only way to change that is to get rid of the MNR. Without South 
African support, and the support of people in the United States who back 
organisations like Shekinah, I do not believe the MNR could survive (quoted in Gifford 
1988:75, italics in the original). 
Religious groups-Jesus Alive, Rhema Bible Church, South African Kwasizabantu 
Mission, The Unification Church (Moonies), Jimmy Swaggard Ministries, World Vision 
International (WVI), among others-confused the people with their theology, diverting 
their attention from the pressing national issues of development and peace. These 
groups had no interest in or will for involvement with the social, political or economic 
realities of Mozambicans. Since Mozambicans were "dying in their sins," these groups 
had no time for all these "worldly things" and what had to be done (evangelism) had to 
be done as quickly as possible. They displayed typical fundamentalist attitudes and 
indifference. As van Koevering (1992:120) points out: 
0 
1 It is a well known fact that some Christian missionaries had umbiguous, and sometimes 
sinister, roles to play in Mozambican politics. Besides Thomas Schaff, another example is 
that of Rev. Armand Miller Doll, also an American missionary to Mozambique for the Church 
of the Nazarene. He was arrested and imprisoned in 1975 for allegedly working for the CIA 
After his release, the Church of the Nazarene crowned him in the U.S.A. as a true saint, who 
had been rescued from the valley of the shadow of death through the prayers of the 
American faithful, the holier than thou. 
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These groups often label involvement in "worldly concerns" as "secular humanism". 
For them "the world" includes all human society outside God - politics, religion, 
commerce, and entertainment, education and world organisations .... Christians who 
talk of "the people", "the people's rights", "oppression and liberation" are thought to be 
promoting humanism .... [Consequently,) relief, as a quick response and means to 
an end, becomes the preference, rather than development. Even where there might 
be involvement in development projects, seminars or training programmes, the 
emphasis is usually on the spiritual growth of the participants (through Bible studies, 
prayer and fasting and teaching) with little or no attention paid to self-sufficiency, 
independence and institutional or organisational development and support. 
When this theology was challenged, it was for them another proof, a clear indication, 
that Mozambique was a communist country which persecuted Christians. It would 
outrage American right wing Christian brothers and sisters, prompting them to offer 
unqualified support to Rename. 
2. 5. 3 End of Hostility? 
To the shock of Washington, in the same year (that the USA tightened its foreign policy 
against its allegedly communist enemy, the Frelimo government, and in support of its 
ally Rename) Rename massacred 424 people in Homoine Hospital, kidnapped a US 
nurse, and committed wide-spread atrocities. A few months later the US State 
Department commissioned a study by a former US official, Robert Gersony, who 
interviewed refugees and catalogued Renamo's atrocities. He stated in 1988 that, "The 
level of violence reported to be conducted by Rename against the civilian population is 
extraordinarily high. It is conservatively estimated that 100 000 civilians may have been 
murdered by Rename." Speaking at a conference in Maputo on 26 April 1988, Ray 
Stacey, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, accused Rename 
of carrying out "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since 
World War II." Rename had been "waging a systematic and brutal war of terror against 
Mozambican civilians through forced labour, starvation, physical abuse and wanton 
killing," he stated (in Hanon 1992:47). 
Frelimo was ultimately made to comply with certain political concessions demanded by 
the USA and its Western allies. Subsequently the relations between Mozambique and 
Western countries improved and Mozambique became the largest recipient of US 
assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the West felt that the concessions made by 
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Mozambique were not enough, on the one hand. On the other hand, these concessions 
constituted a terrible sin for the East. So Frelimo was under pressure from both sides. 
Amid destabilisation and starvation among the people, Frelimo was perplexed. That is 
why Jorge Rebelo, a Politburo member, explained to a party meeting before the Fifth 
Party Congress, that, 
there is the problem of the United States. At a meeting between US Congressmen 
and President Chissano, the key point was: "Are you a Marxist? If so, you are our 
enemy." The argument used by the reactionary forces is that Frelimo is Marxist-
Leninist and so must be destroyed. And the socialist countries say we are not Marxist-
Leninist either. So we are being attacked for something which we are not. Therefore, 
the new party statutes will not mention Marxism-Leninism, firstly in order to be 
coherent with ourselves, and secondly so as not to give ammunition to the enemy 
(cited in Hanlon 1992:49). 
In any case, the US change of attitudes toward Mozambique triggered the inflow of aid 
from the Western block. 
2. 6 Aid Invasion 
2. 6. 1 The Landing of Aid 
It is interesting to note that the Western powers have so skilfully mastered the craft of 
manipulation. They have expertise in the art. For them anything has a potential to be 
subjected to manipulations for opportunistic self-interests. They not only know how to 
use violence and arms to destabilise a country for the sake of their interests, but they 
also know how to use food aid for that end. The coming of aid to Mozambique was in 
such a way that it became similar to sheer invasion to promote donor country interests 
for further destabilisation of the country. Suddenly, massive bands of NGO 
representatives annoyingly flooded the country to such an extent that the Government 
was unable to control them. It soon became impossible to control "the vultures" in a 
"Disaster Tourism", as Joe Hanlon (1992:97) called them. Joe Hanlon was there and it is 
best to reproduce his dramatisation of the phenomenon. 
Mozambican officials had no experience of the freewheeling and freebooting 
international aid community that descended like vultures smelling a dying animal .... 
the delegations were flooding unchecked into Maputo from international organisations, 
OPAGE 0460 
bilateral donors, and NGOs. Journalists, TV crews, and researchers joined the torrent. 
Each potential donor had to see starving babies for themselves; each expected to talk 
with a government minister, irrespective of whether their help was to be millions of 
dollars or a few old clothes. Delegations normally consisted of several people, who 
often expected to be put at the best hotel in Maputo; some complained about the 
vagaries of the air conditioning and that the food was not up to international standard. 
Most demanded cars and translators. They expected to be flown to lnhambane, even 
though there was no scheduled fair link. And looking at starving babies is hard and 
thirst work, so all expected to be fed and watered during their brief stay in lnhambane. 
Mozambique knew it had no choice. It was dependent on press coverage and on the 
first hand reports of the visitors if it was to attract food aid and break the de facto aid 
boycott (1992:97). 
The subsequent landing of the NGOs was equally a haphazard one, resembling 
invasion. As Hanlon (1992:98) continues to report, 
Next came the flood of donors planning to set up on the ground, particularly in 
lnhambane. The shock troops were NGOs. Some came on their own, some through 
governments and the EC, and some under UN auspices. Church groups, largely 
excluded in the past, were prominent in the first wave. All wanted office space and 
housing in Maputo and facilities in the provinces -- immediately. Failure by an 
overworked official or minister to respond to a donor demand was taken either as 
further evidence that Third World governments do not want to help their own starving 
people, or as proof of cupidity. 
Some NGOs set out for the provinces with virtually no liaison with the government. In 
several cases an agency set up a project that duplicated something another agency 
was already doing. Some tried to bypass the government health and food 
administration system .... 
.... Like an animal dazzled by car headlights, the country seemed paralysed and did 
not know which way to turn .... 
Meanwhile the presence of bilateral donors, the UN, and the IMF and World Bank 
was increasing rapidly. 
2. 6. 2 Non-Governmental Organisations? 
Many of the Non-Governmental Organisations were hardly Non-Governmental 
Organisations. In effect, they were strictly governmental-contractors of the donor 
governments-working to establish the interests of their governments. USAID is not an 
NGO. For the sake of our study it nevertheless merits special mention. In fact, the point 
here is that the so-called NGOs are de facto governmental organisations or GOs. 
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The USAID budget was approved and the 1984-1987 US policy on aid made the US 
interests clear. The "US objectives" in Southern Africa included "continued Western 
access to the minerals and raw materials in the region" and to "support the development 
of the private sector." Not only that, but also the region "offers a largely untapped market 
for US goods and services" (in Hanlon 1992:43). 
In Mozambique assistance was granted "in response to the GPRM [Mozambican 
government] policy changes giving priority to the private sector." The USAID had three 
distinctive "short-term objectives" in view: "humanitarian assistance," "to promote the 
development of the private sector," and "to promote privatisation." This way the USAID 
pressured the Mozambican government to implement policy changes liberalising 
agricultural prices, increasing private sector participation in production and marketing of 
agricultural inputs, and privatising state and intervened companies (USAID Mozambique 
Action Plan FY 1989). 
By 1989 the US had its aid entirely tied to its political interests. Its policy had set "new 
conditions for US emergency famine assistance," in particular that "food distribution 
must be allowed to be handed entirely by international organisations and kept separate 
from the distribution net-work of the recipient government." USAID channelled its funds 
through its three main home contractors: Care, World Vision, and the Adventist 
Development Relief Agency (ADRA). Mozambique was coerced to let these agencies 
distribute food aid as freely as they saw fit. Care administered over US$300 million of 
USAID money per year in 37 countries. World Vision is a right-wing, anti-Communist 
Christian organisation, which used aid as part of its evangelism 1. WV had anti-Frelimo 
sentiments and it has not shown signs of change. World Vision International 
administered over US$200 million of USAID money (Hanlon 1992 48-52). 
0 
1 As Gifford (1988:62) observes, World Vision International is indeed "bedevilled by its own 
history" world-wide. "Historically, World Vision has been distrusted by other aid agencies, the 
main complaints being: its linking of aid to proselytising, even using aid to pressurise 
recipients to accept evangelical Christianity; its high administration costs; its refusal to face 
the root causes of the suffering it tries to alleviate; its insistence that it should never 'take 
sides' politically, but remain 'neutral' in every situation; etc." Besides, "its limitless funds and 
large headquarters [in Vietnam] opposite the United States embassy emphasised its [world-
wide] close links with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)." 
Furthermore, "Its willingness to report its activities to USAID led to charges" that it was 
furnishing CIA with high-profile information in order to enable the latter to launch smooth 
OPAGE 0480 
These "NGOs" and other aid agents representing the interests of their donor countries 
set up independent parallel structures and distribution programmes in direct competition 
with the Mozambican government so as to isolate the government from the people and 
thereby toppling it. For where starving people saw these NGOs-rather than the 
government-taking care of their hunger, they consequently lost faith in the government 
in favour of these NGOs. The NGOs and aid agencies ran and expanded faster than 
the government had planned. 
The NGOs further accelerated destabilisation by creating and stimulating a brain drain 
from the state to their ranks. They offered seductive salaries-though extremely low in 
international standards they claimed to hold on to-to seduce qualified personnel from 
the state to their ranks. The flight of the state's best personnel has not been 
documented but it has reached frightening proportions as more NGOs and private 
foreign companies invade the country and do the same thing. The result is the state's 
inability to deliver social services to the people. This way there is still further 
destabilisation even after the war. 
NGOs stimulated and fed the demand and hunger for hard currency in the black market, 
where illegal money dealers operate to export money from the country. NGO officials 
have been the main feeders of the black market with hard currency in Mozambique. Had 
it not been for the NGO and donor agency officials, the foreign exchange in the black 
market would not have survived. After all they controlled more than three quarters of the 
dollars available in the country. As we shall see in the next chapter, NGOs and donors 
stimulated and fed corruption. They are partly guilty for the present moral decay in this 
country. 
operations to dismantle communism. No wonder the relations between the Mozambican 
government and World Vision remained always precarious. 
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2. 7 Programa de Reabilitacao Economica - PRE 
2. 7. 1 Towards PRE 
There was a crisis in 1982-1983 which was caused by draught and South African-
orchestrated destabilisation, and a cut-off of aid credit. There were, of course, structural 
problems, but these had been part of the colonial legacy, related to the cost of imposing 
sanctions against Rhodesia and the impact of South African destabilisation. But in the 
negotiations with Frelimo, the IMF and World Bank were too blind to see these historical 
events and consider them, and too deaf to listen to the truth. Instead, the Fund and 
Bank argued that the crisis was caused by the state control of the economy, an 
explosive growth of money supply, excessive management of foreign exchange, and too 
few exports. They pushed for structural adjustment with sweeping measures: a virtual 
end to all controls and denationalisation of virtually all economic and social services: 
health, education, property, and industry. They demanded that the ration system in 
Beira and Maputo be abolished, and that the Metical (Mozambican currency) be 
devalued from the official rate of MT 40 to the black market rate of MT1500 to the US$. 
All these demands were made without a slight knowledge of Mozambique with its 
specific problems of the destabilising war. The first experiment with the free market had 
already started in early 1984 when the government responded to a charcoal traders' 
strike by allowing a completely free market in Maputo for firewood. As Joe Hanlon saw it 
that year in Maputo: 
[T]he effect was dramatic and prophetic: all available vehicles, including private cars, 
drove out to rural areas and firewood poured into the city [a continuing phenomenon 
as yet]. But the price was high; firewood to cook one day's meal for a family cost more 
than the daily minimum wage for a worker. And, as was to happen repeatedly later, 
the market did not "work"-prices remained high as market stall holders sat behind 
mountains of unsold firewood (1992:116). 
In any event, Frelimo, having originally resisted outside pressure, finally saw that it was 
fighting the behemoths and leviathans of the hard old wild West: the USA, IMF, World 
Bank, EC, including Frelimo's own old friends. Frelimo began to bow significantly as a 
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sign of capitulation to its White masters. Mozambique joined the Fund and the Bank 
formally in September 1984. 
A wave of deregulation and liberalisation followed. In May 1985 there was further 
liberalisation of regulation on business. Companies were allowed to import and export 
directly. State owned companies were removed formally from the government 
apparatus. There was permission for the first time to use money to pay directors and 
workers in forex or goods bought in forex. In the . same month the world Bank 
announced its first loan to Mozambique worth $US45 million for spare parts and raw 
material for industry. Only later in June-six months late!-did the government 
announce the plan and budget for 1985. Since this was in the context of the 
destabilising war, there was a major increase in military expenditure. Health and 
education budgets were cut significantly by 15 per cent. The fact that Mozambique was 
a war economy was ignored and no provision for defence was made. 
2. 7.2 The Reforms and Objectives of PRE 
As already stated, the Bank and the Fund were not happy with Frelimo's concessions, 
as they felt they were not enough. Under pressure Frelimo announced its own version of 
structural adjustment in 1987: Programa de Reabilitacao Economica (Economic 
Rehabilitation Program) known as PRE. This was done without the IMF and Bank 
approval. Despite the fact that the programme did not include all and complete demands 
of the IMF and Bank, it was sharply and decisively liberal. The objectives of the 
programme were to: 
a. reverse the decline in production; 
b. ensure a minimum level of consumption and income, especially for the 
rural population; 
c. reduce domestic financial imbalances; 
d. strengthen the balance of payments position; and 
e. lay the foundation for economic growth (RPM 1987 in Hanlon 1992: 18). 
More specific aims were to: 
a. increase agricultural production for domestic consumption, export, and 
ag roindustries 
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b. increase industrial production to support agricultural marketing, for import 
substitution, and to stimulate the development of exports ... 
c. rehabilitate physical infrastructure ... 
d. increase international rail and port traffic; and 
e. mobilise external resources and allocate them to priority sectors (RPM 
1987 in Hanlon 1992: 119). 
PRE involved a wide range of actions. There was 20 per cent devaluation at once, from 
US$1=MT40 to US$1=MT200 (the Black market rate then was US$1=MT1500). 
Consumer prices were increased. Prices for basic food, water and electricity doubled. 
Prices of goods such as beer, cigarettes, newspapers, bus fares, postage, telephone 
and wide range of similar items tripled. Prices for other items, including soap and 
paraffin for lighting, increased five-fold or more. Regulation had been officially declared 
a criminal offence. Wages were increased by between 50 to 100 per cent. New wage 
rules encouraged bonuses, incentives, and profit sharing, and permitted greater 
differences between high and low paid. Private employers and the state were 
encouraged to lay off workers "wherever possible." The state was instructed to re-
deploy underused staff if possible. Prices paid to farmers were increased: maize price 
was tripled, prices of peanuts and beans increased four-fold. MT3 billion marketing fund 
was established to ensure that consumer goods reached the countryside, to stimulate 
peasant production, which did not impress the IMF and WB. The marketing board and 
its fund were later eliminated following orders from the IMF and WB. The taxation 
system was restructured and income tax was expanded, with rates between 6 and 15 
per cent. Total tax income was significantly increased. Rents were substantially 
increased. The state budget was made more transparent to IMF and WB and included 
all subsidies, many of which had been hidden as bank credits. Price subsidies for the 
year were set at MT 7 billion (about US$ 35 mn) and subsidies to state companies to MT 
14 billion. Limits were imposed on the size of the budget and the current account deficit 
was capped at MT 30 billion. Bank credit regulations were sharply tightened and credit 
was no longer to be used as a hidden subsidy to private and state companies. Interest 
rates increased substantially. However they still remained less than the rate of inflation, 
meaning that the real interest rates remained negative. Aid funds were to be directed 
less to development projects and more to the purchase of raw materials and spare parts 
for local industry. New regulation was planned to encourage national and foreign private 
investment (PRM 1987 in Hanlon 1992:119-120). 
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2. 7.3 The Social Impact of PRE 
Following PRE there came a socio-economic catastrophe, for PRE measures had been 
socio-ecq_ng_miQ_s.uie!ide. There was a sh_arJ:? _deterioration of livelihoods, resulting in 
sharp ris.~s in absolute poverty. The state cut its food subsidies in urban areas, resulting 
in disastrous consequences. Vendors and shopkeepers stayed behind huge stocks of 
unsold goods. People could no longer afford buying, as their purchasing power had 
been crushed badly by PRE measures. In rural areas the terms of trade of the peasants 
deteriorated sharply. In fact, with destabilisation, the commercial network in these areas 
was brought to a complete halt. The industrial sector did not get any better, it rather 
continued to decline. The agricultural sector was badly affected, too. In such economic 
conditions the IMF, the World Bank, and other Western powers, demanded more 
devaluations, deregulations, privatisations, further reduction of state's social 
expenditure, increase of taxes, cuts in food subsidies, and further government removal 
from the national economic activity. It is a well known fact that Mozambique has 
implemented the whole package of the BWls' demands. Joseph Hanlon's essay (1997), 
"It's the l.M.F. that Runs Mozambique," gives clear account of this. 
2.8 Summary and Conclusions 
Portuguese colonialism has had enormous, negative socio-economic effects on 
Mozambique. By independence more than 500 000 men had been exported-some had 
died-to the gold mines of South Africa and Rhodesia. Other tens of thousands had 
died or were disabled in forced labour. Other thousands had been exported as free 
labour to Sao Tome as part of the punishment for resisting colonial authorities, many of 
whom never returned. Portuguese colonialism probably cost Mozambique more than 
1 000 000 men in human capital. Economically speaking, these men were wasted labour 
or human capital, thanks to deaths in chibalo and involuntary migration. They could have 
been invested or employed for the development of Mozambique. Since no were costly. 
By the time Frelimo took over the country the entire forex reserve had been money is 
worth a human life, this is a damage which cannot be estimated in amounts of dollars, 
and which cannot be repaired. 
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Before independence Mozambique's assets had turned into deficits. The growing illegal 
exportation of capital just before and during the eve of independence drained and 
reduced to only a million dollars. This phenomenon did not stop after independence. 
False importations and unpaid exportation escalated, which led to centralisation and 
increased bureaucracy in exportation and importation. This was followed by massive 
sabotages by the fleeing Portuguese, causing more economic damages. 
The dependence nature of the colonial socio-economic system continued with stubborn 
persistence for more than five years after independence. Mozambique had to continue 
depending on South Africa and Rhodesia for its socio-economic livelihood. By then the 
Rhodesian and South African destabilisation was built up and the creation of Renamo in 
Rhodesia was underway. With the demise of Smith's regime and the birth of Zimbabwe 
under Zanu, South Africans became the new lords of Renamo. This marked an 
accentuation of South African military destabilisation through a vastly reinforced 
Renamo. This did not happen without either silent or pronounced support by the United ,~Tf -"\'-l':b 
\. :--l:..~ States. ~'s ~zy-$;( 
;---~ . >;u~ 
By the time the war ended in 1992, there was n.a.._rur~L Jrag~, tran~R.,Qrt, and 
con:i_l'l'lunicatiQJl~§y_stems. Millions had become entirely dependent on relief aid. More 
than 90 per cent had become poor, and more than 60 per cent were in absolute poverty. 
More than a million had died either in war or in brutal Renamo massacres. Hundreds of 
thousands had become refugees, some in neighbouring countries-where they were 
exploited as free or cheap labour-and others displaced internally. The rural education 
and health systems had been completely destroyed. The industrial and agricultural 
sectors had collapsed. 
Mozambique had become the poorest and most aid-dependent country in the world. 
Destabilisation forced Mozambique to turn to the West and accept aid on the West's 
conditions. Donors manipulated food aid and allowed tens of thousands to die in order 
to win political concessions. With the claims of being more competent and closer to the 
people, and acting as contractors of donor governments in Mozambique the NGOs 
proved to be more interested in undermining the government than in helping the people. 
These were "missionaries" paving the way and preparing the ground for actual re-
colonisation. 
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In short-and with the exclusion of losses to human lives-it is estimated that the 
destabilisation caused Mozambique over 19 billion dollars. By 1992 Mozambique's 
foreign debt was well over US$ 4 billion. A combination of the losses of colonialism and 
of destabilisation would shock any decent human imagination. It is clear injustice, 
therefore, for countries like Portugal to turn around now and, on the basis of sheer 
technicalities (as we shall see in the next chapter), claim that Mozambique owes them. 
These are the compounded problems since colonialism, brought forward after the war of 
destabilisation. Mozambique was to devise development programmes, restructuring and 
adjusting its economic anatomy, to reverse the situation\The following chapter is an 
outline of such socio-economic transformations en route t~ economic recove~ The 
focus will be on the Government and the Bretton Woods (IMF and World Bank) 
marriage as the major adversaries in the new socio-economic and political dispensation. 
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Chapter Three 
Socio-Economic Reconstruction, Foreign Opportunism and 
Social Disintegration in Post-War Mozambique 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the current socio-economic situation in Mozambique. It surveys 
the socio-economic conditions in this post-war dispensation; analyses the socio-
economic policies implemented mainly by the BWls and the Government, such as the 
National Reconstruction Plan, structural adjustment and economic stabilisation; and 
probes into the social aftermath of these policies, i.e. social disintegration, opportunism, 
and the collapse of civil services. It also explores the effects that these socio-economic 
dynamics have on the national development and reconstruction programme. 
3.2 The National Reconstruction Plan: Picking Up Pieces 
The National Reconstruction Plan is an instrument of the Government created to 
coordinate the political actions to be developed in the ambit o@construction of the 
socio-cultural and economic fabric of the country destroyed by the w~] 
The National Reconstruction Plan, by its nature, essence, and \Qbjectives, is an 
instrument that combines a component of rehabilitation of man with rehabilitation of 
various elements that compose a society, aiming at the betterment of Mozambicans' 
life conditions, particularly in the rural zones"lPRN 1993: 1 ). 
,.._; 
Thus opens unequivocally the PRN document. 
The General Peace Agreement was signed on the 4th October, 1992. The need for 
reconstruction was evident for everyone to see. Subsequently the Government 
formulated and published, in 1993, the Plano de Reconstrur;ao Nacional, a document 
which comprehensively\§iagnosed the war damages and outlined the Reconstruction 
...... ~~"'\ 
Programme, setting its priorities, goals and objectives for the medium and long term~ 
The period just after the war was one of optimism, both for the Government and the civil 
society in general. We were all optimistic that it was the dawning of the new era in which 
the long, long, years of socio-economic and political oppression-years of fleeing from 
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death, hunger, fear and pain-'-would be dissipated. We believed it would be an era of 
social justice, democracy (political and economic), economic prosperity and better lives. 
We believed it would be a golden age. We had legitimate expectations, for they rose 
from our deep need for the life most wholesome-the life worth living"""""'.the need to live 
dignified lives. 
.-At the time of the General Peace Agreement in Santo Egidio, \the entire population had 
...--
been affected by the war. The effects had a dual impact: a beneficial impact on a small 
layer of the population, and a negative one on the majority. The war had destroyed the 
rural social fabric and use of the land, cutting drastically the food production and 
increasing dependence on international ai~ According to the Plano de ReconstrU<;ao 
Nacional, "The emergency necessities reached more than 300 000 tons/annum of 
cereals, being known as the most critical moments in the years 1991-1992 in which 
draught worsened the deprivation" (1993:19). 
The document reports that the number of the people to be resettled was 5 million, of 
which 3.5 million were displaced and 1.5 million were refugees. The concentration of the 
population in the squalid shanty towns around the cities, in the refugee camps, in the 
accommodation camps, determined the\:fapid aggravation of education and health 
conditions( as well as the moral and cultural values of the majority of the population . 
... ,,.~ 
The increase of uncontrolled hunting and irresponsible cutting of trees (leaving waste 
lands behind) aggravated the environmental conditions. This agglomeration also created 
new situations of penury, aggravating urban problems, creating new situations in the 
ambit of housing and employment, and increasing crime and delinquency in the cities. 
The military demobilisation rendered ineffective a total of 107 000 men in the entire 
national territory between June 1993 and July 1994. It was hoped that approximately 50 
per cent of the demobilised men would return to their places of origin in the rural areas 
and that the remaining would be integrated into the urban formal and informal sectors. 
All these processes involved movements in the national territory, consisting of more than 
one third of the Mozambican population who were to be resettled within a period of three 
years. There were enormous difficulties. The document observes that, 
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The major part of the economic and social infrastructures for the welcoming of the 
population and for the normalisation of the rural life are inoperative or destroyed and 
the functioning of the operative infrastructures lack the personnel, equipment and 
adequate materials. Parallelly, the minimum structures for the functioning of a system 
of public administration of national level are practically non-existing (PRN 1993: 19). 
On the diagnosis of destroyed infrastructures that needed reconstruction, the document 
makes grim reading: 
""1. Health. About 36% of the health posts and 21% of the health centres are 
inoperational (PRN 1993:20). The actual operational health network in 
terms of health post and centres, correspond to about one third of the 
network existent in 1980, and it is constituted by 643 health posts, 220 
Health Centres, 21 Rural Hospitals, 4 General Hospitals, 7 Provincial 
Hospitals (PRN 1993:46). 
-~:2. Education. Of the 5 743 level I and 199 level II primary schools, 47% 
and 13.1 % are destroyed, respectively (PRN 1993:20). The education 
network was completely destroyed in numerous districts and a high 
number of teachers were victimised. There was a desequilibrium between 
the network of level I and level II primary schools. In 1992 there were 3 
051 level I primary schools and 174 level II primary schools, showing that 
the capacity of the level 11 schools was too tiny in relation to the demands 
of level I graduates. This resulted in overloading the reduced number of 
remaining schools, where a school would have classes of up to 60 pupils, 
and thus degrading the education (PRN 1993:51 ). But still the demands of 
level I graduates were not met. I, for instance, like many others, was 
forced to be out of school in 1984 and 1991 for lack of space in schools. 
The University has been only one and it could not absorb the huge army 
of secondary school graduates, who came from the country's ten 
provinces. 
"'"'.?3. Water Supply. The Government recognises that water supply "is one of 
the fundamental basic conditions for the development of the national 
human capital" (PRN 1993:40). 28.3% of the wells, 32% of the bore holes 
and 54% of the small systems of water supply, are currently destroyed 
(PRN 1993:21). 
-~;4. Commerce. Nationally, during the war, 3 699 shops and canteens of the 
rural commercial network are currently destroyed and or non-operational. 
This represents 36% of retail commerce network. While in 1980 the 
existing coverage was 1 277 people per shop, in 1992 it was 1 806 per 
shop. The commercial network was heavily concentrated around urban 
zones. The ratio of people per shop was, in the urban zones, 933, 
compared with 2 965 in the districts. Banks and central warehouses were 
less affected due to their geographical concentration, fundamentally, in 
the provincial capitals and urban zones (PRN 1993:32-33). 
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-;:::, 5. Agriculture. " ... [T]he commercialised agricultural production is, still, 
sufficiently inferior to the levels before the Independence, and the total 
production of food is very low to the levels required to guarantee national 
nutrition self-sufficiency" (PRN 1993:23). The infrastructures that support 
agricultural production reveal an elevated degree of destruction-watering 
system 21%; small dams 68% and seed multiplication centres 41% (PRN 
1993:20). 
-\ 6. Livestock Farming. The cattle constitute a reserve of value for rainy 
- days (bad agricultural years), for they generate additional earnings to 
those obtained from agricultural activity and offer animal pulling force that 
permit the increase of productivity of work on the soil. But sicknesses, 
degradation of accessible pastures, destruction of the veterinary control 
structures-all these caused by the war-reduced the livestock population 
so poignantly. The livestock population in 1992 was about 19% of that 
existent in 1980. The percentage of destroyed tanks carrecicidas is 67% 
(PRN 1993:20). 
_ ...:f.. Road/Bridge Systems. The reactivation of the national economic life 
..- depends directly on the degree to which the road and bridge systems are 
operational. This infrastructure is invaluable for all mobilities of the people 
and goods in perspective of reintegration, also in perspective of 
production and commerce on national, regional, provincial and local 
levels. The total road network by 1992 was 29 000 km, of which 5 000 
were dusty roads. Of these all, 8 000 km were totally destroyed and 
completely impassable-14 000 km were in worse conditions of use-4 
000 km were in reasonable conditions-and only 3 000 were in good 
conditions (PRN 1993:35-40). 
The document observes that the recuperation of these units implies costs whose value 
is equivalent to that of a new construction. It was estimated that to rebuild the war 
damages Mozambique would~eed more than US$20 billi0,~1 In other words, the war 
damages amounted to more than this amount. Apart from these damages, there are 
~~reparable war damag~ The war caused more than a million deaths (Hanlon 1992:31-
42; 1995:15). Besides, there is the~st generatio-~j These are hundreds of thousands of 
children of the early 1980s who have either no idea of the whereabouts of their parents, 
or have suffered the terrible trauma of watching their parents being butchered by 
Renamo, and who have been malnourished in their critical early years and will be 
permanently stunned, both physically and mentally. This shows to what extent 
destabilisation had succeeded in accomplishing its mission. As the PRN document 
states, "the reconstruction constitutes a gigantic challenge for the actors of 
Mozambican society, taking into account the scarcity of internal savings, of a qualified 
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labour force and the implementation of a policy of structural adjustment of a restrictive 
character" (PRN 1993:21). 
The General Peace Agreement brought with it some high expectations of a better 
future. As people who had seen their lives hardened, we began looking to the future with 
hope. It was only logical and common sense to believe that peace would bring benefits: 
that roads, shops, schools, health posts, clinics, hospitals, agricultural support 
infrastructures, etc., would be rebuilt or reopened. 
The Plan of National Reconstruction stated its objectives very clearly: "The National 
Reconstruction Plan is a Government instrument created to guide the actions and 
policies to be developed in the scope of the reconstruction of the socio-cultural and 
economic fabric of the country destroyed by the war" (PRN 1993:1). The Government, 
as everyone else, saw and understood the need for reconstruction very clearly.\Jhe 
reconstruction programme, then, was also intended to rebuild, not only economically, 
but socially and culturally, to create social circumstances in which Mozambicans would 
live with dignity, expressing themselves in their own ident% The PRN was to allow us to 
live in dignity as human beings. 
In the economic sector the Government highlighted the following objectives as its 
priority: 
To reconstruct the socio-economic fabric, destroyed by war, be it in the rural or 
urban zones, contributing thus for poverty reduction; 
To create a favourable integration to the private investment, national and 
foreign; 
To reduce progressively the country's food deficit, contributing for 
verbalisation of the balance of payments on medium term; 
To empower the Government and enable it to play its rightful role on central and 
provincial levels; 
To develop the human capital through the improvement of education levels, 
professional training and health (PRN 1993:2). 
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The document also states that amongst the economic objectives, the reintegration of the 
population and the reconstruction of the necessary infrastructure for reintegration 
assume the greatest relevance (PRN 1993:2). 
3.3 Important Development Indicators 
3.3.1 Macro-Economic Indicators 
Mozambique's economic indicators of 1992 are appallingly low. The gross domestic 
product (GDP) was US$86 per capita, and its growth rate was about 2.1 per cent. The 
inflation rate was 54.5 per cent (Hanlon 1995:161). The Export of goods and services 
was valued at US$362 million compared to US$1 214 million of imports. The forex 
reserve was valued at US$233 million. The current account balance was way bellow 
zero valued at US$352 million. The external debt was US$4 741 million. (Global 
Development Finance, World Bank 1998:388-389-see Table 3.1, p. 75). This situation 
reveals how imperative economic rebuilding was. 
3.3.2 Social Indicators 
There are no aggregate social indicators referent to 1992. But through those of 1993 we 
can have a realistic picture of how the situation was in 1992. Of 190 029 live births in 
1993 25 454 were low weight births, representing 13.4 per cent. Fertility rate or children 
per mother was 6.6. Life expectancy or longevity was grimly low, at 45 years. Infant 
mortality per 1000 children was 128. Illiteracy was poignantly high reaching 72 per cent 
levels. (Anuario Estatistico, INE 1996:37). 
These indicators are continuously aggravated by the fact that the Government was 
incapable of providing civil services. As Oxfam International confirms, "As dramatic as 
these comparisons are, they fail to capture the direct human toll that Mozambique's 
incapacity to provide basic services has on the population of the country" (1997:6). This 
incapacity is due to the civil war, NGOs, Donor Governments-as we saw in the 
previous chapter-and the Bretton Wood institutions' policies (IMF and Bank)-as we 
shall further see in the subsequent pages. 
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3.4 Participants in the Mozambican Economy 
There are major actors in the economy who deliberate and determine how our 
livelihoods should be restored. These actors dictate all the terms of life in the 
Mozambican society. We should now set out to examine each of them. 
3.4. 1. The Role of the State 
It is generally believed that governments must have decisive roles to play in their 
countries' economies. We, too, share the same belief in Mozambique. The only 
difference is that the\Government in Mozambique is apparently not sovereign; it does 
not have full power t~ decide anything in favour of its citizen3 There is a common 
popular saying among ordinary Mozambicans: o governo mor;ambicanao e moleza (the 
Mozambican Government is weak). Everyone-children, young and adult people-uses 
these terms to describe how weak is the state in Mozambique. In fact, the weakest state 
in the world, they say. The reason, among others 1, of course, is that any foreigner 
comes in and is allowed to do and undo as s/he pleases, while complicating the lives of 
the Mozambicans to unbearable measures. No one in government dares say anything2. 
The UNDP has recently described the state as ,;in reality. . . a sleeping partne? 
(1998:69) in the economy. 
This state of affairs represents one of the successes of destabilisation, structural 
adjustment and the aid/poverty industry. Mozambique has been made highly dependent 
on aid from the international community, hence it is prevented from fashioning its own 
0 
1 
2 
For example, the floods took most people by surprise, but certainly not the state. Through its 
meteorological facilities, the government knew ahead of the coming floods and cyclones but 
it deliberately failed to take any preventative measures or precautions for rescuing the 
population. When the floods hit the country the government did not have even a single boat 
or helicopter. It cried shamelessly to the international community for help. The material as 
well as mental weakness of the government throws people into great vulnerability. 
There are many popular criminal cases, all of which involve foreigners: drug dealing cases 
since 1994, e.g. a mandrax factory was neutralised early this year by the police in one of 
Maputo squalid shanty towns; a $60 million robbery in 1996 at Banco Comercial de 
Mocambique, the largest bank in Mozambique, which implicates high government officials; 
human organ trafficking; etc. No one has been brought to book yet, and no one mentions 
any of them. 
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reconstruction and development strategy outlined in the PRN. As Jude Howell 
(1994:328) observes: 
In the current unipolar world dominated by free market orthodoxy, Frelimo ... faces 
the Hobson's choice of either 'going it alone', which given the dire state of the 
economy is impossible, or accepting the conditions laid down by multilateral agencies 
and donor governments. Its power has become negative and defensive, directed 
towards resisting conditionalities and maximising the benefits to itself of donor 
disagreement. 
Still on the same subject, another analyst (Bowen 1992:259) confirms the situation: 
The externally determined aid conditions have seriously diminished the options open 
to Frelimo-or any successor regime-for self-determination. The retreat of the state 
has meant that western international financial institutions, aided by a variety of other 
agencies and organisations, have increasingly taken over the direction of the 
country's development. Mozambican private capital has remained dependent upon 
the resources made available by the World Bank, multinational enterprises, regional 
development banks, N.G.O.s, and so forth. South African capital, the key economic 
factor during the Portuguese era, has reasserted its dominance in Mozambique, as in 
the rest of Southern Africa . 
. . . the hardships of the economic recovery programme, have eroded the internal 
integrity of Frelimo. Since the mid-1980s, the party has ceased to be a unifying force, 
and ordinary Mozambicans have questioned its legitimacy. 
The Government is not accountable to the people who voted it in power. In fact, of 
course, it has never been. Rather, it is accountable to its gods, the International 
Monetary Institutions and the donor community. In the present socio-economic 
transformations-of structural adjustment and economic stabilisation-the government 
is disempowered to be socially favourable to the people, and it is empowered to be 
oppressive. As another observer comments: 
... structural adjustment requires restricting the involvement of the government in the 
market activities, not their wholesale removal from any role in the economy. In 
Barker's 'triple alliance' model of international capital (World Bank and l.M.F.), private 
capital (foreign and domestic), and (progressive) small farmers, called for by S.A.P.s., 
the state is required for its repressive functions .... the 'modernising' African state will 
remain a critical force to contain the contradiction and conflicts-between regions or 
rural-urban divisions, as well as class, gender, or generational differences-that 
structural adjustment would exacerbate (Bowen 1992:258). 
The state has been brought down to its knees in shameful worship of the international 
monetary institutions. Its role in the development of the country is rather lacking, or 
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oppressive, whenever existent. It is incapable of offering basic civil services. The 
government's role remains as one of a marionette. 
3.4.2 The Role of the BWls 
Two giant actors, in fact, bosses, in Mozambique are the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. They dictate all terms of Mozambican life. The Bank and 
the Fund play different but overlapping roles in the economy. They make different but 
overlapping demands. The Bank imposes its policy of structural adjustment programme 
(SAP). The Fund imposes its policy of economic stabilisation (EST). "In many areas of 
Mozambican life, the IMF and World Bank are more powerful that [sic] the government 
or the new parliament" (Hanlon 1997:17). 
3.4.2. 1 World Bank and the SAPs 
The World Bank is responsible for the processes of structural adjustment programmes. 
The Bank is highly centralised and directed from Washington, DC. It has an office in 
Maputo and a resident representative. It has a country operations manager in 
Washington, DC. These two usually engage in power conflicts (see Hanlon 1996:33-37). 
The 1995 Country Assistance Strategy was drafted in Washington without regard to or 
consultation with its own Maputo office. The Bank also has task managers who set 
policy and make loans in specific areas such as roads and agriculture. Normally these 
managers~~Y little or no attention to the local offiiij For instance, "a list of 27 World 
Bank projects published in Maputo gave a Washington DC contact telephone number 
rather than a Maputo number for all but four of them" (Hanlon 1996:33). 
Sponsored by the World Bank, SAP was introduced in 1987 as Programa de 
Reabilita9ao Econ6mica or PRE. In the 1990s it was, however, intensified to accelerate 
the process. SAP was put into place by the Bank as a means of responding to the debt 
crisis and putting Mozambique, as well as other African nations, on a sound economic 
and development footing. 
The SAPs assume that there is a crisis in African economies. According to the WB, the 
crisis has three major components. First, the negative growth rates. These are said to 
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be caused by reduced exports, higher imports, especially of food (grains), and 
overvalued exchange rates. Second, the urban bias on the part of African governments. 
This bias causes low prices to farmers, it is directed against exports, and it subsidises 
imports only for the urban elite. The third is the role and the size of the government. The 
government has inefficient parastatals, owns the major industries, overburdens the 
economy with wages and salaries of the burgeoning civil service; it controls basic 
services; it offers free access to basic services. The government, through all these, 
inhibits economic growth and causes inefficiency. This is the sum and summit of the 
WB's basic argument. It has always blamed the economic crisis on internal causes. It 
completely excludes any possibility that the economic crisis could have external causes. 
As a solution to Africa's crisis, the Bank imposes four basic prescriptions of SAPs. First, 
the export-oriented growth, which holds that African countries must produce for exports 
those products on which they have comparative advantage, and must lower their 
exchange rates. Second, African countries must get prices right, that is, they must 
remove subsidies on imports for urban areas-let the market allocate resources. They 
must also apply market price, that is, a higher price for local producers which will create 
incentives for them to produce more. Third, reduce the role, size and cost of 
Governments. This means privatising parastatals and supporting private traders-
opening up to foreign investment in agro-industries, etc.-cutting wages and salaries of 
civil servants-the public (everyone) must pay for basic services-and privatising all 
basic services. The fourth is the increase in development assistance, linking aid to debt 
management policy reform-increasing the role of World Bank and donors in monitoring 
reform-and increasing the role of the World Bank and donors in providing Structural 
Adjustment Lending. 
The Bank has imposed all these policy measures. With such impositions, Mozambicans 
were pushed too far too fast. For example, the Bank, in its 1995 Country Assistance 
Strategy, set and imposed the following structural adjustment measures and 
conditions: 
1. Privatisation of BCM, a commercial banking arm of the Bank of Mozambique 
2. Customs reform and privatisation of management in the key border posts by 
March 1995. 
3. "Cashew marketing, export licensing liberalisation." 
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4. "Adherence to IMF targets." 
5. Privatising 11 specific enterprises. 
6. Formulating medium term sector policy frameworks in agriculture, education 
and health-the areas of the Bank's main interests. 
7. Bank approval not just of global government budget, but of sectorial budgets 
as well-effectively enforcing policies agreed by the Bank and approved under 
the policy frameworks (cited in Han!on 1996:34; 1997:23). 
3.4.2.2 IMF and EST 
There is no agreement as to the type of economic policy approach used by the Fund. 
Some call it the "Polak mode", others the "Monetarist model" (Hanlon 1996:25-29; Killick 
1995:129-136; Tarp 1993:60-78). Whatever model that be, the IMF, with its 
stabilisation policy programme, is screwing up the Mozambican reconstruction 
programme and making it abortive. Its policy end results are harmful to the country's 
economy. 
The IMF is concerned with economic stabilisation. And it argues that the economy 
cannot stabilise unless inflation is reduced to, at least, one digit number. It also insists 
that there can be no rebuilding of war damages before inflation is curbed. 
Understandably, the IMF is glued to its old fashioned values. A single equation called 
the IMF Financial Programme Model is said to be correct for all countries of the world 
and determines the IMF policy. The equation is: 
BoP-cx/n=a+bx~E-~DC 
where BoP is the balance of payments; (In) is the rate of inflation; (~E) is the change in 
the exchange rate-which is positive for devaluations because the exchange rate rises; 
(~DC) is the change in domestic credit, the sum of loans to the private sector, 
government borrowing, and new money being printed; and a, b, and c are constants 
related to the particular economy (Hanlon 1996:25-29; Killick 1995:129-136; Tarp 
1993:60-78). Since the IMF wants to control both the balance of payments and the 
inflation rate it sets both of them as targets. Hence, the only instruments available to the 
IMF are the exchange rate and domestic credit. That is why since the Government 
joined the IMF in 1984, the Fund called for massive devaluations. Since then 
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Mozambique adopted a floating exchange rate, meaning that the change in exchange 
rate (L.\E) is predicted and not determined. Consequently the only variable is change in 
domestic credit (L.\DC), and the aim of the entire IMF policy for Mozambique is precisely 
to reduce domestic credit. One way of doing this is to limit credit, using the IMF credit 
"ceilings." Another is to reduce government spending. The IMF pursues both ways at 
the same time. Drawing from the equation, the IMF imposes harsh cuts on domestic 
credit and government spending, and it demands increases on taxation to take money 
out of circulation. 
The assumption is that money supply is dependent solely on external earnings and 
internal credit. Therefore, the change in money supply is determined purely by the 
exchange rate and inflation. The argument has been that inflation is caused by too much 
money chasing too few goods. The choice is either to reduce the amount of money and 
thus reduce demand for goods, or to increase the supply of goods so that people may 
have something to spend their money on. The IMF, however, dismisses the second 
possibility as a non-possibility. It then imposes the first one as the sole possibility. As 
Hanlon (1996:29) points out: 
Thus the IMF can say that there is no alternative but to cut domestic credit to reduce 
demand, and its policy is automatically and necessarily deflationary. On neoliberal 
and monetarist political lines the IMF argues that there can be no growth until inflation 
is tamed; that no one will invest in a climate of high inflation, and therefore that 
demand must be squeezed to reduce it. 
As Killick ( 1995: 135) observes, stabilisation induced credit restrictions and sharp rises in 
the rate of exchange which may reduce incomes and outputs. The inevitable outcome in 
such conditions is that the economy cannot grow but shrink, which makes it impossible 
to develop a growth-oriented economy in Mozambique within the confines of the IMF 
stabilisation. 
The IMF imposes cuts by squeezing the Mozambican economy in vain. And as the 
policy does not work, they seek for more things to control and squeeze. Take, for 
example, the fact that the IMF has been disrupting the whole Government budget-by 
tempering with Government receipts, debt service, current deficit/surplus, Government 
investment, and total deficit before grant-and imposing taxation increases so that 
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people may have no money to spend and thereby reduce inflation. The IMF's 
devastating deflationary measures are summarised thus: 
1. Government receipts are revenue from taxes, customs duties, and fees. The IMF 
is demanding that this be increased by nearly a third in less than two years. This is 
intended to be deflationary, making people pay higher taxes instead of spending 
their money. Raising an extra $US 93 in taxes in two years is probably impossible. 
2. Debt service is payment of interests and capital, and is rising rapidly, in part 
because the IMF is demanding that Mozambique put aside money to pay the debt 
to the former USSR. 
3. Current surplus: Mozambique has two budgets, an investment budget for capital 
projects and a current budget. Debt service is divided between the two-capital 
repayments are in the investment budget and interest payments in the current 
budget. The current surplus is critical because it is the amount of taxes and other 
revenue which cannot be spent. So for 1996, the IMF wants revenues amounting 
to 22.6% of GDP and surplus of 3.8% of GDP. In just three years, Mozambique 
must switch from a current account deficit to a huge surplus by increasing taxes 
and cutting spending; in effect, this extra money will be frozen and taken out of the 
economy. Government receipts for 1996 will be allocated to civil service wages 
(19%), civilian goods and services (19%), police and military (15%), interest 
payments (15%), and IMF-demanded surplus (17%). Taking the current surplus 
as the benchmark serves as a cap on government spending, and if, as is likely, the 
government cannot meet revenue target, it will be required to cut spending further 
to meet the surplus target. There is little room for manoeuvre, and it is this 
benchmark which has forced the savage cuts in government wages, prevented the 
hiring of more health workers, and halted road repairs. 
3. Government investment. Government contributes only a tiny amount to 
capital investment, as most of it comes from aid, but this contribution must be cut. 
The World Bank and some other donors require a government contribution; cutting 
this has a big impact because it means that some projects involving substantially 
more donor than government funds cannot go ahead. 
4. Deficit before aid is the key number. This is the portion of government spending-
both capital and current-that remains after tax and customs revenues are taken 
into account. It is funded by aid-direct grants to government, money for projects, 
and countervalue funds. By cutting this figure so much, the IMF is forcing donors 
to halve the money they give to the government for running social services, 
rebuilding schools and roads, and so on. In just two years donors must cut aid to 
government by US$ 173 million. As most aid goes on capital projects, this means 
sharp cuts in capital spending. So the one benchmark 'deficit before aid' serves 
two purposes, by limiting both repairs of war damage and general donor spending 
(Hanlon 1996:30-31). 
The Fund and Bank produce a three yearly Policy Framework Paper. From that, the 
Fund produces its annual Matrix of Economic and Financial Measures. In 1995 the 
Matrix included a hundred and one actions which the Fund ordered the Government to 
take that year. These actions were so sweeping and included among others: 
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1. A cut in deficit before grant of 8 per cent of GDP. 
2. Public commitment by the Government to introduce value added tax. 
3. Significant increase in rentals of state-owned properties. 
4. Downsize the investment program. 
5. Implement the recently approved local authority law. 
6. Increase prices of petroleum products quarterly and ensure the Government 
earns profits from fuel sales. 
7. Elimination of controls on unprocessed cashew nut by April 1995. 
8. Privatise ten large public enterprises. 
9. Raise the cost recovery rate on medicines and medical supplies to 15 per cent 
(cited in Hanlon 1997:23). 
These measures have extremely negative impact on the socio-economic life, as we shall 
see in economic impact. By these demands the Bank and IMF have ignored the Plan of 
Reconstruction. Reducing inflation has become the priority. And the state was forced to 
abandon its plans of rebuilding war damages. All these demands were granted and the 
result was that the screws and the belt were further tightened on the poor. 
3.4.3 NGOs and Donor Community: Partners in Scandal 
Some of the bigger NGOs here are so flush with resources that they cannot maintain 
an adequate rate of dispersal if they have a well planned programme, so they are just 
throwing money around. One of the big donors says the government is corrupt and 
inefficient, but its NGOs are much worse. 
Donors are trying to bypass and undermine the Mozambican government. They want 
foreign private organisations rather than the Mozambican government to be offering 
the food aid as well as health, education, water, and agricultural extension services. 
And they want it to be clear to all Mozambicans it is not the government but foreign 
NGOs that keep them alive and help them to develop. It is a direct attack on the 
power and credibility of the Mozambican government, and Frelimo (Hanlon 
1992:215). 
It is indeed a trenchantly harsh criticism. These lines were written eight years ago. But 
every word of them is true. It was true then, it is true even today now eight years later. 
NGOs have always worked as contractors to donor governments and carry out the 
mission of these governments-to incapacitate the Mozambican government, and thus 
alienate it from the people. Six years later Hanlon was to write, "Six years ago when I 
was writing Mozambique: who calls the shots? the main danger was of weakening 
government structures by creating parallel ones doing the same thing. And it happened. 
Now, international NGOs are bypassing the civil society structures. But sustainability 
demands that Mozambicans set the agenda" (1996:145). 
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In any case, there has been a growth of domestic Mozambican non-profit contractors. 
These contractors, however, reflect the demands of many international agencies, that 
Mozambicans pay more attention to donor goals and demands. Nothing has changed. 
These local NGOs continue with the mission of the mother NGOs. In 1997 Hanlon was 
to notice that nothing had changed. He identifies and describes the four skills the most 
successful of these non-profit contractors have: 
1. Most prized is the ability to provide good looking and well written reports, 
promptly and in acceptable English, and with all current buzzwords such as 
empowerment and the poorest of the poor. Such reports should be written to 
satisfy donor needs to show that they are helping the poorest Mozambicans and 
are satisfying whatever are the fashionable policy lines that year. Computers, laser 
printers and good graphics software are more important than any work being done 
in the field. 
2. Second is the ability to change priority quickly to reflect changing donor demands. 
3. Third is the bookkeeping, ensuring that there are good looking receipts for all 
expenditures, neat books, and clear annual accounts. 
4. Fourth is the ability to provide good tours with visiting donor 
representatives, with proper hotel accommodation, clear arrangements and every 
plane met properly, and trips into the mato [natural resort] which are not too tiring. 
Visiting dignitaries should be met by grateful peasants who tell them how important 
their contribution has been. Visitors should be able to see something definite, 
preferably a building, which is the result of their money. 
NGOs have usually frustrated the rebuilding programme. NGOs go where the money is, 
not where the need is. In so doing they stand on the way of the government and block 
the donors money, so that the donors' money goes to them rather than to the 
government. So the rebuilding priorities set in the National Reconstruction Plan are not 
met. One European Union official commented that, 
International NGOs now work as companies and just go where the money is; they 
knew we had a budget line for NGOs in Mozambique. Most NGOs set up three 
offices-in Maputo, Beira, and a provincial capital. All had cars and computers. In 
1995 we finally sent a circular to NGOs saying we would no longer fund three offices, 
six cars and six expatriates for each NGO-but by then they were already moving on 
(quoted in Hanlon 1996:55). 
International NGOs send expatriate workers to do what Mozambicans can do even 
better. In fact, NGO-built schools started to collapse even before they were finished, 
reported Noticias (23 Oct. 1995), a daily newspaper in Maputo. In health the same is 
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true. According to Hanlon the Deputy Health Minister, Dr Abdul Noormahomed, said: 
"We asked some donors to give us part of the money directly and part to NGOs and 
then compare and see who does a better job. No one was willing" (Hanlon 1996:55). As 
though that were not enough, these expatriates are far too expensive than if 
Mozambicans did the work themselves. Hanlon (1996:56) refers to studies by Green 
and Mavie (1994) which have found that NGOs cost six to ten times as much as the 
government to provide the same services. 
Foreign experts cost US$15 to US$20 thousand per month-including salary, travel, 
head office overheads, insurance, pension, etc. It was found that the total cost of 
expatriate salaries, allowances and associate expenses under technical assistance in 
Mozambique is $US350 million per annum. Hence Hanlon (1996:55) observes that "one 
month of foreign 'expert' time would pay a Mozambican a real wage for a year." It is 
true. But since the mission of NGOs and donor community is hardly to rebuild the 
livelihoods of Mozambicans-torn apart by war which they fanned-but of themselves, 
they keep hiring foreign "experts". A study by the World Bank concluded that 
Mozambicans are not benefiting anything out of the current expatriate technical 
assistance. The study concludes that: 
1. Many of the tasks carried out by the foreigners would have been done by nationals 
if they had the time-but they often do not because of other donor demands. 
2. The quality of work carried out is not superior and is sometimes inferior to what a 
national could have done. A former Finance Minister Osman told a public meeting 
of an IMF "expert" who spent a year in Mozambique but his report turned out to 
be simply a copy of one he had written about Brazil. 
3. Even in areas where expatriates provide real services, the net value-added is not 
as great as it would appear, as they largely depend on national staff to provide 
information, data, background explanations and critiques of expatriates' work. 
The real value-added drops further when one takes into consideration that the 
institution's capacity usually is so weak that it is not able to absorb and use fully 
the expert's contributions (WB cited in Hanlon 1996:56). 
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3.5 A Socio-Economic Paradox? 
The current socio-economic situation in Mozambique is a paradoxical one. This is 
because, on the one hand, the macro-economic indicators are rising and many neo-
orthodox economists and economic commentators seem so optimistic about the future 
of the national economy 1. They are positive that the structural adjustment is yielding 
positive results. But on the other hand, the social indicators have not changed a bit, or if 
they change at all, they decline. The question is why and how? The answer is injustice. 
Put the macro-economic indicators together with social indicators and you have a 
paradox. Then, add injustice and the paradox has vanished. 
Table 3.1 (below) shows that GDP per capita has been growing continuously. It grew 
from US$ 86 in 1992 to US$96 in 1993. However it declined slightly to US$95 in 1994, 
and it rose again to US$109 in 1995, and then to US$110 in 1997. The inflation has 
been successfully controlled up to so far, as the table shows. The economic 
commentators always mention the growing GDP per capita, declining inflation, and the 
fast growing rates of economic growth. They conceal more than they say. For example 
they do not mention the skyrocketing difference between the imports and exports of 
goods and services. The imports of goods and services are more than two times higher 
than the exports. This has a negative effect on the local industry. It kills the local 
industry and causes losses of jobs, which has far reaching social consequences. 
D 
1 One would expect that the floods and cyclones of February and March 2000 shuttered such 
optimism. But that would be a gross mistake. For it would be to underestimate the stubborn 
eagerness, selfish impulses, and lust for quick and easy profits on the part of those who 
plunder the country and those who, directly or indirectly, benefit from this plunder. When 
asked about the economic impact the floods and cyclones had on the country, President 
Chissano spoke as though he were addressing a band of mentally retarded children, telling 
the nation and the international community that in spite of all nothing would be in jeopardy, 
the national economy would continue to "grow" with the same pace as always and that things 
would continue running normally! In the mean time, two towns were being swallowed in 
Gaza; the road system which linked the Southern region to the Central and Northern regions 
was completely destroyed; over a thousand people were dying or disappearing; about 8 000 
in Chilaulene, Gaza, were stranded and starving for 30 days; people hardly went to work; 
hospitals, schools, factories, banks and other businesses were destroyed or shut down 
nation-wide (for example Coca Cola in Maputo was in water and the whole country had to 
rely on refrigerants imported from the neighbouring countries). For the president to speak the 
manner he did shows that the floods and cyclones did not extinguish nee-liberal economic 
optimism but revealed the extent to which the corrupt elite are determined to plunder the 
nation. Even in moments of inordinate human sacrifice such as this, it seems that economic 
growth, not the people, is what matters! 
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Indicators '92 
Inflation1 
-
Imports2 1214 
(goods&services) 
Exports2 362 
(goods&services) 
Ext. Debt2 4714 
BoP2 -352 
GDP3 1066 
Forex Res- 233 
erves2 
GDP/capita3 86 
Table 3.1 
Macro-economic Indicators 
'93 '94 '95 '96 '97 
-
70.2 54.1 16.6 6.4 
1321 1427 1254 - -
372 395 470 541 
-
4864 5244 5270 5476 
-
-446 -467 -445 -344 -
1238 1235 1280 1545 -
187 178 195 344 
-
96 95 109 - 110 
'98 '99 
-1.3 1.6* 
- -
- -
- 5500 
- -
- -
- -
- -
1 Is in percentage. These are accumulated aggregates as registered in 
December of each year. 
Source: Evolu9iio Econ6mica e Social em 1996, Republica de 
M0<;:ambique; Vital Statistics, June quarter 1999, World Bank's 
Mozambique Resident Mission. 
2 These figures are in millions of $US. 
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank 1998, Washington 
3 GDP per capita is in $US. 
Source: Mozambique: National Human Development, UNDP 1998, 
Maputo. 
* Inflation registered in May 1999 (WB 1999) 
They usually keep silent about the growing foreign debt, and the human sacrifices it 
causes. The IMF and Bank extract huge portions of money from the poor to pay a debt 
they do not know about, a debt which they never contracted. The poor are told that their 
children, their children's children, those who are born and those who will be born in 
generations to come, owe the rich huge amounts of money. Oxfam observed that the 
"Actual debt payments, which represent only a fraction of debt service due, are annually 
diverting more than one in four dollars that the country earns through its exports. This is 
more than domestically financed expenditure on health and education combined" 
(Oxfam 1997:6). The debt payments have gone from US$ 207 million in 1997 to 
US$ 295 million in 1998. It has been projected that they will then grow to more than 
US$400 million by the year 2000 before levelling off at an average of about US$ 435 
million by the year 2005. This comes to a total of $US 3.4 billion over nine years, or 
more than four times the level of projected domestically financed investment during this 
entire period (Oxfam 1997:9). The IMF and Bank refuse to see debt as a barrier to 
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reconstruction and development. Mozambique's domestically financed expenditure in 
1997 was about US$360 million, or only about US$20 per capita. This is very low. But 
the IMF, the Bank, and donors unequivocally say that it does not matter, and if it means 
that we should starve, then, so be it. The debt must be paid. 
When we consider this injustice, then, the paradox is gone. This injustice explains why 
there has not been reconstruction of war damages and development. That is why the 
statistics are so grim. Out of a total population of 16 million people, about 10 million 
Mozambicans have no access to safe drinking water; two thirds of adults are illiterate 
and almost two thirds of them are women; about one million children a year do not 
attend primary school; about 9 million Mozambicans are without access to a formal 
health system; approximately 190 000 children annually die before reaching the age of 
five; and more than 10 000 Mozambican women die each year from childbirth-related 
complications (see Table 3.2, p. 77). 
In May 1997 the Government noted that "the ability to allocate resources toward 
development is highly dependent upon obtaining significant debt relief' (in Oxfam 
1997:6). It is beyond reasonable doubt that reconstruction and development for 
Mozambique cannot materialise under present circumstances. As the Oxfam document 
notes: "In relation to domestically financed expenditure, actual debt servicing in 1994 
represented: more than two times the amount of recurrent expenditure in the education 
and health sectors; almost four times that amount of recurrent expenditure in the health 
sector; and more than the recurrent budget for the health, education, police and judicial 
systems combined" (1997:9-10). Such processes cannot, under any circumstances, be 
morally justified. Economic growth that diminishes human well-being and dignity can 
hardly be moral. 
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Indicator 92 
Infant Mortality -
( deaths/1000 births) 
Maternal Mortality -
Illiteracy 
-
Life expectancy 
-
Global Mortality -
Table 3.2 
Social Indicators 
93 94 95 96 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
45 
-
46.3 
-
- -
18.6 -
Rate (per 1000 inhabitants) 
Female illiteracy - - - - -
Access to safe - - - - -
water 
Access to health 
- - - - -
facilities 
Low birth weight - 13.4% - 13% 12.6% 
rates 
97 98 99 
134 - -
1500 
- -
62% 
- -
47 - -
- - -
78% - -
33% - -
39% - -
- - -
Sources: Anuario Estatistico, INE 1996, Maputo; Mozambique: 
National Human Development Report, UNDP 1998, Maputo; 
Debt Relief for Mozambique: Investing in Peace, Oxfam Intl. 
1997, Maputo. 
3.6 The Socio-Economic Impact 
The economic growth reflected on the macro-economic indicators is achieved under 
extremely inhumane circumstances. The SAPs and EST have impacted negatively upon 
Mozambican society. They are squeezing us too tight. One parliamentarian noted that 
"the belt is too tight, and it will end up dividing our bodies in two parts." 
3. 6. 1 Decline of Local Industry and Commerce 
Structural adjustment programmes and economic stabilisation measures have caused 
the decline of domestic industry and commerce. SAPs require that the government 
withdraw from economic activity, deregulate completely the economy, and cease to 
control prices. Under such circumstances, only the market should control the economy 
and regulate prices. The Government was coerced to sell its most productive industries. 
And since the national entrepreneurs are not prepared and lacked capital to buy these 
industries-since the IMF and WB drained all credit and also put a restricting ceiling on 
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credit granting-and since loans are on short-term and on high interests-then, only 
foreign capital takes over. 
One example will suffice to make the point. The World Bank, for instance, coerced the 
Government in 1995 to liberalise the price of raw cashew nuts and to allow their direct 
exportation, without protecting the local processing industry. The result was a disaster. 
Traders were the beneficiaries of this liberalisation, not the producers. When peasants 
sold their cashew nuts, they did not benefit from any higher prices or from any higher 
living standards, since the prices for many standard consumer goods, such as cooking 
oil and soap, have risen dramatically. This is especially the case where the supply of 
these goods is controlled by the same traders who are also buying up the cashew nuts. 
Traders monopolised the cashew-nut trade, coerced peasants to sell their cashews at 
low prices, and exported wildly to India without regard to the local industry. In less than 
two years the national cashew industry collapsed, throwing many people out of jobs. 
This is why Ruy Baltazar, in a World Bank consultative meeting in Maputo, unwaveringly 
blamed the Bank for the collapse of the cashew industry. He asked Bank officials: "Who 
will pay for your blunders?" (Graham Saul, Report on the Feb 26 HIPC Review Meeting 
in Mozambique, 1999). The UNDP National Human Development Report (1998) 
implicated the Bank for the collapse of the cashew processing industry. It states: 
The explicit intention behind the World Bank's support for liberalising the cashew 
sector was to cause an increase in farm gate prices for raw nut and thus induce 
increased income in the countryside. It was expected that this would have a huge 
multiplier effect domestically (1998: 66). [However,] ... 
The Bank admitted that liberalisation might lead to the decline, or even the collapse, 
of the processing industry, but argued that this was of little account: increased 
cashew production and multiplier effects resulting from increased peasant production 
would compensate for the loss of jobs in the industry (1998: 67). 
There has been no increased cashew production and multiplier effect. There was no 
compensation for the loss of jobs. Those people are now facing the unemployment 
crisis. And no one dares say anything. The report also notes that, 
In terms of market structure, there is no perfect competition amongst the traders. 
Certainly the number of traders participating in the sector has increased since the 
mid-1990s, which has increased competition. But there is also market control, 
imperfect information, and asymmetry of market relations in general. ... in some 
areas the small producers/harvesters are tied in debt bondage to small traders, who 
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may themselves be similarly indentured to one of the large trading companies that 
dominate the market (1998:66). 
The IMF stabilisation policies have imposed restricted access to credit for local 
commercial and industrial nvestors. Total credit fell from US$ 438 million in 1990 to only 
US$ 201 million in 1993. From here it then fell further to only US$150 million in 1995. 
Long term investment credit totalled 26 per cent in 1995. The rest has been short term 
funds lent, typically, for 90 days or less (Hanlon 1996:59). Studies have shown that lack 
of credit is the single biggest barrier to investment and growth. The interest rates are too 
high, which makes it hard for industrial manufacturers borrowing for longer periods. This 
problem also affects the commercial sector badly, especially in rural zones. There are 
no shops in rural areas because there is no money to rehabilitate them. The Director of 
the Cereals Institute of Mozambique, Sulemane Juma Giramo, explained that, 
The small black rural traders have not returned to the districts. They are 
decapitalised; they don't have the substantial part payment that the banks require and 
some have outstanding bank debts because their tractors and shops were destroyed 
in the war. And the big 'Indian' traders are the ones who left the rural areas after 
independence, they don't want to go back to buying in small quantities (quoted in 
Hanlon 1996:60). 
This situation is destroying the local industry and commerce. Conditions are such that 
local business people are pushed aside in their own country and watch foreigners 
usurping their space. The opening of Shoprite and other huge supermarkets was met 
with complaints from the local business community. The Bank and Fund, with their 
policies of structural adjustment and economic stabilisation, are to blame. This situation 
can hardly be morally justified. 
3.6.2 Social Disintegration 
Social disintegration in the country cannot be overstated. There is reshuffling of 
individuals in social classes. Men are no longer able to support their families, so they 
abandon them to become hoboes. Women and children are left vulnerable to hunger, 
diseases and death. Many women resort to prostitution. And as the tourism industry 
gets wilder daily, with Europeans, North Americans and South Africans flocking in in 
pursuit of pleasure, the prostitution market is quite favourable. Old people from their 
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50s upwards are beggars, most of whom are retired workers from rich companies but 
earn less than two US dollars monthly (Metica/ 11 July 1997). It is morally outrageous to 
know that they are fathers and mothers whose children are still alive and working. The 
problem of children staying out of school to sell anything on the streets is untold (Metica/ 
03 July, 1997). 
There is a concentration of wealth in towns, while the schools, the roads, the shops, the 
hospitals, the water wells, in rural areas remain destroyed or unoperational. 
Consequently there are startling manifestations of advancing polarisation. These 
circumstances are surely immoral. Structural adjustment and economic stabilisation are 
reshuffling individuals within Mozambican social classes, as the fortunes of others rise 
while those of others fall and the overall balance of interests and power is consequently 
being altered decisively. This is related to the measures of devaluation, inflation and 
capital flight. Given devaluation measures, the rich have become richer. In attempting to 
prevent capital flight the Bank and Fund coerced the Government to raise internal 
interest rates to high levels. This victimises those who borrow, but it produces windfall 
earnings for big savers. Those who have huge bank deposits eventually benefit from 
such huge returns that they once again engage in enormously conspicuous 
consumption. 
3. 6. 2. 1 Aspirants to bourgeoisie status 
There are those who have been for a long time aspiring to ascend the ladder to the 
status of bourgeoisie. They have been frustrated for a long time. Now the crisis of 
economic stabilisation and structural adjustment has come as a long awaited Messiah to 
relieve their frustration and lust for money and power. These people are usually 
directors of subsidiary companies of transnationals. In an article entitled The Crisis of 
the 1980s in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean: An overview, Ghai and de 
Alcantara make reference to the centrality of association with foreign concerns and 
those among the African elite best able to weather the crisis successfully. These are 
top executives in private business, linked with foreign capital, local agents of foreign 
concerns, and those among importers and exporters able to obtain special access to 
foreign exchange in a situation of scarcity. Thus, in a time of marked economic 
recession, areas of business linked with outside interests seem to have become 
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more privileged, in relation to those without such links, even when overall levels of 
foreign investment are shrinking. And in a period of privatisation, those able to buy up 
or buy into state-owned enterprises, usually at concessional prices, are also to be 
counted among the privileged (1991 :27). 
This is a perfect description of the aspirants to bourgeoisie status in Mozambican 
society. Hanlon speaks of this same group of people as he indicates that: 
The aid industry, structural adjustment, and privatisation have forced a level of class 
and wealth difference unprecedented in post-independence Mozambique. And there 
is a new comprador group whose social and economic standing is entirely dependent 
on foreigners. If the donors leave, then this group loses the resources that give it 
political power, as well as the means to maintain its living standard. Thus this new 
comprador group has a vested interest in the donors staying and in the continuation 
of IMF involvement, privatisation, and structural adjustment (1992:226). 
3.6.2.2 Inequality 
It is indisputable that structural adjustment and economic stabilisation have fanned the 
presently fast growing inequality. Already in 1987, when PRE was introduced, there was 
evidence of growing inequality. The Institute Nacional de Estatistica conducted a 
National Household Survey on Living Conditions in 1997. The Institute found that of the 
total of 3 621 505 households nation-wide, 0.065 per cent had a monthly income of 
more than US$2000, and of these there are those with more than US$10 000; 0.3 per 
cent had a monthly income ranging from US$860 up to US$2000; 1.3 per cent had a 
monthly income ranging from US$430 up to US$860; 2. 7 per cent had a monthly income 
ranging from US$260 up to US$430; 20 per cent had a monthly income ranging from 
US$86 up to US$260; 60. 7 per cent earned less than US$86 per month; 15 per cent 
earned less than US$13 per month. Of the total working population only 0. 79 percent 
are foreigners and earn not less than $US8000 per month (see Table 3.3). This reflects 
injustice in the distribution of economic benefits shown in the macro-economic 
indicators. These conditions fail to measure up to morally acceptable social criteria. 
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Table 3.3 
The Distribution of Income 
The Number of Households 
{in Percentage) 
0.065 
0.3 
1.3 
2.7 
20 
60.7 
15 
Monthly Income per Household 
{in US Dollars) 
above 2000 (2 to 6 times over) 
860 to 2000 
430 to 860 
260 to 430 
86 to 260 
13 to 86 
Less than 13 
Source: Inquerito Nacional aos Agregados Familiares Sohre 
Condii;oes de Vida, INE 1997 
The wages of civil servants have fallen drastically since SAPs and EST were imposed. 
The current civil services pay scale ranges from US$20 to US$150 which is lower than 
it was in 1990. Salaries of teachers, nurses, and other civil servants fell bellow the 
poverty line in early 1992, bellow the abject poverty line in mid-1993. Nothing has 
changed yet. The UNDP and Unicef published a booklet jointly entitled Pay, Productivity 
and Public Service in 1995. In it they define the absolute poverty line as "household 
expenditure needed to fulfil the cheapest possible but nutritionally adequate diet and the 
absolute minimum expenditure necessary to cover non-food needs" (quoted in Hanlon 
1996:54). For Mozambique the UNDP and Unicef said this was US$75 per month by 
then. But more than two thirds of civil servants fell bellow this. The abject poverty line 
was $US50, but more than one third of civil servants fell bellow this. Nothing has 
changed yet. 
3. 6. 2. 3 The decline of civil seNices 
SAPs and EST measures have also caused a sharp decline of civil services. Work 
without compensation has caused low morale amongst the civil servants, as more than 
two thirds of them live bellow the poverty line. In reaction to this, service providers take a 
range of actions for survival including less time spent at work, less attention at their 
work, privatised user fee (such as tuition for supplementary lessons), corruption, use of 
public service time and facilities (such as cars) for private business, and the theft and 
sale of supplies. Work starts at seven in the morning and ends at five in the evening. A 
friend of mine, however, who is a criminal investigator at the Criminal Investigation 
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Laboratory in Maputo, arrives at work after ten in the morning and leaves for home 
before three in the afternoon. He does it at will. I inquired as to why he does it. "We all 
do it: they don't pay us anything," he said. Teachers no longer perform their duties and 
often ask for bribes from students if they want to pass. Some sell test and exam papers. 
Money is what counts now, not whether the student has mastered the material. In the 
hospitals nurses openly and boldly ask for bribes from pregnant women. If a pregnant 
woman does not have extra money under her skirts to bribe the nurses she is left alone 
vulnerable to death. Hospitals hardly operate. There are no medicines. Nurses steal 
them for sale outside. Savana reported cases such as these (10 September, 1999). 
The UNDP and Unicef booklet argues that Mozambique needs more and better trained 
public servants. There are now 110 000 civil servants, more than half of whom work in 
health and education. The booklet argues that to provide universal access to basic civil 
services Mozambique needs 250 000 people. But the Bank and IMF squeeze means 
that the Government cannot employ more people (Hanlon 1996:54). 
What aggravates this state of affairs is that donors, the World Bank and NGOs hire 
national skilled labour from the very limited labour supply, usually taking the people in 
question away from the public sector. The Bank blames the donor community as it says, 
"over the past five years, a high percentage of top civil servants have left public office, 
most of them either going to work for donors (directly or on donor-funded 
projects/activities) or abroad to study." Since the Bank and IMF squeezes have pushed 
doctors and engineers close to the poverty line, donors have responded by paying top-
up salaries to key people to keep them in their jobs, and by providing foreign technical 
assistance to fill the gaps when Mozambicans leave. In any event the Bank insists that 
"the donor community, which largely causes this problem to begin with, is attempting to 
remedy this situation through ... preaching [sic} competent staff from their current 
activities which further weakens the public sector" (in Hanlon 1996:53). Donors indeed 
hire Mozambicans away from the civil service at salaries ten times higher than the 
government can pay and then offer them to Mozambique as technical assistance. The 
complaints by the Bank are typical hypocrisy within the international community 
because-even worse-the Bank also does the same thing-unjust technical 
assistance. It hires civil servants to stay at their desks and do the same job they were 
doing before. As Hanlon notes, "The only changes are a higher salary and a new boss-
DPAGE 0810 
the World Bank instead of the government" (1996:53). This causes civil servants to have 
divided loyalty between donor or Bank and government. They bias time allocation 
toward areas of priority concern to donors or Bank. This has encouraged attendance at 
relatively unimportant donor-sponsored conferences, workshops and courses, as well as 
trips to overseas, at the price of reducing attendance at and attention to work at home 
(Adedeji et al. in Hanlon 1996:53). 
Dr Brazao Mazula, the Rector of Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, argues that "In order 
to survive, it is not easy for the Mozambican intellectual to resist what we may call 
'economic prostitution' in the face of low state salaries. The most serious consequence 
of this 'prostitution' is the danger of conniving with the steady decline in the level of 
teaching, research." A former minister of agriculture, Paulo Zucula, argues that "The 
real corruption problem is in our heads. We just accept jobs from the World Bank within 
the Ministry of Agriculture, or we go on a course. This is corrupt-we carry out the 
orders of the World Bank" (in Hanlon 1996:53). A UNDP and Unicef booklet states that: 
UNDP and Unicef strongly believe that an efficient and effective public service-down 
to the primary school teacher, rural health worker, tax collector and police 
constable-is a sine qua non for human development and for reaching the global 
goals set for social development (quoted in Hanlon 1996:54). 
One day a friend and I sat and discussed the problem of the economic squeeze. Vasco 
Banze, a former high school colleague of mine who is now a civil servant, said to me: 
"Matsinhe, if anyone tells you he lives on his monthly salary alone, know this-he's a 
liar! Once you understand that, then, your dissertation will be fine." Vasco also stated 
that "those who do nothing else to supplement their salaries live mysteriously. They eat 
one meal daily, and sometimes the sun rises and sets and they go sleeping without 
having eaten a thing. The following morning they wake up and go to work." He 
concluded, "Truly, only God understands how they survive." This is the main reason civil 
servants are corrupt. It is corruption driven by need. The UNDP and Unicef booklet 
also states: 
The elements associated with the decline in public service quality are all elements of 
coping strategies designed to ensure household survival. They cannot be eradicated 
so long as additional incomes beyond government pay are necessary for survival of 
the majority of public servants who are front-line service deliverers (in Hanlon 
1996:54). 
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The bottom line is that there are no living wages. The Organiza9ao dos Trabalhadores 
Mo9ambicanos-Central Sindical (OTM-CS-Mozambican Labour Organisation-Central) 
conducted a study on the workers' living conditions. They compared the prices of basic 
goods and the minimum wage. They found that the minimum necessities-rice, maize 
meal, cooking oil, brown sugar, beans, second rate fish, fruits-for the monthly 
subsistence of a household of five members amount to US$90. According to OTM-CS 
the minimum salary of US$25 is 3.6 times less than the current price of US$90. The 
monthly minimum salary is equivalent to % of 1 US dollar per day (FFE 1997:53). Note 
that these expenditure estimates are only for basic food. They do not include transport, 
clothing, education, health, water, electricity, rent, toiletries, etc., etc. Workers are being 
exploited and alienated from themselves and from their labour. There is no self-
affirmation and dignity in working. Work is degraded to mere necessity for staying alive; 
it has become no more than the prerequisite for maintaining biological existence. The 
type of life workers lead, or would like to lead, or believe they ought to lead, is primarily 
secondary. Survival is primary. My people only fe~I themselves freely active in their 
primary animal functions-eating, drinking, procreating, etc. In their human functions 
they no longer feel themselves to be anything but animal. As Marx said in the Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, "what is animal becomes human and what is 
human becomes animal" (Marx 1985: 111 ). 
3. 7 Return to Colonialism? 
There are good reasons to believe we have gone a full circle from the last days of 
colonialism in the 1960s to re-colonisation strikingly quite similar to it: this is manifest in 
the way the economy is being managed; how peasants are being told to take all the 
risks; how only the better-off can gain from SAPs and EST; the extent to which 
corruption has been fanned; the social chaos and the degree of human sacrifice; the 
undue power that foreigners have and the extent to which they plunder the country; the 
pace at which Mozambicans are forced out of the cities and replaced by white 
expatriates; racism, etc. There is re-colonisation "from the cotton plantations 1 in the 
0 
1 M. Anne Pitcher explores the theme of recolonisation in the northern cotton plantations of 
Nampula where exporters monopolise the cotton trade, buy cheaply from the peasants and 
sell dearly in the international market: "They offer low prices to producers, and then export 
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north to the way the economy is being taken over by companies identical to those which 
ran it in colonial times" (Hanlon 1996:83). According to one entrepreneur, "We are 
giving our national heritage to big foreign companies in what is, finally, colonisation" (in 
Hanlon 1996:83). "It is strange that Mozambicans have the capacity to be president and 
prime minister. .. but are incapable of managing the country's wealth" (Savana 1 
March, 1996). 
3. 7. 1 Strangers in Our Own Mother Land 
We have been observing some phenomena wrought by structural adjustment and 
economic stabilisation. It is obvious that socio-economic transformation in Mozambique 
is not in favour of Mozambicans. Since SAPs and EST were imposed Mozambicans 
are, as already stated, forced out of the cities. With the wages they earn they are 
incapable of paying water, electricity and rent. They cannot afford educating and 
feeding their children. And as Mozambicans move out of the cities, foreigners take over. 
The White colonial Lourenc;o Marques of the 1950s and 1960s is being recreated. 
Mozambicans have no space in their own mother land, they have become slaves and 
strangers in their own territory. The Catholic Cardinal, Don Alexandre, was moved to 
express his disillusionment with the present state of affairs. When interviewed he stated 
in Savana: 
Foreigners are plundering the country. The Church cannot remain indifferent. I speak 
of exploitation ... I warn the people that they will lose this land for indeed foreigners 
are dominating. The city was full of Mozambicans, but they were pushed to the jungle, 
for those who have money have taken everything. Mozambicans cannot afford the 
means necessary to maintain themselves in flats. They cannot afford paying water 
and electricity and rent because they do not earn enough. 
There [in Europe] also they [Europeans] are losing jobs, and, then, they opt in coming 
to Africa. Look, in the land of the blind, the one who has an eye is king, then, those 
come here because there also is the same thing ( Savana 6 August, 1999: 1-4, my 
translation). 
The Cardinal also went on to mention what everybody knows: blunt and ripe racism has 
returned in Mozambique: 
cotton on the world market at much higher price .... I found out that they were making about 
35% profit as a result of the low producer price." See "Recreating Colonialism or 
Reconstructing the State? Privatisation and Politics in Mozambique," Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Volume 22, Number 1, March 1996. 
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Many times we were discriminated against, as if today we are not. I find people who 
cry, because their children do not study in the universities because of discrimination. 
There are those who believe that every good thing must be only for them, because 
for them colour of skin makes sense. It is not colour of skin that should give orders 
(Savana 6 August 1999:1-4, my translation). 
Colonialism goes hand in hand with corruption, social chaos, dirty business, and 
irresponsibility of Government officials. Mozambique has turned into complete chaos. 
There is no law and order. Corruption is so ripe. The Government has been weakened. 
Thus the Savana editorial unwaveringly declares: 
We have pronounced ourselves, for more than one time, against the fact that the 
government we have is selling the whole country to foreigners without looking to the 
fact that Mozambicans are the owners of the land and, therefore, they deserve priority 
in the occupation of the vital spaces of the national economy. 
We have said, for more than one time, that Mozambique must be the country with the 
weakest government in the world in which any foreigner arrives, is received by a 
minister, lunches with the PM (prime minister), dines with the PM and, in the following 
day, gives a press conference saying that he will invest this much millions of dollars in 
area X and, oops, the government is on the move and removes, without prior 
discussion, the natural population and residents of the zones wanted by the so-called 
investor! 
We have said, more than once, that the fundamental problem is not the foreigner who 
plunders our land. The fundamental problem is the high indices of corruption in the 
governmental machine that invites the foreigner to plunder the land in the disguise of 
bringing investment whose national partner is, many times, the minister himself or the 
governor who authorised the referred investment. 
What kind of a nation do we want to build with this behaviour of savages lusting for 
money? Could it be that in the name of capital accumulation this government lost the 
notion of shame and subjects us all to the disgrace of feeling that theft is now open 
and blatant in this end of the mandate? 
How is it that the foreigner will not plunder our land if the government itself is quite 
occupied in the plundering of businesses which would simply be for the 
businessmen? 
How is it explained that, all of a sudden, all the historical leaders of the nation are 
precisely the presidents of the Administration Councils of mega companies of 
foreign capital? Could it not be to help those foreign capitals to plunder our land? By 
the way what are we here talking about when the problem is so very clear and 
obvious? (3 August, 1999:9, my translation) 
Foreigners plundering the country is a public issue which is debated publicly in the 
newspapers, chapas (taxis), street corners, schools and everywhere. In exploring this 
subject, Jose Mucavele, a well-known musician, asserts in his own terms that, 
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... we allow that any European hobo have only Mozambique in his head. He arrives 
here and just a week later he is a businessman. He is somebody's boss. He is a 
shoeless-foot there in Europe. He arrives here and he has all the facilities because 
sometimes he comes with a small support from European institutions. We are no 
longer able to control. ... Now what is happening here in our country is beyond the 
acceptable, and it is politically dangerous. I do not accept that a shoeless-foot come 
here to explore a spazzashop. That he should come here to explore a cafe, because 
we have Mozambicans trained in hotel management ( Savana 10 September, 1999:2-
4, my translation). 
Writing in Metical, Hungulani Ba Ka Khossa, a formidable writer and a critic of the state, 
did not spare the President and has demanded justice and dignity from him. He 
unweaveringly declares: 
It's enough, Mr President! 
... [N]othing I owe to my country. As a child, my father paid for my studies. In 
adolescence, he put me at the University. In adulthood, I got a job and I always pay 
my tax. What do I owe to my mother land? Little, or nothing, I respond. 
This token is summed up as follows: Any country must give its citizen the right of 
his/her dignity. In other words, the pride of belonging to that country. I demand, Mr 
President, that you give us the dignity of being Mozambicans. We don't want the 
British to come to our home and tell us what we must do. We are Mozambicans. The 
land is ours. Give us dignity, Mr President. Our vote was not in vain. I will come back 
to this theme next week (Metical 1 March 1999, my translation). 
Tensions are building up and Mozambicans have begun to talk. Some will even act if no 
one takes heed of what they say. Jose Mucavele stresses the need to challenge the IMF 
and demand justice. He thus declares: 
It [would be] good to tell the IMF, the boss, that your policy, that demand of yours, will 
break my spine, and I will no longer be able to work. Another thing that I reprove is to 
tell me that I am paying debt. I do not accept any debt to any country. Those 
countries owe us Mozambicans, they have a lot of debt for the delay of this country, 
for the underdevelopment of this country, etc. I would like to ask, for example, if I 
have any debt with Portugal! Portugal would have the courage to demand any debt 
payment from me? Is what they plundered for 500 years little? ( Savana 10 
September, 1999:2-4, my translation). 
Mozambicans are not historically unconscious. They know their history and they refuse 
to be detached from it. That is why they speak and question openly this blatant injustice. 
Frelimo's Government has lost its legitimacy and credibility. It has now come under 
heavy criticism from ordinary Mozambicans. "Frelimo is an empty drum that makes a lot 
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of noise," they say (Savana 3 September, 1999:6). Frelimo has become the weakest 
and most despised Government-a clear proof of successful accomplishment of the 
international community's (WB, IMF, NGOs and donors) mission of destabilisation in 
order to isolate Frelimo. 
SAPs and EST are costly. It is the poor who pay the price so dearly. The Cereals 
Institute of Mozambique has been privatised in favour of South African investors. And 
workers there have been waiting for new orders since June 1998 without a salary. 
These are fathers and mothers of five and six. Most of them have turned into beggars 
to support their families. They wrote an open letter, pleading with the Government and 
with all Mozambicans for justice: 
What a pity of Giramo who is serving as a scoundrel of the boer, until when this 
situation? Who is involved in this deal? Why make suffer a disgraced one who is 
already disgraced? Is this just? 
Ouch! Ouch! Ouch! Mozambican, wake up, the land is yours! Workers dwindling and 
foreigners transferring bulky sums (billions and billions) to their lands while we are left 
paupers (Savana 6 August, 1999:6, my translation). 
The Maputo Citrus Company was also privatised. Since then it has been inoperational 
for more than two years. And workers are left without a salary or a word. They, too, have 
written a public letter: 
We are workers because we want to preserve our rersonality as children of this land; 
unanimously our "Nnandhayey6", hi ta ya ku mani? We lament the fact that all this 
happens at the sacred moment, preparation of elections. How can we vote with 
empty stomach? How can we vote with the child at home who cannot go to school for 
lack of this and that? 
How to vote with a week of mourning for having lost a wife who was buried by the 
Municipal Council for lack of money? (Savana 3 September, 1999:6, my translation). 
The return of the Portuguese is very symbolic. It is the return of ex-colonial masters. 
The Catholic Cardinal warns that this return of the ex-colonial masters should be subject 
to greater suspicion and scrutiny. 
0 
1 Nyandhayeyo expression is a traditional Shangaan cry of desperation, a cry for help. See 
conclusion in chapter four for a detailed explanation. 
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Our rulers must see with well seeing eyes. They must see what sense this return 
has, this return of the ex-coloniser. It must be asked what this return means. If it is 
not well analysed, we might fall into what the South Africans have fallen into during 
the [sic] "apartheid", where the Black was put on poor places, on poor lands, without 
any possibility of producing and the more fertile lands, richer lands, were for others, 
the Whites (Savana 6 August, 1999:4, my translation). 
It should be recalled that Portugal was the only colonial power that insisted in keeping its 
colonies under its control while the other powers had long withdrawn. Portugal was the 
last colonial power to withdraw from its colonies. We should therefore ask in this light 
what it means that they are returning. 
3.8 Whose Reconstruction and Development? 
The economic disaster in Mozambique is not accidental. The adversaries are not that 
stupid to understand and blind to see this economic catastrophe. Adjustment and 
stabilisation constitute an economic suicide in Mozambique. And since it is obvious for 
everyone to see that the Bank's and Fund's policies never worked anywhere in Africa, 
we can, then, conclude that the social circumstances they are creating work for their 
own benefit. Adjustment and stabilisation have failed and continue to fail in 
Mozambique. The Bank and Fund acknowledge this, but they simply tell us to go on. We 
are, therefore, compelled to draw this one logical conclusion: this economic suicide, this 
economic disaster, perhaps is a conspiracy. The Fund and Bank, donor community, and 
NGOs are carefully deliberating and engineering, as they did in times of destabilisation, 
the present processes to remake Mozambique in their image. As Hanlon (1996: 107) 
asks, "Could it be that the IMF programme really is successful, but that it has different 
goals and a different agenda from what the Mozambicans are told?" 
The head of OTM, Soares Nhaca, asserts that the IMF uses the same programme 
everywhere because it is trying to do the same thing everywhere-to create 
dependence on the North. Indeed, as Vallely (1990:73) observes, During the 1980s 
there were ninety-four IMF programmes in operation all over the Third World. In 1989 
some seventy countries were struggling under the burden of IMF demands. IMF 
programmes abounded throughout the Third World countries. Vallely narrates the 
dramatic events: 
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In Santo Domingo women found cooking oil had doubled in price overnight. In Manila 
a bus driver had to greet his customers one morning with the news that fares had 
risen in one leap by 30 per cent. In the north-east of Brazil a peasant farmer arrived 
to collect his credit payments to pay for essential fertiliser, and found that these had 
been abolished in an IMF programme. In Santiago hundreds of small businessmen 
closed their workshops because their home-made products could not compete in 
price with mass-produced foreign imports, now that tariffs and duties had been 
scrapped at the behest of the IMF. In Mexico accidents and injuries increased 
substantially as the oil industry was put into overdrive to produce record exports to 
pay. [sic]. Even in the developed world, in Europe and the United States, more than a 
million workers found themselves caught in the wake of the IMF-created Third World 
recession when they were laid off after orders from developing countries fell and left 
their firms without customers. Countless personal tragedies were repeated 
throughout the world. Each one was nothing more than a statistic to the macro-
economists who devised the 'adjustment' strategies. But each one brought trauma, 
heart-break and misery to an individual or family (1990:173-174). 
The IMF is not trying to resolve the problems of hunger and underdevelopment in 
Mozambique, nor in other Third World countries, but to satisfy the needs of the Northern 
economies, which are themselves readjusting. And permanent dependence means that 
the IMF can always determine Mozambique's policies-in detail. D. Ghai (1991 :7) also 
points out that SAPs and EST are calculated to defeat "the nationalist project by 
international capital and represent an attempt by external capital to seize control of the 
national economy." We do not think that this failure is accidental. A new market 
composed of the newly created rich is being forged for Western goods and plays a key 
role in administering re-colonisation imposed by the Bank, the Fund, the donor 
community and NGOs. As Hanlon observes the phenomenon: "A tiny elite increasingly 
serves foreign masters, both aid agencies and private companies, and is rewarded with 
dollar salaries, fancy cars, and foreign trips to cultivate their taste for imported goods" 
(1996:83, italics added). Father Francisco Ponsi writes: 
Contrary to what we would like to believe, Africa belongs not to the various African 
countries, notwithstanding their proclamation of sovereignty and independence; nor to 
one or other of the former colonial powers. Africa belongs to the World Bank! Africa 
and Mozambique belong to the WB (and the IMF). Its program is to force Africa into 
the system of neo-colonial economics, without taking people's necessities into 
account. What counts is the free market and its god-money (quoted in Hanlon 
1996:108). 
What raises suspicion, as Hanlon observes, is that the World Bank and the IMF always 
make impossible demands and expect immediate concessions. " ... [l]f economists in 
the private sector made such blatant mistakes," argues Hanlon, "they would be 
dismissed. This suggests that these are not errors at all" (1996:108). 
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NGOs and the donor community are equally implicated in this conspiracy. They are 
guilty of conspiring against the poor and plundering their land while pushing them to the 
jungle. As a provincial education director observes: 
It's identical to what happened 100 years ago. After the Berlin conference there were 
wars to establish colonial control of the continent. Then in came the missionaries, and 
they cleared the way for the capitalists. Again we have wars, this time followed by 
non-governmental organisations. They are the new missionaries (in Hanlon 
1992:203). 
The new missionaries also come from the donor countries and international NGOs. 
Their paymasters' goals have nothing to do with the reconstruction and development of 
Mozambique. Bishop Pinto points out that their goal is to keep Mozambique dependent 
on food aid, both to ensure exports for their surplus food, and to keep Mozambicans 
dependent (Hanlon 1996:55). Indeed, Hanlon mentions a study conducted for the US 
government which confirms the veracity of the Bishop's allegation: 
[A] US-funded team funded in the Ministry of Agriculture actually did a study of who 
eats yellow maize supplied by USAID (which is traditionally less popular than locally 
produced white maize) and concluded that even after aid is ended, Mozambique 
ought to import US yellow maize commercially because it will be cheaper than locally 
produced white maize and thus, it alleges, will benefit poor people. The US has used 
aid to create a new market (Hanlon 1996:110-111). 
Assisting Mozambique is riot a priority for aid-workers, who are more preoccupied in 
guaranteeing job security and personal satisfaction, "or have very narrow horizons." Aid 
is a massive poverty industry for non-profit transnational contractors, and what they do 
is "for governments and international agencies ranging from the European Commission 
to Unicef." They have as their first priority to keep money flowing, and this more often 
"means that effective tendering and reporting are more important than helping the poor." 
They have as their second priority "ensuring their own comforts and smooth operation, 
with four-wheel-drive cars, computers, photocopiers, air conditioners, flights home, and 
so on." They have as their third priority not to help the poor but to perpetuate poverty so 
that they can have reason to stay and maintain their livelihoods. These people "are 
looking for adventure and travel in exotic places." Since they must always persuade 
parliamentarians not to cut aid budget and thereby justify aid at home, they must show 
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"'success' and photographs of nice white people helping starving black babies;" they 
must buy "goods and services from the donor countries;" they must accept to be agents 
of the donor countries and use the money aid to induce "political changes which the 
donors consider good, notably free-market reforms and privatisation." Workers from the 
Bretton Woods Institutions and aid agencies are not stupid. "But they are-of 
necessity-wilfully blind or at least blinkered. They cannot afford to see" (Hanlon 
1996:111-112). 
The poor are currently feeding the rich in the North. We are not on equal footing to 
trade. The current economic transformation to which we are subjected in Mozambique is 
not meant to improve our living conditions. It is geared toward developing and feeding 
Western parasite economies at the cost of intolerable human sacrifice. Western money 
dealers have completely lost a sense of shame and humanity: the Bank, the Fund, the 
donor community, and the NGOs. What they are doing is morally flawed. 
3.9 Summary and Conclusions 
After the war, the resultant damages were properly diagnosed. Priorities and needs 
were properly identified and plans of rebuilding and developing were drafted 
accordingly. These included rebuilding social and economic infrastructures-schools, 
hospitals, roads, bridges, shops, wells, livestock, etc.-so as to ensure a smooth 
resettlement and integration of the returnees, and guarantee their livelihoods. However, 
the BWls imposed policies which forced the government to abandon its plans of 
rebuilding and focus attention upon SAPs and EST. With SAPs and EST, the BWls 
diverted capital from reconstruction and development, froze it and removed it out of the 
economy to debt servicing. 
The World Bank and IMF policies resulted in socio-economic catastrophe: real wages 
collapsed dramatically; the government was pushed away from the economic activity, 
forced to reduce its budget and prevented from investing in social services; corruption 
was fanned beyond acceptable proportions; Mozambicans were and continue to be 
pushed away from their land; foreigners take over and, with their capital, they plunder 
the nation; conditions for re-colonisation have been created. 
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SAPs and EST are rapidly disintegrating Mozambican society. They are causing social 
and economic chaos and great human sacrifice. In short, this chapter showed that the 
actual socio-economic transformation represents pitfalls to reconstruction and 
development. In the next chapter I shall make an ethical appraisal of the BWls' market 
ethics and their fundamentalist theological discourse which underpins these socio-
economic processes. I shall, then, cast my lot toward the quest of a development ethic 
for just reconstruction and development. 
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Chapter Four 
Towards an Ethically Meaningful Approach to Reconstruction 
and Development 
4. 1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the market ethic which governs the policies of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, that is, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It is this 
market ethic which dictates the allocation of national resources. It is the same ethic 
which determines the priorities which these institutions impose for rebuilding war 
damages. The chapter also considers the right-wing (fundamentalist) theological spirit 
manifested in these institutions in defence of their positions. This fundamentalist 
theological spirit functions as a religious superstructure to sanction the sanctity of the 
SAPs and EST. An understanding of it will help unveil the covert manoeuvres used by 
the elite groups, TNCs, and money dealers who control the BWls. The final part of this 
chapter discusses the possibility of a socio-ethically meaningful approach to 
reconstruction and development in Mozambique. It draws heavily from African sources 
in our development ethics. 
4.2 Illusions of the BW/s' Market Ethics 
The Bretton Woods Institutions have a body of ethical principles which dictate the 
policies they design and impose on Mozambique, just as they do to any other Third 
World nation with which they deal. Their ethics is market ethics, or First World Ethics, as 
Vallely (1990) calls it. It should be stated that the definition and description of the market 
is out of place here. The intention is not to define or reconstruct market ethics. I rather 
wish to highlight those aspects of the market which seem to be the guiding principles of 
the BWls. I place those market ethical principles under an evaluative framework to see if 
they do measure up to the ethically inspired social criteria that we have outlined in the 
introductory chapter. 
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In his Bad Samaritans, Paul Vallely (1990) identifies and describes six market principles 
which, according to him, constitute the ethical system that dictates the decisions taken 
by BWls and which are imposed on the Third World Countries. 
4.2.1 Self-interest 
The first market ethical principle identified is that of self-interest. Vallely observes that 
there is heavy reliance on self-interest by the BWls. Self-interest in itself is harmless 
and good in its own right. To make it a sweeping market law as the BWls do is, 
however, immoral. As Vallely observes, "there is a need to acknowledge the unhealthy 
extent of the reliance of the market system on self-interest as a motivating force. 
Admittedly this is not inevitably a corrupting influence, but it has a well observed 
tendency to be so" (1990:268). Self-interest can produce wealth, but it can hardly 
produce a fair distribution of that wealth. In fact, where it has been relied upon, it has 
created unjust distribution of wealth, as is the case in Mozambique. 
Economics is "dominated by a conception of the human being as a rational egoist, 
motivated exclusively by narrow self-interest and pursuing this self-interest in a 
consistent and conscious fashion" (Rowthorn 1996: 16). These economists "typically 
assume that [human] agents are both self-seeking and dishonest" (1996:18). This type 
of thinking is responsible for "a compartmentalised view of human existence whereby 
selfishness is morally acceptable in what might be construed as economic life, whilst 
altruism and cooperation are relegated to other spheres of life" (1996:19). So economics 
is construed solely in terms of selfishness and the pursuit of self-interest. We are not 
taken aback when studies conclude that economists are "selfish species beings,'' and 
that economics attracts selfish people to study it (1996:20). 
Such heavy emphasis on natural instinct is responsible for worsening the conditions of 
the poor in Mozambique. Reliance on self-interest as an unbreakable economic principle 
"reduces men and women to mere economic units for whom everything except material 
prosperity becomes a mere peripheral issue. It turns into an absolute a single aspect of 
human life, which is a dangerous ideological distortion" (Vallely 1990:269). In terms of 
our African concept of community, it violates the very basis of human existence. It 
undermines and destroys the essence of humanity, the essence of ubuntu. It denies that 
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"I am because we are." Therefore, this unscrupulous reliance on self-interest is not an 
ethically acceptable social criterion for reconstruction and development. It allocates 
resources as self-interest dictates. 
The duty of the Government, according to William Temple, is to order "public life so that 
self-interest prompts what justice demands" (quoted in Vallely 1990:269). But the BWls 
have weakened and pushed the Mozambican Government aside. They have let loose 
self-interest to govern unchecked. They have created conditions whereby one satisfies 
one's passions as one pleases. They create social circumstances in which there is no 
community ethic, and so as "In those days [when] there was no king in Israel: every man 
[does] that which [is] right in his own eyes" (Judges 21 :25). In the end it is the poor, the 
weak, the vulnerable, the women and children, who are squeezed too tight. 
4.2.2 Myopia of Profit 
It is sad but true that profit, in fact quick profit, is another imperative "moral law" of the 
market which governs the BWls and which is motivated by self-interests. This is an 
"area in which the market-motivated by the search for fairly immediate profit-is 
notoriously unreliable in its short-sighted perspective on investment" (Vallely 1990:270). 
Conditions have been created in which long or medium-term investments are no longer 
attractive. Investment is attractive only if it is short-term and aimed at skyrocketing 
profits at once. For example, there is a proliferation of forex houses and tourist 
complexes in Mozambique. But there are numerous communities without schools, 
clinics or hospitals, and shops for basic goods. No one is willing to invest in these areas 
because the instinct for quick and easy profit discourages such investment. This is "the 
impersonal nature of the market which conveys information about the desires, resources 
and abilities of its participants in an impersonal way which makes it easy for participants 
to lose sight of human values" (Vallely 1990:271). The Government cannot intervene. Its 
budget has been cut dramatically, its civil servants have been reduced and the 
remaining ones do not earn a living wage. At the bottom it is the poor who are crushed. 
Market ethics undermines our African ethical values of caring and sharing. 
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4.2.3 Individualism 
Individualism is a well-known principle of capitalism. It has been adopteed and given 
precedence in Mozambican socio-economic life. Individualism, however, "is not an 
unalloyed bad" in itself. "It brings a directness to our relationship with God and nurtures 
a sense of tolerance of dissent and even eccentricity." But Vallely also acknowledges 
that it has "a number of distinct and irreconcilable species of the outlook." "The inner 
goal. .. is ... personal success .... the conspicuous consumption becomes the mark of 
self-fulfilment and individualism becomes egotism. Self-assertive individualists without 
moral roots seek a brittle kind of success with no thought for casualties" (1990:271-272). 
Self-assertive individualists without moral roots are the officials and share-holders of the 
BWls who seek to (re)create Mozambique in their own image. 
4.2.4 Perverted Economic Growth 
Economic growth is another overwhelming principle and goal underpinning the market 
ethic as preached by the BWls. Economic growth has almost become a god to be 
worshipped and at the same time a goal to be achieved at any cost. This means that the 
poor must often suffer for the sake of its achievement. It is a clear reflection of what 
Lewis has said some decades ago: 
First, it should be noted that our subject matter is growth, and not distribution. It is 
possible that output may be growing, and yet that the masses of the people may be 
becoming poorer. . . . But our primary interest is in analysing not distribution but 
growth. Secondly, our concern is not primarily with consumption but output. Output 
may be growing while consumption is declining. We mention these problems so that 
pedantic reviewers shall not be able to say that we are not aware of them. We do not, 
however, have to solve them. For our concern is not with the measure of output, but 
with its growth (in Berberoglu 1992: 15-16). 
Indeed the BWls are well aware of the injustice that their policies are engendering, but, 
as Lewis has said, their concern is not justice but economic growth. The BWls do know 
that since their programmes have been implemented, the people of Mozambique have 
grown skinnier and tinier while the economy is growing. The poor Mozambicans are 
being squeezed out of proportion while the statistics of economic growth rise daily. This 
is the evil of the market ethic as preached by the BWls. This is an immoral market 
system in which, as Herbert Daly observes, 
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We count the real costs as benefits-this is hyper-growthmania. Since the net benefit 
of growth can never be negative in this Alice-in-Wonderland accounting system, the 
rule becomes 'grow forever' or at least until it kills you-and then count your funeral 
expenses as further growth. This is terminal hyper-growthmania. Is the water-table 
falling? Dig deeper wells, build bigger pumps, and up goes GNP! Mines depleted? 
Build more expensive refineries to process lower grade ores, and up goes GNP! Soil 
depleted? Produce more fertiliser, etc ... As we press against the carrying capacity of 
our physical environment, these 'extra effort' and 'defensive' expenditures (which are 
really cost masquerading as benefits) will loom larger and larger. As more and more 
of the finite physical world is converted into wealth less and less is left over as non-
wealth-i.e., the non-wealth physical world becomes scarce, and in becoming scarce 
it gets a price and thereby becomes wealth. This creates an illusion of becoming 
better off, when in actuality we are becoming worse off (in Vallely 1990:274). 
At the bottom of this market ethic system it is the poor who are squeezed to produce, 
reproduce, sustain, and perpetuate such conditions. This kind of economic growth is 
fallacious. 
4.2.5 The Myth of Efficiency 
Another prescribed code of the market ethic preached aggressively by the BWls is 
efficiency. The technical advisers of the BWls are obsessed with the myth of efficiency. 
In everything they do, Mozambicans must follow the principle of efficiency. In this sense 
efficiency means to profit more and more while spending as little as possible, regardless 
of what this may involve. In other words, it means investing less and less while profiting 
more and more by any means. For example, it is considered very efficient that 
Mozambique is paying its foreign debt despite the human sacrifice that this involves, say 
the BWls. But if Mozambique does not pay the debt and, instead, builds schools and 
hospitals, rebuilds war damages, pays humane and living wages, feeds the hungry and 
leads the blind, does justice to the poor and oppressed, etc., there is no efficiency. 
According to them, it is efficient that traders import those consumer goods that only a 
few members of society have the purchasing power to buy. Since the overwhelming 
majority of Mozambicans have their purchasing power completely destroyed, it is 
efficient that the market ships food away from those who cannot afford to buy it to those 
areas where purchasers have the necessary cash to buy. It is efficient that private 
investors unscrupulously exploit Mozambicans, plunder the country, pay no taxes, and 
repatriate huge sums of profits to their home countries. As Vallely notes, 
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There can, indeed, be evils in efficiency. War, theft, murder, and colonialism can all 
be efficient for the ruthless, but for the rest of us there is a moral code in which such 
efficiency is set. Slavery was efficient for those who were not subjugated but in the 
end the true Christian option was not for us to become kinder slave masters but 
rather to abolish slavery. Manufacturing processes which endanger the health of 
those who produce them-using abets or carcinogenic paints-may be cheaper than 
safe alternatives but civilised societies have quite rightly legislated against them. As 
Tawney said: 'To convert efficiency from an instrument to a primary object is to 
destroy efficiency itself (1990:272-273). 
In this light the true costs of reconstruction and development are terrifyingly high. 
Reflecting on his country's long history, the Chinese philosopher Lin Yutang observes 
that, "It is evident anyway that the Chinese as a nation are more philosophic than 
efficient, and if it were otherwise, no nation would have survived the high blood pressure 
of an efficient life for four thousand years. Four thousand years of efficient living would 
ruin a nation" (quoted in Goulet 1995:200). But the BWls and other economic agents do 
not agree. Yet a social system cannot be deemed efficient if it merely improves the lot 
of a particular section of global society. That Mozambican socio-economic 
circumstances are efficient, as the BWls claim they are, is a pure lie and it is politically a 
very dangerous ideological distortion. 
4.2.611/usory Neutrality 
At the heart of the market ethic is the illusion of neutrality. There is, in fact, no neutrality 
in the market ethic as maintained by the BWls. Some things, like water and oil, do not 
mix and are irreconcilable. Likewise, neutrality in trade is irreconcilable with greed, lust, 
self-interest, profit, efficiency, and perverted GDP growth. It is very ridiculous that self-
assertive individualistic agents, motivated by self-interest and the crudest lust for quick 
profits, which must be attained efficiently, should be procedurally neutral. As Vallely 
writes, 
Most fundamentally there is a need for an acknowledgement that the market can only 
operate within a proper moral framework, to which its operations must be 
subordinated. Capitalism is at present in danger of sawing through the bough on 
which it sits. The smooth operation of the market depends on shared moral order. All 
[operations of the market] involved must value [positively or negatively] truth, honesty, 
bribery, fraud, and breach of promise. All (operations of the market] must 
acknowledge the sanctity of contract. All [operations of the market] must have respect 
for the law and feel able to rely on the probity of judges, officials and legislators. The 
market assumes a complex web of custom, taboo and moral bonds which were 
established in a previous era and are now being held in place by the vital forces of 
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inertia and the law which is now more often seen as the rules of a game than a 
vehicle for moral truths ( 1990:275). 
These are the basic principles which constitute the market ethical system which 
underpins the socio-economic transformations imposed by the BWls on Mozambique. 
Let us turn now to the fundamentalist theological discourse of the BWls. 
4.3 The Fundamentalist Spirit in the BW/s' Economic Liberalism 
Lately the BWls have been spoken of in pseudo-theological terms. For instance, 
according to one observer, 
At one extreme, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Paris Club 
for debt rescheduling are presented as a secular Trinity, converting African countries 
from their sinful ways and showing the route to salvation to an ignorant and ungrateful 
multitude. At the other, the Fund, the Bank, the Paris Club and the commercial banks 
are portrayed as a modern Four Horsemen of the apocalypse complementing and 
completing the work of war, drought, epidemic and famine in a prostrate and defeated 
continent (R.H. Green in Mihevc 1995:21 ). 
It should be understood that the objective here is not to argue that the BWls' modus 
operandi is a derivative of fundamentalist theology, or that the BWls have 
fundamentalist historical roots. The aim is not even to show how the tenets of 
fundamentalist theology inform the BWls. Rather, the objective is to show the striking 
similarity between the BWls' modus operandi and fundamentalist theological discourse. 
This leads one to believe that in as much as fundamentalist theology is characterised in 
a particular manner, the BWls' modus operandi is likewise fundamentalist. SAPs and 
EST make up a clear agenda that is used by the BWls "to tie together a set of policies, 
the effects of which are known and understood. It is an agenda and a discourse which 
is, at its core, a fundamentalist one which not only denies the legitimacy of alternatives, 
but has actively sought, over the past decade, to ensure that all of the options available 
to developing countries have been narrowed down to one" (Mihevc 1995: 16). 
In his The Market Tells Them So, John Mihevc (1995) shows how theological language 
throws new light into understanding the ethical procedure of the BWls. According to him, 
behind the BWls there lies a fundamentalist theology. In other words, there is 
fundamentalist religious faith, and not just economics, behind the BWls. Mihevc quotes 
OPAGE 0990 
Boone as she brings to light the relationship among the various elements of 
fundamentalist theology: "The authority of fundamentalism arises in the 'reciprocal 
relations' of text, preachers, commentators, and ordinary readers. And in studying these 
relations, one confronts the compelling power of the closed system, a power which 
cannot be localised but is of one cloth, a power woven in and through every thread" 
(1995:27). Mihevc underscores six fundamentalist threads woven into the BWls' of 
SAPs and EST. These threads throw light into understanding the ethical modus 
operandi of the BWls. 
4.3. 1 The Theology of SAPs and EST 
It is argued lately that the proponents of SAPs and EST "recipes, the nee-liberal recipes, 
have an enormous faith in their product, even in the face of much previous experience, 
much professional doubt and obvious political realities. In this it resembles more a brand 
of religious fundamentalism than a school of thought" (Hans Singer in Mihevc 1995:27). 
Indeed, Father Ponsi has spoken of the BWls acting like a brand new Pope, and he 
could clearly see the similarity between that of his church and this new one (in Hanlon 
1996:109). Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli, in their Faith and Credit (1994), also 
speak of the BWls in a similar way: 
The supranatural, non-democratic institution functions very much like the Church, in 
fact the medieval Church. It has a doctrine, a rigidly structured hierarchy preaching 
and imposing this doctrine and a quasi-religious mode of self-justification. Or, to 
borrow from a wholly different tradition, the Bank is reminiscent of a centralised 
political party characterised by opacity, authoritarianism and successive party lines. 
Could the World Bank be the Last of the Leninists? ... 
In our society, the concept of development has acquired religious and doctrinal 
status. The Bank is commonly accepted as the Vatican, the Mecca or the Kremlin of 
this twentieth-century religion. A doctrine need not be true to move mountains or to 
provoke manifold material and human disasters ... 
Religion cannot, by definition, be validated or invalidated, declared true or false-only 
believed or rejected. Facts are irrelevant to belief. True believers, the genuinely pure 
of heart, exist in every faith, but the majority generally just goes along lukewarmly out 
of cultural habit or material advantage. When, however, the faith achieves political 
hegemony as well, like the medieval church (or the Bolsheviks or the Ayatollahs), it is 
in a position to make people offers they can't refuse, or to make their lives extremely 
uncomfortable if they do (cited in Hanlon 1996: 109). 
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This is the spirit of theological and religious fundamentalism along which the BWls move 
so smoothly. The discourse of the BWls' analysis and policy prescriptions for 
Mozambique, as for any other Third World country in which they operate, c;;losely 
resembles the discourse of fundamentalist theology. The BWls, as Mihevc points out, 
represent "a wide variety of political interests, including the US Treasury Department, 
the finance ministers and executive directors of [their] member countries, [their] share-
holders, as well as the multitude of international finance interests, from banks to 
transnational corporations to elites in Third World countries." However these institutions 
have been able to maintain "a remarkable degree of uniformity with regard to 
fundamental principles of development in [their] vision of the need for SAPs [and EST]." 
They have "succeeded in this regard precisely in this agenda by employing [their] army 
of technocrats, researchers and policy advisors as the new missionaries of development 
for Africa. The echoes of the colonial role of the missionaries is obvious" (1995:28). 
Another commentator observes: 
. . . (l]t is important to recognize the power, influence, and academic and 
developmental consequences of this historically unique contribution of funding 
development projects and development research (note here the echoes of the early 
imperial era, when the metropolitan governments funded learned societies that in turn 
supported the field work of missionaries and adventurers who like Livingstone, also 
saw themselves as geographers, anthropologists, and historians) (J. Sarnoff cited in 
Mihevc 1995:28). 
The discourse of the BWls as a fundamentalist one is thus exposed in theological and 
religious terms. This helps in further exposing the inner logic of their discourse. This 
exposure 
challenges the [BWls'] undisputed hegemony and self-confirming authority over 
development of the continent. This self confirming authority is achieved by employing 
the techniques and strategies of fundamentalist discourse. The fundamentalist 
strategies [are] employed ... as the universal paths of salvation not only for Africa but 
for all the Third World, endowing SAPs with moral authority and superiority over 
competing claims, condemning opponents of SAPs as irrational, inefficient or self-
serving and, finally, fulfilling its anointed role of establishing, controlling and 
maintaining the SAP agenda (Mihevc 1995:29). 
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4.3.2 Servant of the Text 
The role of the servant of the text is a well known vociferous and undisputed technique 
employed in the fundamentalist religion and theology. This method is used in the 
fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible. It is, like all of them, a "most deceptive 
technique [precisely because it disavows] the interpretative role of preachers in reading 
the Bible" (Mihevc 1995:29). It is a fundamentalist technique that the BWls have 
adopted to bless and sanction their policies. According to Mihevc, the BWls 
disavow [their] own interpretative role in what [they] pass off as the value-free 
scientific economic analysis of Africa's economic crisis. The fundamentalist thrust of 
the [BWls'] arguments throughout the 1980s is revealed by the way [they) defend 
[their] positions. Rather than employing a careful analysis of the historical context or 
the lived experience of those affected by [their] policies, the [BWls] consistently refer 
to ideological constructs to defend [their] positions (1995:30). 
Indeed. For example, in Mozambique the BWls categorically refuse to start from the 
fundamental historical causes of underdevelopment. They voluntarily and deliberately 
blind themselves to the historical fact of 500 years of colonial plunder, sheer brutality, 
and colonial legacy. They voluntarily and deliberately blind themselves to the historical 
fact of the war of destabilisation. Instead of taking these historical causes and applying 
the appropriate reconstruction and development programmes, they preach market 
ethics. They argue that the market will allocate the resources and do the rebuilding 
efficiently. "The [BWls'] role remains unassailable in so far as [they are] able to fill the 
role of preacher or high priest whose authority derives from the text of perfectly 
competitive markets" (Mihevc 1995:30). The BWls are saturated with cold predisposition 
against anything and anyone contrary to their market ethic dogmas. As another 
observer says, 
... the most realistic proposals are set aside without being discussed. Everything has 
to be sacrificed for the sake of maintaining the prevailing ideas. Now this kind of 
rigidity and irrationality (which I would compare with the dogmas championed in 
authoritarian theologies) means that there is a sacred and therefore unassailable 
character from which taboos that cannot be infringed are promulgated. Those daring 
to suggest alternatives aimed at changes are regarded as dangerous or discounted 
as unrealistic .... (J. de Santa Ana cited in Mihevc 1995:31). 
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4.3.3 Dispensationa/ism 
One other of the basic features of fundamentalist thinking is known as 
dispensationalism. It is also a method of biblical interpretation. According to this method 
the history of the Bible is divided into dispensational epochs, as for instance, 
Innocence, Pre-Fall, Law, Promise, Reign of Christ. As Mihevc points out, "These 
dispensations are distinguished by a change in God's method of dealing with humanity. 
'Each of the dispensations may be regarded as a new test of the natural man [sic], and 
each ends in judgement-marking his utter failure in every dispensation"' (1995:32). 
Dispensationalism is also characteristic of its adherence to premillenialistic thinking. 
According to this thinking it is utter futility to try effecting social change because the end 
is near anyway. Christians ought to evangelise souls and never engage in socio-political 
activism. As Mihevc explains its thrust: "While it is not possible to transform a lost 
society one can convert individuals in that society to the ethic of individual 
industriousness and personal virtue" (1995:32). 
In their fundamentalist proceedings, the BWls have charged their policies with 
dispensationalist undertones. According to them, as Mihevc explains, "the African state 
is beyond redemption." Therefore, the only thing at hand, writes Mihevc, 
is to focus on few pockets of private industry in the continent and to bypass the state. 
This newly discovered problem provides a useful gloss for a sober assessment of the 
ability of SAPs to achieve their stated goals. Indeed, as SAPs continue not to work, 
the need to rediscover Africa's problems as rooted in the failure of its peoples and 
governments becomes increasingly necessary. By the end of the 1980s the World 
Bank had given up hope of converting African society and the state to the virtues of 
the free market and was content to save individual souls by encouraging investment 
in the private sector (1995:32). 
This idea of dispensationalism explains why the BWls have kicked the state out of the 
socio-economic scene, have ruthlessly opened up Mozambique for a new colonial 
plunder by foreign quick-profit seekers and pleasure hunters. Because the BWls 
institutions believe that Mozambique is beyond redemption, they maintain that if there is 
any hope for Mozambicans, then, it lies in private plundering by foreign "investors." 
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4.3.4 Theology of Sacrifice 
Theology of sacrifice is another powerful stronghold of fundamentalist thinking. And 
Mihevc confesses that it "is embedded in our Western Christian tradition" whereby "The 
crucifixion of Jesus stands as the central symbol for Christians of a self-sacrificing God 
offered up for the redemption of humanity." However this aspect is used to justify 
oppression. Unlike liberation theologians who see this self-sacrificing God as acting in 
empathy with those who suffer injustice at the hands of the more powerful and seeks to 
liberate them, the fundamentalist theology of sacrifice rather legitimises "suffering and 
oppression as part of God's inscrutable plan for the greater good of maintaining the 
divinely-willed existing social order. The poor are told that their poverty is their cross to 
bear and that their suffering will be redeemed in the world to come" (1995:33). 
According to Mihevc, fundamentalist theology of sacrifice plays an important role in the 
BWls' theology of SAPs and EST. He thus writes: 
SAPs are presented to African countries as a form of economic behaviour requiring 
sacrifice to the discipline of the market. This notion of sacrifice is also rooted in the 
assumption that sacrifices are required in order to pay off debts incurred in the past. 
In the theology of sacrifice the morality of debt servicing is inverted. In a process that 
sacrifices the lives of millions in the Third World to pay the debt, the moral question 
that takes precedence is the one which asks whether it is lawful not to pay debts; 
what will happen to the international order if suddenly debts no longer needed to be 
paid? (1995:33). 
It is this theology of sacrifice on which the BWls heavily rely to impose their policies 
upon Mozambique. These unscrupulous money dealers squeeze us too tightly and 
those who suffer the most (women and children) are cast over to the mercy of NGO 
officials who devise special alleviation programmes. But most are left to sheer 
accidental luck. Nevertheless, in the meantime the Mozambican economy-the BWls 
insist-"cannot escape the painful period of adjustment that is necessary before it can 
enter into the promised land of balanced budgets and high growth rates. This kind of 
expiatory theology ... is indicative of a cultic piety based on tribute, expiation, guilt and 
conformity." And those "who do not conform to the body of prevailing prescriptions are 
dangerous and unclean and must be readjusted to become acceptable" (Mihevc 
1995:33). When all theology of sacrifice is said and done in this way, "nothing is 
unlawful. Any human sacrifice, any violation of human rights is justified and no moral 
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conscience in the world can legitimately interfere," notes Hinkelammert (cited in Mihevc 
1995:34). 
4.3.5 Filling in the Gaps 
Another typical interpretative manoeuvre employed by fundamentalist theology is "the 
so-called gap theory, the practice of hypothesizing from what the Bible does not say in 
order to resolve textual difficulties." For example polygamy has been condemned and 
those who converted to Christianity as polygamous have been forced to divorce their 
other wives and remain with one. This was done on the basis that since the Bible does 
not say it is right, it clearly means it is wrong. In other words the Bible says polygamy is 
evil and forbidden by not saying that it is right. "This technique can degenerate rather 
quickly into disregard for determining the actual facts of the case, effectively closing off 
discussion once the main objective-the protection of inerrancy-has been achieved" 
(Boone in Mihevc 1995:35). So the real objective and agenda is not the logical 
coherency of the strained interpretation, but first and foremost the preservation of the 
doctrine of the text. 
This can clearly be seen in the BWls' defence of their positions, as Mihevc charges. The 
reason is that, he observes, "A closer examination of the African experience over the 
1980s reveals that the World Bank consistently ignored or manipulated the evidence 
relating to Africa's economic crisis in order to preserve the inerrancy of the doctrine of 
structural adjustment." To illustrate the BWls' use of the gap theory, he refers to studies 
done by the World Bank jointly with UNDP in 1988, Africa's Adjustment and Growth. 
According to Mihevc these institutions made successful and effective use of the gap 
theory. "The study crudely attempted to prove that African countries which were 
adopting SAPs were performing better than those which did not by means of very 
questionable statistical manipulations. The document demonstrates the value attached 
by the World Bank to preserving the inerrancy of the doctrine of structural adjustment" 
(Mihevc 1995:35). 
This explains why the free-marketeers have been aggressively promulgating the 
incredible "successes" of the Mozambican economy. Camara de Comercio Portugal 
Mot;ambique CCPM (Portuguese Mozambique Chamber of Commerce) is typical of this 
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practice. In its publications it conceals the fact that the IMF and WB are screwing 
Mozambicans too tightly and causing unbearable human sacrifices. It conceals the fact 
that foreign capital is plundering the country. It gives a truncated view of Mozambique's 
actuality. In Mozambique Nos. 21 and 22 issues, April and September 1999, it 
published information in which it completely lied, telling the world that Mozambique was 
performing better than ever, by means of very questionable statistical manipulations. 
Take for example the article Mozambique, A Rare Case of Success (Mot;ambique No 
22, September 1999:68-70), in which it gives a completely false picture of 
Mozambique's socio-economic conditions. It also mentions Portugal forgiving(!) some of 
Mozambique's debt. Not surprisingly CCPM is an agency deeply committed to promoting 
Portugal's private interests in Mozambique. 
4.3.6 Justification by Correct Statement 
The final technique in fundamentalist thinking is what is required to distinguish true 
adherents from those who have interpreted the text incorrectly. This is achieved by the 
use of "correct statement" (Mihevc 1995:35). This manoeuvre involves the use of 
"correct" "terminology, catch-phrases and principles in interpreting the text. Great care is 
taken to shield believers from the wrong words or combination of words for fear that 
exposure to them can destroy their faith" (Mihevc 1995:36). This kind of attitude toward 
any alternatives to structural adjustment put forward is clearly revealed in the recent 
writings of the BWls. For the BWls other alternatives are invalid because they do not 
use "correct" terminology. "These alternatives, to the extent that they are even 
acknowledged, are subjected to the test of justification of correct statement. Because 
these alternatives do not employ the correct terminology and catch-phases (such as 
adherence to the market, getting prices right) they fail to meet the standard of being 
considered as realistic or viable" (1995:36). Correct statement must be in line with the 
moral principles of the market ethic as explained above. Mihevc writes: 
The correct statements, in the development theology of the World Bank, champion 
the virtues of an individualistic, free enterprise "gospel of prosperity". This leads to a 
reductionist view of the human as homo economicus, the rational product of Western 
economic individualism. Many of the economic principles which form the basis of the 
World Bank's development theology are rooted in an ethical worldview predicated on 
extreme individualism. This extreme individualistic worldview grounds many of the 
ideals championed by the religious within the US (1995:36). 
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Thus the BWls believe that failure to succeed can only be explained by individual or 
government shortcomings and not the fault of the policies themselves. According to 
Mihevc, the BWls function no differently than the countless right-wing evangelical 
movements spreading the gospel of prosperity throughout Africa. The BWls simply 
ignore the political and economic reasons for so much poverty in Third World countries. 
It is also important to note that there are common interests of a particular elite group 
which cut across a number of institutions, think-tanks, transnational corporations 
(TNCs), and governments. They also cut across agencies like the BWls, NGOs such as 
World Vision, and many of the fundamentalist Christian churches. And one of the most 
fundamental characteristics of these fundamentalist bodies is lack of historical or 
sociological awareness and, of course, lack of institutional memory. As a result these 
bodies are so ruthless and uncritical in reading into the "theological doctrines" which 
were developed later. They uphold the status quo and take it as a given and not as a 
result of unjust historical processes. They fondle and bless it. They give thanks and 
praise to the Lord for it. 
In the final analysis, the BWls are, indeed, religious institutions, except that they are 
based on a "pseudoscientific fog of superstition," cold predisposition, blindness and 
ignorance, undemocratic and dictatorial spirit, cruelty and brutality and, therefore, are 
not the kind of desirable institutions for human beings. That is why Walter Russel Mead 
suggests: 
If we are going to have religions, then let us have real ones: religions based on things 
like love and human dignity, not on increasing the GDP .... We may not ever be able 
to build a positive science of economics based on empirical knowledge, but that is no 
reason to wrap the little we know in a pseudoscientific fog of superstition (cited in 
Mihevc 1995:39). 
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4.4 A Brief Moral Evaluation from an African Pespective 
In chapter one I presented an ethical theoretical framework for this study, that is, our 
recommended ethtcal social criteria on the basis of which development conditions in 
Mozambique were to be evaluated. Chapter two dealt with the "development of 
underdevelopment" and highlighted its main causes. Chapter three dealt with the 
economic reforms (SAPs and EST) designed to remedy the crisis. These reforms have 
resulted in the current negative socio-economic transformation. The question before us 
now is: Does the current socio-economic transformation in Mozambique measure up to 
ethically acceptable social criteria? To make this ethical appraisal we must summon the 
socio-ethical values contained in our theoretical frame of reference. 
4.4. 1 The Wholeness of Life 
If we consider our sense of the wholeness of life, with all its socio-ethical implications, 
the social circumstances created in Mozambique are very degrading, and constitute a 
human devaluation. They are a damning indictment on the competing actors in the 
economy. We have said that according to African custom religion is part of life, and it is 
all encompassing. In other words, all of life is sacred; it is tied up with religious and 
traditional values. Life must, therefore, be viewed as a whole. 
We May add that our sense of the wholeness of life is as much about the quantity as it 
is about the quality of life. Wholeness of life means that, even in affluent societies, 
development is not narrowly about having more as it is about being more in life. 
Development and reconstruction must, therefore, create social circumstances in which 
people will live not only quantitatively but also qualitatively: they must create social 
conditions in which people will not only have more but also, and in effect integrally, be 
more in life. Is this not what Jesus recaptures when he says, unlike thieves and thugs 
who come "but for to steal [from us], and to kill, and to destroy: I am come that [we] 
might have life, and that [we] might have it more abundantly"? (John 10:10). 
Writing on this subject, Denis Goulet accuses Western economists and technocrats of 
chopping down our life into pieces: "They analyze, prescribe, and act as if humans could 
live by bread alone, as if human destiny could be stripped down to its material 
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dimensions alone" (1995:205). Pursuing this subject further, Goulet points out that, 
"High indices of suicide in 'developed' countries hint at the truth that material 
[possessions] may be less essential-even for survival-than is the presence of 
meaning. . . . having a meaningful existence may well be the most basic of all human 
needs" (1995:206). Richard Falk has also asserted that "awe and mystery are as 
integral to human experience as bread and reason ... the future prospects of the human 
species depend upon internalizing an essentially religious perspective, sufficient to 
transform secular outlooks that now dominate the destiny of the planet" (quoted in 
Goulet 1995:206). 
There is perhaps nowhere in the world where these conceptions of life are better 
embedded than in our sense of the wholeness of life. If there are any people who 
believe in this very strongly, it is the African people. For them, life must be 
encompassed as a whole. However, our current social circumstances in Mozambique 
make it impossible for people to live life in its wholeness. With the lack of a living wage, 
we are surrounded by hunger and starvation. So life becomes a matter of petty 
economics. Life has been reduced to a mere flight from hunger and starvation to a 
chase after bread. People spend their time at work for another days' meal only to 
sustain their animal functions. They have no time left to spend with family, friends, and 
for recreation; or for cultivation of religion and culture, learning, researching, etc. Viewed 
through the lens of the wholeness of life, accordingly, current Mozambican socio-
economic transformation does not measure up to ethically acceptable social criteria. 
4.4.2 Human dignity 
When we consider human value or human dignity we are compelled to make harsh 
moral judgements about our social circumstances: people are reduced to a status less 
than they ought to be. As human beings, we have dignity because we are made in the 
divine image. Mozambican masses, however, are hardly treated as people made in the 
image of God, but rather as things made in the image of capitalists, technocrats, 
consultants, and money dealers, of the BWls. As Nyerere once said, "under present 
circumstances we are creatures, not of God, but of our fellow men [sic]" (1987:119). In 
the present social conditions, the Mozambican masses are more like animals than they 
are people. If one considers that civil servants cannot afford paying electricity, water, or 
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afford bread for more than ten days after earning the monthly salary-if one considers 
that it is considered "normal" for a person to be hired for a day's work just for only one 
meal-if one considers all these social predicaments and more, then it is clear how 
much our people have lost their dignity. It shows clearly how much of our dignity has 
been swallowed up by an unjust socio-economic system. It shows clearly what price 
people have to pay to maintain this social system. 
As I expressed to my friend my indignation at the extent to which people have been 
deprived of their dignity and no longer mind selling themselves to foreign capital to be 
used, misused, and abused, my friend said jokingly: "If dignity can't pay the bills, what 
do you do?" Implicitly he meant that obviously you trade it off! A person can be 
compelled to sell his/her birth right, his/her God-given gift, value and pride, so that s/he 
may eat, drink, pay electricity, water, and rent. Does development really mean that we 
must make a "cruel choice"1 between dignity and material prosperity? Does 
development mean that material prosperity cannot exist side by side with dignity? This is 
the extent to which our society has lost its moral sense. The fact that even all the 
decisions to take the people's land and give it to foreign capital are made without any 
prior dialogue or consultation with them is a clear negation of their dignity. 
4. 4. 3 Sense of Community 
If we consider our sense of community, the understanding that munhu i munhu hi 
vanwana vanhu, or motho ke motho ka batho babang, then it is obvious that we are 
currently becoming fragmented, alienated and made enemies to and against ourselves, 
as a result of an unscrupulous pursuit of individualistic self-interests and profits. "In our 
traditional societies each individual accepted that he could not do exactly what he 
wanted when he wanted, but that instead he had a loyalty to other members of his 
community" (Nyerere 1970:222). For to be human means to belong to the whole 
community. It also means human harmony with nature and the departed members of the 
family. It means "I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am." But current 
socio-economic transformations are undermining our sense of togetherness, they isolate 
us in order to better exploit us. Consequently it is also extremely difficult, if not 
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impossible, these days for people to live not only in community but also in harmony with 
nature. The socio-ethical values are brutally violated. 
4.4.4 Persona/ism 
These conditions also undermine the value of personalism embedded in our sense of 
community. Let us take, for instance, a nurse or a teacher who is not paid a living wage. 
She or He finds it extremely difficult to acknowledge the patient or the student as his or 
her brother or sister in community who must be treated as a person. The patient is now 
treated as a source of income who deserves to die if she or he does not pay the bribe. 
The student is now an enemy who, although brilliant and a genius, deserves to fail if 
s/he does not pay the bribe. The spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood is dying out. What 
prevails instead is disregard of personhood. The inversion of values is the order of the 
day: Instead of loving people and using things for the sake of people, there is love of 
things and the use of people for the sake of things. On the surface there is social 
disintegration, as we saw in chapter three, which results on the deeper level from the 
inversion of socio-ethical values. 
4.4. 5 Liberation 
If we also consider our situation and the need for liberation, we come to understand that 
there is no intention or agenda for liberation on the part of the aggressive actors in the 
economy. It seems that the real purpose is to subjugate and subject us further to re-
colonisation. Take for instance the claims of Portugal that it has forgiven(!) some of our 
debt(!); and consider the blatant plunder of the country by foreign capital. Consider also 
that the government has been weakened and kicked out of the economy, and now left 
unable to inspect the movement and activities of foreigners in the country. With their 
unrestrained power, the BWls have constantly and systematically been ignorant about 
our historical and social situation. They have always shown voluntary and stubborn lack 
of historical consciousness and institutional memory. This can only lead to further 
oppression because our poverty and oppression is framed into an ideological value 
system of the oppressors. In so doing our social context is systematically disregarded or 
See Goulet, Denis 1975. The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development. 
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trivialised and thereby our liberation is rendered impossible or labellied as a utopian 
dream. 
The aggressive economic agents have never shown a preferential option for the poor 
and oppressed, as required by liberation ethics. Since the current socio-economic 
processes never take the state of domination and dependency as their starting point, 
they can be of no use to us. A development ethic which takes the status quo as a given, 
and not as a result of unjust historical processes, cannot claim to be advocating for the 
interests of the downtrodden Mozambican masses. 
4.4. 6 Other Values 
In the current socio-economic processes the aggressive manipulators of Mozambican 
economy have not shown any sympathy or benevolence toward the Mozambican 
masses. There has been no sensitivity toward the current human sacrifices and concern 
for the well-being of the masses. Fairness and duty are hardly part of the moral rules in 
the current social circumstances. In the present social conditions the economic actors 
have not shown any commitment to the responsibilities entrusted to them in the 
Mozambican social contract. What is morally outrageous is not only that the poor suffer 
in such conditions, but also the extent to which the rich (nations and individuals, 
nationally and internationally) have become so inhuman that they no longer have any 
human feeling. They are emotionally empty, to such an extent that they have lost the 
ability to be moved by extreme human sacrifice and strife. It has thus become "normal" 
for a person to watch others die of hunger and disease while he or she is extremely rich, 
even if they die precisely as a direct result of his or her acquisition of these riches; or 
even if they die exactly because I have been sucking them directly or indirectly in order 
to get those riches. The poor, indeed, have become animals; but the rich have become 
even worse: they have become cannibals. 
Since the current wild economic liberalisation (with its underlying ethos as advocated by 
the belligerent economic actors in Mozambique) presently subjects human beings to 
indignity-that is, turns them into entities less and other than what they are themselves, 
New York: Atheneum. 
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turns them into slaves of impersonal laws of the market and inhuman GDP growth, 
fragments their life and makes it unworthy of living-the current socio-economic 
transformations do not measure up to ethically acceptable social criteria. If we take a 
serious consideration of what life means in African understanding, we may conclude that 
the kind of reconstruction and development currently carried out in Mozambique 
constitutes an extremely damning socio-ethical indictment to the actors in the economy. 
To summarise, the market-or First World-ethics and the fundamentalist spirit in the 
modus operandi of SAPs and EST constitute the National Reconstruction and 
Development Pitfalls in Mozambique. 
4.5 Toward a Development Ethic for Meaningful and Just Reconstruction and 
Development 
It is important first to note the need to recognise the bankruptcy of the Western 
fundamentalist theology of development embedded in the SAPs and EST of the BWls. It 
is also important to recognise that Western conventional ethics, moral philosophies and 
theologies have generally asked moral questions irrelevant to our situation, and have 
almost always answered questions that our situation does not ask (Tutu 1987:52). In his 
The Challenge of World Poverty, Gunner Myrdal articulated the biases, opportunism, 
and self-interests of Western theories of development and underdevelopment, implying 
their impossible universality. He thus declares: 
It is my view that our conceptions of underdevelopment, development and 
development planning as presented in most of the scientific and popular economic 
literature and, still more ominously, in the Plans of underdeveloped countries, is 
heavily biased in a direction that is basically opportunistic. Our policy conclusions, 
therefore, are founded upon ideas about reality that are systematically, though 
unintentionally, falsified. 
This should not be surprising. There is a tendency for all knowledge, like all 
ignorance, to deviate from truth in an opportunistic direction (Myrdal 1970:21, italics in 
the original). 
We need to refuse that the Washington DC fundamentalist right wing dogmas inherent 
in the SAPs and EST of the BWls should resolve our problems. The BWls' technocrats 
and money dealers have always related to us basically through tight squeezes. Our 
remedy does not lie in the heads of Western academicians or expatriate researchers, or 
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in the mercy of NGO officials, or donor community. We need to reject the market ethic 
because it relies solely on self-interest, quick and easy profit, individualism, anti-human 
efficiency, illusory neutrality, and inhuman hypergrowthmania. We must wage war 
against these evils. 
Already in the 1950s the same Gunner Myrdal could tell of the bankruptcy of Western 
economics and its inability to meet the demands of Third World Countries. Shocked by 
world poverty, and overwhelmed with consuming frustration, he stated that it would be 
best if Third World people themselves did the thinking and mended for themselves as 
they saw fit. This is what he said: 
In this epoch of the Great Awakening, it would be pathetic if young economists in the 
underdeveloped countries got caught in the predilections of the economic thinking in 
the advanced countries, which were hampering the scholars there in their efforts to 
be rational but would be almost deadening to the intellectual strivings of these in the 
underdeveloped countries. 
I would, instead, wish them to have the courage to throw away large structures of 
meaningless, irrelevant, and sometimes blatantly inadequate doctrines and 
theoretical approaches and to start their thinking afresh from a study of their own 
needs and problems (in Meier & Seers, eds. 1984:20). 
It is surely true. The Portuguese taught Mozambicans long ago that if they behaved well, 
sacrificed themselves, lived as though they were Portuguese, and called their languages 
linguas de caes (or languages of dogs) and their traditions and wise elders 
ultrapassados (or outdated), they would surely become Portuguese themselves one 
day. As people with amazing faith, Mozambicans still hold on to this promise so fondly 
and dearly. This is especially true of those Mozambicans living in Maputo. President 
Thabo Mbeki refers to them when he says: 
[T]hese see themselves having greater affinity with the former colonial power than 
with the villages from which they originate and where their extended families still live. 
They accept assimilation into the culture, the language, the mores and society of the 
coloniser as a mark of progress and civilisation (27 September 1999). 
Mozambicans have be.come unaware of the unsearchable moral riches which lie 
unexplored in their African heritage. Perhaps we should begin to think that God is angry 
with us for demonising our traditions. The reason is that God seems to say to us, "Get 
up, Mozambicans. Kill and eat" from your tradition. And we say in return, "Surely not, 
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Lord! We have never eaten anything impure or unclean." But this same Lord charges us 
not to "call anything impure that God has made clean." I am saying that if we are to find 
solutions to our development problems we are to turn to the wisdom of our elders, we 
are to drink deep from the wells of African heritage. As Boesak said, in this search we 
"have to drink deep from the well of African tradition, to use what is good and 
wholesome for contemporary society." As Africans we must "sincerely believe that it is 
possible to recapture what was sacred in African community long before white people 
came-solidarity, respect for life, humanity, and community. It must be possible not only 
to recapture, but to enhance it and bring it to fruition in contemporary society" (Boesak 
1981:152). 
T. S. Maluleke (1996:9) also echoes the same point when he says, "Are we standing at 
the dawn of yet another round of Western arrogance in this era? If so, Black and African 
theologians will have to re-discover and clean up their own wells for they will have little 
choice but to drink from those." He later on makes the same remark, "I think that what 
Africa will need is the ability to drink from our own wells as it were" (1996:17). The late 
Dr Nyerere died hammering the same point: development "must come out of our own 
roots, not through the grafting on those roots of something which is alien to our society .. 
. . we cannot adopt any political 'holy book' and try to implement its rulings-with or 
without revision." He then goes on to say, "social change will be determined by our own 
needs as we see them, and in direction to what we feel to be appropriate for us at any 
particular time .... we start from a full acceptance of our African-ness and a belief that 
in our own past there is very much which is useful for our future" (1970:316). Known to 
be a zealous advocate of the African Renaissance, Mbeki said further that if we are to 
resolve the problems of poverty and oppression in this continent "we must get ourselves 
into the right frame of mind." And this means: 
We are Africans! 
We are not American! 
We are not British! 
We are not German! 
We are not French! 
We are not Belgian! 
We are Africans! 
[And for the sake of my fellow Mozambicans 
I would add: 
We are not Portuguese! 
We are Africans!] 
(T. Mbeki, 27 September 1999, in Dar Es Salaam) 
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This catechism has powerful theological over- and undertones. It has far-reaching and 
permeating socio-ethical implications for the development of our people. Uncritical 
consumption of Portuguese cultural and linguistic dross has caused Mozambicans 
cultural and identity amnesia. And it has happened at great cost. Denis Goulet 
acknowledges the importance of treating cultural values non-instrumentally. He writes: 
[T]raditional values harbour within them a latent dynamism which, when properly 
respected, can serve as the springboard for modes of development that are more 
humane than those derived from outside paradigms. When development builds on 
indigenous values, it exacts lower social costs and imposes less human suffering and 
cultural destruction than when it copies outside models. This is so because 
indigenous values are the matrix from which people derive meaning in their lives, a 
sense of identity and cultural integrity, and the experience of continuity with their 
environment and their past--this even in the midst of change. A non-instrumental 
treatment of values draws its development goals from within the value system to 
which living communities adhere (Goulet 1995:210). 
But with our deep and uncompartmentalised religiosity and sense of wholeness of life, 
our sense of humanity and community, our natural commitment to upholding human 
dignity, it is easier for us to think of economics as part of our religion and live as though 
all of life were sacred. African women have made themselves clear on this point. As 
Odudoye declares: 
What has economics to do with Christianity? some may ask, forgetting that God is an 
economist. We are part of God's household and elements in God's housekeeping. 
Indeed as stewards of creation we cannot separate economics from theology .... 
The least in God's economy is always at the centre. In God's economy the margins 
are more important than the centre. Should Churches of Africa not take up the 
economic concerns of women and other church people? (cited in Mihevc 1995:264). 
Erika Marke has also declared: 
From women's perspective, a new understanding of development has to follow the 
vision of a just, peaceful and sustainable society whose primary concern is to care for 
the integrity of creation. As a result of their specific history, the gender-related role 
assigned to them by patriarchy, and knowledge and experiences gathered from that, 
women can take the lead in concretizing this vision (in Mihevc 1995:268). 
Still another has unwaveringly asserted that: 
[l]t is crucial to note that the African woman's ethical vision is rooted in African culture 
and spirituality which helps Africans to organise attitudes of resistance to repression 
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and rejection. It is within these organizations or basic communities that we find little 
steps of liberation (Njogore in Mihevc 1995:268). 
The Western pool of ideologies is illusory to Africans and fails to live up to the African 
understanding of life and pressing demands. That is why BWls would have us think of 
economics as a value-free discipline unrelated to social justice (who dares to say 
Africans think that way!). As J. De Santa Ana asserts: 
At present the prevailing "scheme" is administered by the IMF and the World Bank. 
The real power is in the hands of the international bourgeoisie, especially those 
working with finance capital. This is where the violence is really centred in our time. 
The appearances may not seem to justify that statement. Yet it is in the hush of 
elegant drawing rooms where plush carpets muffle the tread of footsteps that the 
most violent actions affecting the life of peoples are devised. It is in places like this 
that the economic readjustments are imposed and they do not give life but take it 
away from the poorest sectors. This is where injustice is administered under the 
pretext that economic practice has nothing to do with social justice but is meant to 
generate wealth (as though the one were not closely linked to the other!) (cited in 
Mihevc 1995:35). 
Now this is the modern economic system which allows the obscenely rich to co-exist 
beside the starving person, which we Africans must resist and must-with our religious 
understanding and sense of the wholeness of life-morally judge and theologically 
describe it as the "reign of Baal and not Yahweh." 
As Africans we must think and mend for ourselves. And in this sense our hope lies in 
our transformation and cleansing from a delusional mode of thinking and ideologies that 
we have often accepted uncritically as impartial knowledge. We must drop the religiosity 
of poverty and the theology of passivity that we have inherited from Western 
fundamentalist Christianity. Our hope for reconstruction and development with a human 
face in Mozambique lies in our genuine religiosity. As Godfrey Mwereria declares: 
Paradoxically, the most powerful instruments that Africa has in the resolving of the 
debt crisis are theological instruments rather than economic instruments. The crucial 
agenda implied in this theological task is a reconstruction of an African political 
theology that becomes the basis of African normative political economy, collective 
self-reliance and theology of development. This political theology should be based on 
African people's history, culture, anthropology, ontology and praxis. The essential 
elements and structures in the process of reconstructing African political theology 
should include: • Rediscovery of popular religiosity of the African people that 
transcends institutionalized and denominationalized religion. • Rediscovery of critical 
and political theology and faith that will bring about the birth of a new consciousness 
of faith, the true metanoia which stems from solidarity with people's praxis. • 
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Rediscovery of the theology of development which becomes the basis of people's 
struggling, mobilizing and renewing faith (cited in Mihevc 1995:241). 
In terms of liberation, the pioneers in the days of revolutionary struggle have 
emphasised political liberation. They did so because the times and historical 
circumstances required that they do so. While we still must emphasise the liberation 
motif of our development ethics, today, however, the circumstances require that we shift 
gears and put stress on the need for socio-economic liberation. Our ethics today must 
be coloured by the concerns of Mozambican women and men who are engaged in 
struggle against the BWls' SAPs and EST in order to make life most fulfilling for 
themselves. In terms of our historical consciousness and African perspective of life, our 
ethics must serve our needs by promoting certain forms of human activities while 
suppressing others which are regarded as unsupportive of our fuller humanisation. 
In articulating our ethical positions we must take to task the Mozambican Government 
officials and ministers for their abuse and misuse of power to gain undue wealth and 
advantages for themselves, their relatives and friends by illegal or immoral means 1. 
They are the ones who are so eager to maintain the link with the colonial power through 
the export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods (whose consumers it 
is they) as well as an intolerable debt burden which ensures that the poor are squeezed 
while exporting inordinate piles of capital to the rich countries of the North. In these 
manoeuvres they exercise power "accompanied by abstruse, solemn and meaningless 
state rituals, at times buttressed by the integration of fear-inducing superstitions within 
these rituals, to ensure that a great gulf is maintained between the rulers and the ruled" 
(Mbeki 27 Sep., 1999). 
D 
1 Corruption has reached intolerable proportions within the government., and it causes 
vulnerability to the population. As Savana (March 11, 2000) editorial said: "it is not always by 
lack of internal material conditions that the country always throws shameful appeals to the 
International Community to come here and do what we ourselves, most of the time, should 
be doing with our own means .... For example, the money that the government squandered at 
the end of last year purchasing 'four by four - discovery' to award each of the leaving 
ministers was enough to buy some good helicopters [and boats] to rescue the victims of the 
floods .... That is, if there were a different attitude, we would have, at this stage, a good 
national infrastructure to intervene in dramatic situations, as is the case with these floods and 
earth-quakes. But, since the attitude does not exist, vulnerability will continue.... (my 
translation, see also MediaFax, March 16, 2000). 
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The quest for a development ethic for just reconstruction and development can only lead 
to a meaningful solution if, and only if, our ethics draws heavily from our African 
heritage. This includes several things. We must (1) uphold our sense of the wholeness 
of life; (2) affirm human dignity and equality; (3) honour our sense of community and 
humanity: Motho ke motho ka batho babang; (4) our development ethics must 
unwaveringly continue to stress the theme of liberation as its final goal. To do this, at 
least three conditions must be met: i) hold onto the motif of "historical consciousness" 
(Maimela 1993:54-56) or historical materialism that ethics, just as all social structures 
are human creations, has always been human work which is grounded in and reflects 
human historical events and experiences of a particular people; ii) stress the social 
context of our people; iii) take seriously the preferential option for the poor and 
oppressed-just as the God of the Bible does- as our point of departure in articulating 
our ethical treatise. And we must make up our minds and bring all these to their logical 
conclusions and implications. If we do this rather than accepting the dogmas of the 
BWls' market ethic, I think we will have a meaningful national reconstruction and 
development programme in Mozambique. 
4.6 Conclusion: Nyandhayeyo hi ta ya ka mani? 
Nyandhayeyo! Hi ta ya ka mani? (Help! To whom shall we Go?). This is a Tsonga 
expression and it is uttered in its abbreviated form: Nyandha. Nyandha is a cry of 
desperation. It conveys despair, distress and hopelessness. A person utters this 
expression at the highest pitch of his or her voice. He or She summons all the energy 
and power that s/he can possibly afford to utter the Nyandhayeyo cry. She or He 
screams it loud, hoping that somebody-anybody-will come to his/her rescue. The 
Nyandhayeyo is uttered when a person is confronted with disaster or extreme danger, 
being almost face to face with death. 
An attentive observer can read the Nyandhayeyo expression in the eyes of the people of 
Mozambique. It is written in huge capital letters all over their faces. They display it in all 
aspects of life. When they talk, what really comes out is the expression of 
Nyandhayeyo. Nyandhayeyo is an expression of a dilemma. It is a cry of distress, a cry 
of danger. It is an expression of fear of death. In short, Nyandhayeyo is a call for help. 
The poor cry out as they get poorer while the rich get richer. They cry out loud as the 
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wages decrease while the economy "grows." They scream it until their throats get sore 
as the IMF and the Bank screw them tighter and tighter. They scream because the old 
demon has returned to haunt them: Ripe Colonialism 
Although the following poem is a protest against African women's oppression by SAPs, 
-through its emotive and functional genre- it recaptures in quite concise and precise 
terms the mood of the Nyandhayeyo cry of Mozambique's people amid SAPs and 
EST's squeezes: 
The Story of Women 
The story of women and economic justice 
is a story of life and death 
A story about endless agonies 
A story about managing the unmanageable 
A story of endless hours of work and toil 
A story of sleepless nights 
A story about destitution, squalor and neglect 
A story of hearing about policies 
that determine our lives but never being 
there to participate 
A story of the voiceless and powerless 
A story of trials and temptations 
A story of lost personalities and dignity 
A story of survival behind battle fronts 
as women and children flee bomb raids 
A story of structural, emotional and physical violence. 
A story of struggle and humiliation 
A story of dreams and visions unfulfilled 
A story of hope 
A story of combat and resistance 
A story of withdrawal from structures of exploitation 
A story of innovation and creativity 
A story of breaking new frontiers for survival 
A story of heroic people marching to 
the future with new alternatives for 
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the survival of the human race 
Agnes Chepkwony Aboum 
Taken from The Market Tells Them So (J Mihevc 
1995:269) 
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Chapter Five 
Summary and Conclusions 
We have come to the end of our critical analysis and evaluation of the Mozambican 
national development and reconstruction and their respective socio-economic aftermath. 
The Portuguese colonial system initiated and perpetuated the continuous existence of 
an economic system which systematically plundered Mozambique. This economic 
system was designed in such a way that Mozambique could not compete with but feed 
the Portuguese economy. Portugal created conditions and a spirit of chronic 
dependence which could reproduce and (re)enforce themselves on a sustainable 
fashion. Despite some successful reforms after independence, Frelimo could not 
reverse or brake this vicious cycle, for Mozambique continued to be dependent upon 
those economic mechanisms created by colonialism. Mozambique continued to produce 
what it did not consume and to consume what it did not produce. It exported men to 
South African mines for revenue; produced raw material for exportation; and depended 
largely upon foreign capital. 
After independence, Frelimo partly failed to dismantle the colonial apparatus it inherited 
from the colonial master and to replace it with a just government. Structures of colonial 
economy were not eliminated and, in fact, most of them still exist. Decolonisation was 
not completed. Having come from the jungle, Frelimo was soon deep in administration 
nightmares, which were aggravated by the flight of many skilled Portuguese, and by the 
fact that the colonial system had systematically denied the right of education to 
Mozambicans. There simply were not enough skilled personnel to run the newly 
independent country. 
In any event, Frelimo made some successful reforms especially in education and health 
systems which had received no attention during colonialism. These, however, were 
short lived. Rename had begun its destabilising operations. Backed by former Rhodesia 
and, later on, by South Africa (sometimes with South Africa's direct involvement), 
Rename managed to bring the national economy down to its knees. Further, working 
hand in glove with the donor governments, many foreign NGOs (or the aid or poverty 
industry, as they have recently come to be known) functioned in a destabilising manner. 
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As contractors to donor governments, they either used aid for political concessions or 
ran faster than the government in order to isolate and discredit it. The landing of aid 
itself in Mozambique was wrought in a destabilising manner. One bad result of these 
manoeuvres was the fuelling of corruption and the cultivation of hunger for luxurious 
consumer goods which, in turn, prompted disastrous consequences. The whole 
destabilisation mission was successfully accomplished. The final goals of destabilisation 
were achieved with great efficiency, costing Mozambique over US$ 20 billion worth in 
damages. 
SAPs and EST were purported to be put in place for the first time in 1987, at the peak 
of the war. The fact that, in those years, Mozambique was a war economy was 
completely ignored and provisions for defence were not made. Hence Rename 
sabotaged humanitarian projects. SAPs and EST were intensified after the war, 
implementing unconditionally the whole package of pre-tailored policies imposed by the 
BWls. 
SAPs and EST were put into place in order to stimulate and unleash development and 
reconstruction. However, the result was the worsening of the Mozambican socio-
economic conditions. The fact that Mozambique is a post-war economy was deliberately 
pushed aside. Quite naturally and of course, this added to the growing of corruption, 
opportunism, social instability and insecurity, exploitation of the poor, ripe racism and 
injustice, as witnessed in chapter three. National development and reconstruction 
programmes were abandoned along the way and left to the mercy and imperatives of 
the market. The market now, indeed, "tells them so." It dictates how the national 
resources should be allocated. There is not a single comprehensive, coherent, 
systematic and well organised development or reconstruction plan. Development and 
reconstruction are now left to ad hoc projects. How can we develop or reconstruct this 
country through arbitrary projectisation? Further, the growing dependence and 
impoverishment in which the majority of Mozambicans are damned to live are benefiting 
a few people who would not like to see progressive changes. Internationally, the certain 
beneficiaries are the share-holders, technocrats, etc. of the BWls, the donor community 
and the poverty industry. Locally, the so-called "development" benefits exclusively the 
morally bankrupt Mozambican government and a few private individuals. 
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We have argued that under the present socio-economic circumstances, the final 
objectives seem to be contrary to what is the general claim of those who are in power. 
The objectives are hardly genuine development and reconstruction. There is a tendency 
to further disintegrate the Mozambican society, turn Mozambicans into prisoners of the 
earth for efficient exploitation, re-institutionalise socio-economic (even cultural) 
enslavement, re-colonise in order to feed Western economies, create a climate 
favourable to importing dirty and over-valued Western industry, and forge a new market 
for Western luxurious consumer goods, seeing that they are now hardly marketable in 
the saturated Western markets. We have argued that these conditions are immoral and 
have attributed the root cause to the market ethics on which the whole process of socio-
economic transformation is based. 
At the bottom of all these socio-economic circumstances lie the market ethics and the 
fundamentalist spirit by dint of which Western interests take precedence over reason as 
the modus vivendi; and dictate the modus operandi of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund in formulating and imposing their policies and position 
without accountability for the social aftermath. We have argued that this can hardly be 
justified as an appropriate approach for a meaningful national development and 
reconstruction programme. The reason, as we have just witnessed, is that the whole 
approach is based upon perverted socio-ethical grounds. Consequently, it fails to be 
morally justifiable. It does not measure up to ethically acceptable social criteria. 
Having disapproved of this approach, we have argued, in turn, that the first stride toward 
a meaningful development and reconstruction programme is to accept the moral 
bankruptcy of Western ideologies and its inability and failure to address our problems 
meaningfully. In fact, the very fact that we have suffered intolerable socio-economic, as 
well as political, atrocities can mainly be blamed upon our quick and often uncritical 
acceptance and consumption of Western ideological dross and their assumptions of 
exclusive superiority over the non-western world, and the consequent denial of our own 
traditional wisdom-a noble legacy-that our blessed ancestors have passed on to us. 
By refusing to acknowledge the ties that bind us (our sense of being) to the soul of 
Mother Africa, we have cast a spell of damnation onto ourselves. We cannot keep on 
blaming others. To a certain degree, we have been and we are the masters of our own 
lives and destinies. To some extent we do auto-determine ourselves. 
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We have also highlighted the need to respect, recognise, and embrace what is naturally 
ours: the African Heritage. An appropriate approach for a meaningful development and 
reconstruction programme will only be possible within the nobility of the African 
Heritage. As we have witnessed in chapter one, African Heritage is heavily loaded with 
latent and unexplored potential to fuel, unleash, and drive a meaningful socio-economic 
well-being with less ambiguities. There is the need to accept ourselves candidly just as 
we are and just as we have been meant to be by the Divine will: We are Africans! Is 
development about becoming less and less African (i.e. denying ourselves) and 
becoming more and more Euro-American? 
The point is, the quest for a development ethic for meaningful development is possible 
only if, and only if, our ethics retrieves and drinks heavily from the deep wells of African 
wisdom. The wholeness of life would guard against any tendencies of 
compartmentalising life between the sacred and the secular and the danger of turning 
life into a collection of unrelated bits and fragments. For the African Heritage recognises 
that no human being shall live by bread alone. The sense of community, respect for 
humanity, guards against the tendencies to treat human beings as means to ends. The 
high regard of human dignity discourages any tendencies to create social circumstances 
which dehumanise human beings and remove the crown with which they have been 
divinely created. Given the oppressive nature of our socio-economic existence in time 
and space, we hold that liberation must be constantly stressed as our goal. In this 
process, our development ethics must uphold historical materialism, and acknowledge 
that ethics is also a human creation and is grounded upon and reflects human historical 
events and experiences of a particular people. Therefore, development ethics must 
stress the social context of our people. It must deliberately take sides with the poor and 
oppressed rather than ignore their conditions of poverty and oppression and the search 
for meaningful solutions within the ideological framework of the rich and the powerful. 
When all is said and done, we would finally add that if the world were not governed by 
the first born of evil but by sound morals, then, no country would claim debt servicing 
from Mozambique without doing gross violation to the human rights of the Mozambican 
people. If international politics operated on sound morals and justice, then, it would not 
be Mozambique that owes Portugal, not Mozambique that owes the donor community, 
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not Mozambique that owes the BWls, not Africa that owes the West, not the South that 
owes the North, not the poor that owe the rich, but actually always the latter owing the 
former. If the princes of evil were not in power within Mozambican politics, then our 
socio-economic conditions would be better than they are right now. Socio-historical 
amnesia, lack of socio-historical consciousness and lack of institutional memory have 
always victimised and led to the blaming of the poor and oppressed (countries and 
individuals alike). If we seriously consider the socio-historical reality in which the world is 
(in the present) and has been (in the past), that is, if we are true to history, there is only 
one perfectly clear, logical and inevitable conclusion. The very same history bedevils the 
West/North; the West/North is heavily implicated and guilty of continued international 
injustice against the poor; the West/North is indelibly indebted to Africa (or to the South). 
Mozambicans, as well as Africans in general, are at the harshest receiving end of the 
international injustice which is orchestrated by the West. 
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